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Abstract
This thesis provides a philosophical account of the morality of extraterritorial 
punishment. The introduction clarifies the methodology by putting forward an 
analytical account o f moral rights and endorsing the interest-based theory o f rights, and 
presents a normative appraisal of the moral significance of political boundaries. Chapter 
1 presents an innovative interest-based justification for the right to punish. Chapter 2 
examines the extraterritorial scope of this right to punish with regards to domestic 
offences. It argues that the justification here advocated is the best suited to account for 
the strong intuition that the right to punish should be primarily territorial in scope, and 
provides a critique o f the principles for states’ power to punish offences committed 
extraterritorially currendy in force under international law. The next part of the thesis 
focuses on extraterritoriality in the context of international criminal law. Chapter 3 
argues that the defining feature o f the concept o f an international crime is that it 
warrants conferring upon some extraterritorial body the power to punish their 
perpetrators regardless of the nationality of both offender and victim. Chapter 4 
provides a fresh look at universal and international jurisdiction, i.e., at the theoretical 
explanation for the proposition that every state should have the right to punish 
international crimes and the scope of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court. Chapter 5 provides a theory of legitimate authority to punish offenders. It relies 
on an innovative application of the influential service conception of authority to this 
specific question and permits a philosophical examination of issues such as show trials, 
victor’s justice, tu quoque, and trials in absentia or against defendants who have been 
abducted abroad. A conclusion summarizes the central findings of the thesis and 
suggests possible avenues for future research.
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Introduction
“the justice of each nation ought in general to be 
confined to the punishment of crimes committed on 
its own territories”
Emmerich de Vattel, 1758.
1. The morality of extraterritorial punishment
This thesis is concerned with providing a normative theory of extraterritorial 
punishment. Extraterritoriality is a feature that is deeply entrenched in the practice of 
legal punishment. For one, states often claim the right to punish certain offences 
provided under their own domestic laws even when they are committed outside their 
territorial boundaries. Many states, for instance, claim the right to punish certain 
offences committed by or against their own nationals on the territory of a foreign 
state.1 Similarly, states often criminalize conduct such as the counterfeiting of their 
currency, espionage or treason regardless o f where they happen to be performed. 
International Law recogizes states these extraterritorial powers. In short, then, although 
domestic criminal law is usually regarded as primarily territorial in its application, these 
types of provisions are fairly standard in the vast majority o f states.
Moreover, since the end of WW2, but crucially since the end o f the Cold War there 
has been a significant development in the practice of extraterritorial punishment for 
crimes provided under international law. Many individuals have been prosecuted in 
different parts of the world for crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, etc. 
before domestic, international, or ‘hybrid’ tribunals which were often enough located 
outside the territorial boundaries o f the state in which the offences were perpetrated. 
Paradigmatic examples of this trend, and of the difficulties it creates, are the current 
proceedings against Omar Al-Bashir, standing President of Sudan, before the
1 For instance, under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 English and Welsh courts hold the right to punish 
English or Welsh nationals or residents who commit certain offences, e.g., in a trip to South-East Asia. 
Similarly, under article 113-7 o f its Penal Code, France claims jurisdiction over any felony committed 
anywhere in the world when the victim is a French national at the time the offence took place.
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International Criminal Court in The Hague, and the extradition proceedings against 
former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet in the UK.
Finally, the issue of extraterritorial punishment is of pressing importance in certain 
debates on criminal justice in the context of globalization. The clearest example is 
perhaps that of transnational terrorism. To illustrate, the U.S. currently holds several 
hundred people detained in Guantanamo and other foreign prisons. A crucial 
underlying claim in this situation is that the U.S. holds the right to punish these 
individuals even if the acts for which they would be punished were committed outside 
its territory. Several of the normative claims made in this context have been applied, 
mutatis mutandis to other phenomena such as transnational organized crime, including 
drug-trafficking, cybercrime, trafficking in human beings, etc.
For some reason, however, extraterritoriality has not received much attention from 
either people working on the philosophy of international law or on the justification for 
legal punishment. It has also been entirely neglected by the literature on global justice.2 
This gap in the literature is a significant one. First, because as I shall argue in this thesis, 
providing a philosophical account of extraterritorial punishment both sheds new light 
on, and challenges, some widely held positions regarding the appropriate scope of the 
right to punish. And also, because it confronts debates concerning the justification for 
legal punishment with an important problem that challenges the normative and 
explanatory force of the leading arguments in the field. The aim of this thesis is, 
therefore, to provide a convincing normative account o f the issue o f extraterritorial 
punishment; but also to steer current debates on criminal justice and the philosophy of 
punishment in new and pressing directions, bringing them more in line with issues such 
as globalization, the emergence of transnational crime, terrorism, war, and the 
responses to mass atrocities.
2 See, e.g., Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: A  Global Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005) and Thomas Pogge, Global Justice (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), Thomas Nagel, 'The Problem o f  
Global Justice1, Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2005), John Rawls, The Taw of Peoples With "The Idea of 
Public Treason Revisited" (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1999) and Thom Brooks, ed., The 
GlobalJustice Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).
Having introduced the central issue this thesis will be concerned with, three 
important points of clarification are in order. First, this thesis will provide a 
philosophical examination o f the moral justification for the laws regulating 
extraterritorial punishment. It is neither a black letter law analysis of what legal rules are 
currendy in force, nor an abstract normative account which purports to come up with 
an entirely innovative set o f principles that should regulate the practice of 
extraterritorial punishment. This account builds on current widely endorsed legal rules 
and practices, but stands apart from them by examining the moral principles on the 
basis of which they can be justified. To conduct this enquiry I will use the method of 
‘reflective equilibrium’ or ‘coherence model’.3 I start with a set o f moral principles that I 
consider reliable. These are neither simple moral intuitions, nor mere personal 
preferences. They are normative considerations for which I will argue in some detail. 
On the basis of these principles, I will assess the morality o f the basic rules governing 
extraterritorial punishment under international and domestic criminal law. It is likely 
that some principles have such normative force that they will make us revise certain 
standard legal practices; but it is also likely that some established legal rules are seen as 
so fundamental as to count against certain o f these principles. The coherence method 
entails going back and forth between the basic principles and the established set of 
rules and practices until we reach a perfect fit between basic reliable principles and 
morally justified legal rules, namely, a point of ‘reflective equilibrium’. This method 
assumes that readers will “be willing to modify or relinquish some of their beliefs if 
they could be shown that by so doing, they would strengthen the support for others 
that are more fundamental, and increase internal coherence generally.”4
Second and somewhat relatedly, this thesis takes as a given that the world is 
divided into states, which are territorial units with their own political organization and a
3 See John Rawls, A. Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1999) and Norman Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics', The Journal 
of Philosophy 75, no. 5 (1979). For applications o f this method in criminal law theory see Joel Feinberg, 
The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law /  Vol. 1, Harm to Others (New York ; Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1984); this is also similar to the methodology in Duff, Tadros, etc Antony D uff et al., The Trial on 
Trial Vol. 3, Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal Trial (Oxford: Hart, 2007).
4 Feinberg, Harm to Others, 18.
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more or less permanent population. It will also acknowledge the existence of 
international criminal tribunals and other forms of supranational arrangements. This 
thesis is not about devising a new set o f institutions that would best tackle the problem 
of criminality in its current forms and varieties. There are good reasons to address the 
empirical context in which a normative argument is made, since even though normative 
claims and factual conditions belong to different levels o f discourse, they are not 
entirely unrelated. For a start, that context constitutes an exogenous limitation that links 
the argument to a certain state of affairs. Moreover, factual conditions do raise 
normative questions. Accordingly, I readily admit that the normative issue of 
extraterritoriality as examined here stems from the fundamental fact that the world is 
politically divided into states. However, I will not put this form of organization into 
question, but rather work within its framework in order to develop a consistent moral 
argument able to account convincingly for most o f our core intuitions regarding the 
practice o f extraterritorial punishment.
Thirdly, I need to somewhat isolate the specific normative question I will 
concentrate on from other, closely related issues. Ultimately, any justification for legal 
punishment needs to make an argument of the following sort: “A is morally justified in 
punishing O on the grounds of C, D, etc.” where “A” is a certain individual or body 
that metes out punishment to “O ”, and “C, D, etc.” are the reasons that justify 
inflicting this punishment. Jeffrie Murphy has suggested that providing a full account of 
that claim involves answering at least five interrelated, albeit distinct questions.5 First, 
one needs to provide an adequate theory of criminalization, i.e., of the sort of 
behaviours that can be the object of criminal sanctions, and distinguish criminal 
punishment from, e.g., torts or liability for damages. Secondly, one needs to explain the 
moral justification for legal punishment, to wit, “how a certain conduct which is clearly 
morally wrong when considered in isolation ... can be morally justified all things 
considered”.6 Thirdly, one needs to explain why a particular body (e.g., the state) would
5 Jeffrie Murphy, 'Does Kant Have a Theory o f Punishment?' Columbia Law Review 87 (1987).
6 ibid, 510.
11
be legitimately entitled to perform this task. Fourthly, one would need to provide an 
adequate theory of criminal liability, that is, a set of rules governing, inter alia, 
justifications, excuses, and other defences. And finally, one would need an account of 
the appropriate punishments.
Arguably, not every one of these questions is relevant to the case for extraterritorial 
punishment. By this I do not mean that they are unrelated to it. Rather, I mean that a 
plausible argument focused on the specific issue of extraterritoriality need not sort out 
all o f them in full. For example, examining the rules that should govern individual 
criminal liability in the international sphere is certainly beyond the scope of this thesis.7 
On similar grounds, I will provide here neither an account o f what makes certain 
conduct criminalizable, nor one o f the appropriate punishments that should be 
available (i.e., sentencing rules). Rather, I will concentrate only the specific 
considerations on which the extraterritorial scope of the right to punish rests, which I will 
argue have to do with the justification for A holding the right to mete out legal 
punishment to O.
In this thesis I will defend seven interrelated propositions.
1. For a given body A to have the right to punish a certain individual O someone’s 
interest must be sufficiently important to warrant conferring upon A that right, 
and A must be able to claim the authority to do so.
2. In order to explain the (extraterritorial) scope o f this right we need to look at the 
interest that explains conferring upon that given body the power to mete out 
legal punishment to O.
3. A state’s right to punish O is justified mainly by reference to the collective 
interest that individuals in that state have in there being a system of criminal 
rules prohibiting murder, rape, theft, etc. in force.
4. States’ right to punish O is primarily territorial in scope.
7 For a recent, extensive overview see Kai Ambos, ha Parte General Del Derecho Penal International. Bases 
Para Una Elaboration Dogmatica (Der Allgemeine Teil Des V'olkerstrafrechts: Ansats^e Einer Dogmatisierungj 
(Montevideo: Fundacion Konrad-Adenauer, 2005).
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5. The right of a particular state to punish O can be exercised extraterritorially in 
the case of domestic offences only when these are perpetrated against its 
sovereignty, security or important governmental functions.
6. There are certain offences, namely international crimes, that warrant conferring 
upon at least some extraterritorial body a right to punish their perpetrators.
7. Every individual state and the International Criminal Court have the moral right to 
punish individuals for these offences irrespectively of where the alleged crime 
was committed.
I will also defend three more critical positions. First, I will argue that although an 
account o f authority is necessary to provide a complete justification for the right to 
punish O, the extraterritorial scope of this right is unrelated to the considerations on 
which this authority is explained. Secondly, I will claim that certain rules currendy in 
force governing the extraterritorial application of states’ domestic criminal laws lack any 
sound moral justification. In particular, I will argue against the right attributed to states 
to punish O based on the fact that either O or the victim are a national of that state. 
Finally, I will argue that the leading normative justifications for legal punishment are ill- 
suited to deal with the issue of extraterritoriality. This is because they either lead to 
problematic restrictions to the territorial application of a state’s domestic criminal laws 
(such as the inability o f a state to punish offences committed on its territory by 
foreigners); or they collapse the distinction between domestic and international crimes 
by advocating the same broad principles o f extraterritorial jurisdiction for both. But let 
us start from the beginning. In the remainder o f this introduction I will introduce the 
methodology I will use throughout this thesis and clarify further the normative 
challenges that a plausible case for extraterritorial punishment would have to face under 
current, non-ideal conditions.
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2. Our point of departure
Ronald Dworkin has famously suggested that political theories could be classified as 
rights-based, duty-based or goal based, depending on which of these moral concepts 
was considered of ultimate importance.8 This classification can also be applied to 
theories exploring the morality of certain legal practices or institutions. In this thesis, I 
will use a rights-based approach to examine the moral justification for extraterritorial 
punishment. It is certainly beyond the scope of these introductory remarks to show that 
rights-based theories have better grounds or are more convincing in general than goal- 
based or duty-based theories. Rather, I shall merely provide some reasons for the 
choice I make.
Right-based theories may be plausibly favoured by normative, epistemological and 
purely practical considerations. From a normative perspective, they usually are 
deontological theories. To that extent they are free from the deep objections raised 
against justifications grounded on a teleological or consequentialist structure (goal- 
based theories).9 From an epistemological standpoint, the source and significance o f the 
moral weight attached to rights can be explicated convincingly. As a result o f its rising 
popularity among contemporary philosophers and legal scholars, the language o f rights 
has acquired a great deal of clarity and insight. As I will show in the following pages, we 
can make explicit to a significant extent what rights are, what it means to have a right, 
and what the case for a particular right is. Finally, from a more practical point o f view, 
rights discourse is extremely influential in national and international politics as well as in 
moral and legal philosophy. As we see everyday in different contexts, most relevant 
actors frame their demands in terms of rights, whether that be the right to life, the right 
to privacy, the right to social welfare, the right to private property, etc. This has cast 
some doubts regarding the emancipatory potential o f rights discourse,10 but it has
8 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Tights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1994), 169-173.
9 For some o f the well-known criticisms see, e.g., Bernard Wiliams’ A  Critique of Utilitarianism in J. J. C. 
Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism - for and Against (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 
108-118 and Rawls, A  Theory of Justice.
10 See Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Tights: Critical Eegal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Oxford: 
Hart, 2000); David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue (Princeton University Press, 2004).
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certainly not undermined their established popularity. Thus, contingent as all this may 
be, rights provide a common and compelling language in which competing arguments 
are framed.
Before going any further, I need to make this assumption thinner and more 
plausible in the light o f the relevant literature on rights. First o f all, using a rights-based 
theory does not amount to saying that morality in general is exclusively rights-based. 
There are some convincing objections against the latter claim, which I need not 
consider here.11 It may be enough to note how implausible it seems to claim that rights 
are the sole source of moral value. Secondly, for a given theory to be rights-based, rights 
need not necessarily figure in its first premise. Clearly enough, some rights will be based 
on some more fundamental right or sets of rights. For instance, the specific right to 
write a political pamphlet is normally grounded on the right to freedom of expression. 
But not all rights are necessarily valued for rights-related reasons. Some basic or 
ultimate rights will usually be grounded on considerations that are, themselves, not 
framed in the language of rights. For example, in Dworkin’s theory of rights the 
fundamental right to be treated with equal concern and respect is not grounded on a 
more fundamental right but on human beings’ dignity or their political equality.12 
Similarly, other rights, such as the right of individuals to criticise their government, are 
usually considered important wholly or primarily as the instrument of social goods. 
Thus, right-statements work as some kind of middle-level reasons which can help us 
tackle difficult philosophical issues. In Raz’s words, they “belong to the ground level of 
practical thought in which we use simple-to-apply rules”.13
In any case, their fit to our present enquiry might be put into question. Someone 
may object, for instance, that the view that the criminal law is rights-based is analytically 
unwarranted. Indeed, although rules (legal rules in particular) and rights (legal rights) 
are usually related to one another in many normative contexts, this is only a somewhat
11 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), chapter 8.
12 Dworkin, Taking Tights Seriously, 198.
13 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain : Essays in the Morality of Taw and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press; Oxford University Press, 1994), 48.
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recent, contingent association.14 Rules and normative systems in general have 
functioned without being construed in terms of rights throughout most of human 
history.15 Moreover, the criminal law is usually described exclusively in terms o f duties 
and liabilities rather than rights. Its statutes describe conduct such as murder, 
manslaughter, robbery, etc., and prescribe or attach certain penalties to those who 
commit them. There is, many would argue, something artificial in arguing that the legal 
rule which penalizes the intentional killing of another person is basically stating that 
individuals have a (legal) right to life.16
Admittedly, the criminal law is best described in terms of duties and liabilities. 
However, these concepts can, themselves, be normatively justified in terms of rights, or 
so I will argue below. The duty not to kill someone is explained by the right o f that 
person not to be killed. It is that particular right that does the justificatory work behind 
the prohibition on murder. Similarly, A’s liability to have punishment inflicted upon her 
for murdering B is explained by the state’s right to punish offenders. It is that right, or 
so I shall argue throughout this thesis, that needs justification. In short, then, the 
conceptual and normative apparatus that rights provide not only is adequately suited to 
tackle the issue at hand; it also clarifies to a significant extent the specific questions that 
this thesis needs to address and the kind of answer it needs to provide.
3. An account of rights
Rights, then, have become pervasive and fundamental features o f practical thought in 
law, morality and politics. In virtue of this, it may be assumed that they, themselves, 
need no justification but rather that they call for an explanation.17 In the following
14 See Richard. Tuck, Natural Rights Theories. Their Origin and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979).
15 The most famous example of this is the Ten Commandments. “Thou shalt not kilT  said nothing about 
anyone having a right to life.
16 Hart in his classic Legal Rights claims that expounding the criminal law in terms o f rights would be 
confusing and even redundant (H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) 
186 and, mainly, 192).
17 See Raz at the beginning o f Personal Well-being in his The Morality of Freedom. Against this, Scanlon 
Rights Goals andfairness in Jeremy Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984)
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pages I will not provide an original account of what rights are. Rather, I shall 
concentrate on what I consider the most plausible one available in the literature. But 
first, a point of terminology is in order. Unless I specify otherwise, I will not talk about 
legal rights. As suggested above, the subject of this enquiry is not what legal rights and 
duties individuals and states have under current international law, but rather what legal 
rights and duties they should have at the bar of justice. The way in which I propose to 
answer this question is to examine what moral rights they have.18 Throughout, I make 
the standard assumption that legal and moral rights have the same structure.19
3.1 The conceptual analysis of rights
There is enough consensus in the literature that regardless of whether conceived as 
trumps,20 side-constraints,21 or exclusionary or pre-emptive reasons22, the normative 
force that rights have is very significant, even if short of being considered absolute. 
That is, the language of rights accounts for the strength o f a particular normative 
statement.
Wesley Hohfeld’s classical analysis of types o f legal rights, as well as its application 
mutatis mutandi to moral rights, remains in its essential features substantially 
unchallenged.23 Hohfeld argued that the proposition “A has a right to (p” distinguishes 
four distinct types of jural relations or incidents, namely,
137 and Cecile Fabre, Social Rights under the Constitution. Government and the Decent Life (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 15.
18 Moral rights must be distinguished from the much more controversial concept o f “natural rights”. 
Regardless of the specific content o f natural rights, the main conceptual difference between both is that 
natural rights normally claim an ‘ontological status’ (Hart in Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights 78) that, to 
my knowledge, has never been successfully established.
19 Fabre, Social Rights under the Constitution, 114; Peter Jones, Rights (London: Macmillan, 1994), 47-48; 
Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, 238.
20 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights.
21 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974).
22 See Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 195-196. On this see below. For criticism o f Raz’s position on this 
matter, see N.E. Simmonds’ Rights at the Cutting Edge in Matthew H. Kramer, Simmonds, N.E., Steiner, 
Hillel, A  Debate over Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 204.
23 Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (Yale University Press, 1919). For recent accounts on 
rights that draw heavily on him, Kramer et al, A  Debate over Rights, Leif Wenar, The Nature o f Rights', 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 33, no. 3 (2005), and Cecile Fabre, Whose Body Is It Anyway? : Justice and the
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Claim-right Liberty
I
No-right
I
Liability
Power Immunity
I
Disability24
To say that A has a claim-right means that she is owed a duty by other(s). For instance, 
my right to personal safety means, among other things, holding everyone to a duty not 
to physically attack me. To have a liberty-right, by contrast, is to be free from a duty to
am at liberty to look over my garden fence at my neighbour in that I have no legal duty 
not to do that. This, o f course, does not entail that my neighbour is under a duty 
himself to allow to be looked at. He could certainly build a taller wall or plant a tree. A 
power can be defined as the ability to change one or more of these jural relations 
(liberties, claims, powers or immunities). Examples of powers include the right to vote, 
to make contracts, to get married, etc. Conversely, someone is said to possess an 
immunity when someone else lacks precisely this ability. Under public international law 
heads of state and other high-ranking officials are generally considered immune from 
the jurisdiction of the domestic courts of other states. This means that, at least while 
they are in office, they are not liable to being punished by a foreign state. These four 
relationships can be plausibly divided into two levels, the first one covering claim-rights 
and liberties and the second one, powers and immunities.
Yet, rights are characteristically formed by more than one of these incidents.26 
Throughout the thesis I will refer to specific incidents when appropriate; when I use 
the term right I will be referring to the ‘molecular’ right composed by two or more of 
these incidents.
Integrity of the Person (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), chapter 1. For some dispute, see L. W. 
Sumner, The Moral Foundation of Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
241 modify Hohfeld’s terminology in line with the most usual expressions for each o f these positions.
25 Hart, Essays on Bentham, 166-167. Saying that B has no duty to cp is logically identical to saying that A 
has no right that B cps. At least a duty derived from that right. To that extent, the jural position that 
contradicts a liberty is termed a “No-right”. No-right stands for no-claim-right.
26 See, characteristically, Wenar, 'The Nature o f Rights'.
act (or refrain from acting) in a certain way.25 Take Hart’s example: under English law, I
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Three relevant distinctions are in order here. On the one hand, while first order 
relations determine whether a particular action is permissible, impermissible or 
obligatory, second order relations determine the possibility or impossibility of a change 
in someone’s moral situation. To claim that A is under a duty not to deprive B of her 
freedom of movement means that it is impermissible (wrong) for her to do so. By 
contrast, to say that A is under a disability to vote does not (necessarily) mean that it 
would be wrong or impermissible for her to do so. Rather, the implication would be that 
her vote would be null and void, i.e., of no effect. This thesis is mainly about the 
extraterritorial scope of a particular power: the power to punish. In this respect, it is 
important to bear this distinction in mind when considering the implications of 
claiming that a court C has acted ultra vires or lacked the power to punish a particular 
individual O.
On the other hand, to say that A has the power to cp does not necessarily mean that 
she is at liberty to do so. The classical example is that A in many instances has the 
power to sell a good G she knows is stolen to B, even if she would be under a duty not 
to do so; she would be criminally liable and liable to pay compensation to the original 
owner but the legal effects of the sell would stand. There is, hence, some degree of 
normative independence between the different levels. This is not to claim, however, 
that there are certain situations in which the wrong involved in transferring or 
modifying certain rights is such that it precludes the transference or modification 
itself.27 Indeed, A would lack the power to sell B a gun so that she can kill C.
Finally, a crucial feature o f Hohfeld’s analysis of rights for our purposes is its 
relational aspect. Put differendy, rights capture a normative relation between A , the 
right holder, and B a certain (potentially identifiable) individual who is bound to respect 
that right. For instance, when A lends B her complete collection of ‘The Sopranos’, B is 
under a duty towards A  to return it. Yet if this is true we need to make sense of a 
particular distinction usually made in the literature. To wit, some rights are said to be
27 Fabre, Whose Body Is It Anyway'?, 26. From a non-Hohfeldian perspective see Jeremy Waldron, 'A Right 
to D o Wrong', Ethics 92 (1981).
held in personam while others are said to be in rem. This means that while the former are 
held against a specific individual or group, others are said to be held against humanity at 
large. An example of the former is A’s right that B returns her Sopranos collection. An 
example of the latter is A’s claim not to be tortured. Rights in rem can be seen therefore 
as undermining this relational aspect o f rights that I claim will be relevant for the theory 
of extraterritorial punishment I develop in this thesis. However, I suggest they do 
nothing of the kind. Rights in rem should be understood as a shortcut for a significant 
amount o f bilateral jural relationships between A and several potentially identifiable 
duty-bearers. The fact that we need not identify them all at once does not mean that we 
cannot do so. In sum, the concept o f rights in rem is simply another way in which rights 
talk simplifies our normative thinking.
3.2 The interest-wili theories debate: identifying the right-holder
In the contemporary literature on rights, there are two main general theories that 
purportedly explain the nature o f rights, i.e., the choice or will theory and the interest 
theory. The debate between them has been described as a “stand-off’.28 This debate is 
prominent enough not to merit a full description here. Both theories presuppose that 
rights confer some sort of benefit to the right-holder. The specific point of contention 
is the “directionality of duties”, that is, it has to do with identifying the right-holder to 
whom the relevant duty is owed.29
The will theory claims that having a tight means having a “legally respected 
choice”.30 Thus, the essential feature of a right is that the right-holder is able to control 
the performance o f the duty that it is owed to her. She may waive or extinguish the 
duty or leave it in existence; after breach, she may leave it ‘un-enforced’ or may
28 H. Steiner, “Working Rights”, in Kramer et al, A  Debate over Rights.
29 Matthew H. Kramer and HiUel Steiner, Theories o f Rights: Is There a Third Way?' Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 27, no. 2 (2007), 298.
30 Hart, Essays on Bentham, 190. On this, also Jones, Rights, 32-36 and Sumner, The Moral Foundation of 
Rights.
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‘enforce’ it, for example, by suing compensation; and she may in turn waive or 
extinguish the obligation to pay compensation.31
There are at least three fundamental shortcomings to this theory. First, it leads 
(explicidy and inevitably) to the implausible claim that, inter alia, babies, children and the 
severely mentally ill cannot be right-holders. After all, they do not have this legally 
protected choice themselves. Secondly, it cannot accommodate rights over which we 
have no control regarding their disposition, such as the right not to be tortured. Under 
almost every system of criminal law, victims of torture lack both the power to waive 
someone else’s duty not to commit any such act, and they even lack the power to waive 
the enforcement of their rights by the state. Hillel Steiner has attempted to rescue the 
will theory by suggesting that under the criminal law the will theory vests rights in state 
officials.32 But certainly it seems odd, to say the least, to suggest that the holder of the 
right that I am not tortured is some state official. Steiner finds this implication 
unproblematic. Yet, because the issue at stake is precisely the “directionality of duties”, 
it goes against our basic understanding of what it is to hold a right not to be tortured to 
claim that this right lies with the state and not with the individual. This takes us directly 
to the third difficulty with the will theory of rights. In short, it fails to capture why 
rights are so important in moral and legal discourse, to wit, that someone’s interests are 
harmed if her right is not respected.33 Not all rights can be explained as protections to 
their holders’ title to control the performance of a duty. If A beats up B very badly on 
the street it would be clear that A has violated B’s right to her physical integrity. Now, 
the reason for this is arguably that it really hurts to be beaten up like this not that he did 
not ask for her consent. It is therefore B’s interest in being free from this kind o f pain 
and not (merely) his tide to control the performance of A’s duty that his right protects.
The interest theory, by contrast, explains the “directionality o f duties” by reference 
to whose interest would be affected by the violation o f the duty or would be protected
31 Hart, Essays on Bentham, 184.
32 H. Steiner, ‘Working Rights”, in Kramer et al, A. Debate over Bights, 250.
33 For this way o f understanding rights see Dworkin, Taking Bights Seriously, 198, and Fabre, Social Bights 
under the Constitution, 15.
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by that right.34 It therefore has no trouble explaining why the right not to be tortured 
lies with each individual and not with some state official. This account, however, is not 
without difficulties. A standard objection against this conception of rights is that it is 
unable to accommodate third party beneficiary cases.35 Suppose A hires B to look after 
her aged mother (M) in her absence. Normally, we would say that A has a right against 
B that she would look after M. But this seems to contradict the fact that it is M who 
has the most pressing interest in B f ulfilling  her duty. This objection is designed to 
make two different, albeit concurrent, points. First, that the interest theory is unable to 
explain the distribution of rights in this simple case; and secondly, that the choice 
theory explains the situation cogendy. After all, it would be up to A and not M to 
demand the fulfilment o f B’s duty, its enforcement by the state, or eventually to 
extinguish it.
I believe this objection misses a basic feature of any plausible version of the 
interest theory, namely, that not every interest qualifies as an appropriate basis for the 
attribution o f a right. Indeed, if the interest that M has were of the kind that should be 
protected by a right, this would make the agreement between A and B morally (and 
legally) superfluous and, by implication, not only B would be under a duty to look after 
M in A’s absence, but also D, E, and F would be under a similar duty. Put differendy, 
this example does not cast doubt on the “directionality” aspect o f the interest theory; 
rather it shows that it needs further refinement as to what kind o f interests are in fact 
protected by rights. Just as M’s interest in being looked after would not do, nor would 
A’s interest in having some free time to go to see the new Woody Allen movie explain 
B’s duty to look after M.
In sum, I argue that the best way to identify the right-holder is to look at whose 
interest is being protected by the relevant right. However, interests can do more than
34 For standard formulations of the interest theory, see Raz, The Morality of Freedom; Matthew Kramer’s 
“Rights Without Trimmings” in Kramer et al, A  Debate over Rights; and Neil MacCormick, “Rights in 
Legislation” in P.M.S. Hacker and Joseph Raz, Taw, Morality and Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
35 E.g., Hart, Essays on Bentham, 187-188.
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simply identify the right-holder. They can, in fact, help us answer the question o f what 
must be the case for X to have a right vis-a-vis Y. To this question I now turn.
3.3 Assigning moral rights: identifying the relevant interest
Joseph Raz has influentially argued that “X has a right if and only if X can have rights, 
and other things being equal, an aspect o f X’s well-being (his interests) is a sufficient 
reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty”.36 I assume here that this 
method for assigning rights can be applied, mutatis mutandi, to all Hohfeldian incidents, 
namely, that interests explain not only claims, but also liberties, powers and immunities. 
In other words, X would have a right if  she has an interest which is sufficiently 
important to hold some other person(s) to be under a no-right, a liability or a disability, 
respectively. Three central aspects of this proposed version of the interest theory call 
for further elaboration.
First, under Raz’s definition, rights do not simply correlate with duties, liabilities, 
etc.; they actually ground them.37 Rights are considerations that operate at the level of 
the justification of a given institution, policy or decision. They are considerations 
concerning the reasons on which governments or other people should, or should not, 
act. Let me illustrate this. The right to be free from physical assault does not simply 
protect a sphere of personal liberty from being violated. It works as a reason to prohibit 
other people infringing this sphere by, e.g., attacking me on the street. This is important 
because it shows that the explanation of who has a right, precedes the determination of 
who owes the person a duty and what that duty is.38
Moreover, the notion of interest can help us explain where the normative force 
that rights have in moral argument comes from. The interest theory of rights advocated 
here relies on the insight claimed generally by consequentialists that it matters morally
36 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 166 (my emphasis).
37 In short, I suggest both these propositions are true. Logical correlativity and normative implication 
are not mutually exclusive and can perfectly be co-extensive. For an illustration o f this see Rowan Cruft, 
'Rights: Beyond Interest Theory and Will Theory?' Taw and Philosophy 23, no. 4 (2004), 370, fn 337.
38 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 184-185 and Alasdair Cochrane, "Moral Obligations to Non-Humans" 
(PhD LSE, 2007), 78.
23
whether someone’s life goes well or badly for themselves. Interests, under this 
approach, connect the concept of rights to individuals’ well-being. Individuals’ well­
being is, therefore, the fundamental consideration on which the rights-based argument 
provided in this thesis ultimately stands.
Yet Raz argues that rights should be understood as reasons o f peremptory force. 
That is, rights are not simply considerations of a particularly weighty sort that should be 
subsumed in a broader overall calculus; rights end that particular argument by telling us 
what is to be done. We should not construe this proposition as suggesting that, by 
establishing the existence of a right we have reached the end of our enquiry about what 
is to be done.39 As it will be clear throughout the thesis, much more argument is needed 
in order to examine who the bearer of the relevant right is, what is its content, its 
scope, and exactly who is under the relevant duty, liability, etc. Rather, the proposition 
that rights have peremptory force means that they work as constraints on the 
maximization o f well-being, and allow us to accommodate the key deontological 
insistence on the value and separateness of individuals. 40 By way o f illustration: A is 
sitting in the silent coach in a train to Manchester. Apart from her, all the other 
passengers are teenagers who have probably reserved seats in the wrong coach. The 
fact that A has a right to travel in a silent environment means that all the other 
passengers are under a duty to remain silent. This would be the case even if we would 
maximize the level of overall well-being by allowing the other passengers to carry on 
with their conversations.
Admitedly, the peremptory force of rights might create a difficulty if considered 
under the light of another well-extended feature of rights discourse, namely, the fact 
that rights tend to conflict. If we follow the interest theory of rights, conflicts of rights 
seem inevitable. For instance, A might have an interest in expressing her views that 
might be sufficiently important to be protected by a right. However, B might also have 
an interest in not being insulted publicly which would also warrant conferring upon her
39 N.E. Simmonds, “Rights at the Cutting Edge” in Kramer et al,^4 Debate over Rights, 204.
40 Fabre, Whose Body Is It Anyway?, 18-19. See also Alasdair Cochrane, "Moral Obligations to Non- 
Humans", 78.
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a tight. Provided A desires publicly to insult B their rights would clearly conflict. This 
would seem inconsistent with Raz’s claim that rights have peremptory force. I submit 
this is not the case for two reasons. From the point of view of terminology, we can 
rescue this understanding of rights by simply suggesting that interests o f the relevant 
type only give rise to prima facie rights. Prima facie rights exist outside o f particular 
circumstances. However, once we have examined the concrete situation we may assign 
one o f the parties a right. In other words, although prima facie rights can conflict, once a 
right is assigned in the specific case, that right works as a peremptory reason. From a 
normative perspective, interests can help us tackle conflicts of rights. In this particular 
situation it would seem that B’s interest in not being insulted publicly outweighs A’s 
interest in being able to do so. Accordingly, we could consistently argue that although 
A has a prima facie right to freedom of speech generally, she lacks the right to insult B in 
these particular circumstances. The issue o f sorting out conflicts of rights might get 
much messier than this.41 However, this simple mechanism will generally suffice for the 
purposes of this thesis.
The third central aspect of Raz’s version o f the interest theory is that it provides a 
plausible criterion by which moral rights are to be assigned, a neglected question in 
some of the most influential accounts o f rights 42 His definition stipulates that someone 
has a right not merely if she is an intended beneficiary of a duty, but only if her interest 
is a sufficient reason for holding another person under a duty, liability, etc. Three issues 
become immediately relevant here. In order properly to grasp the relationship that 
rights capture between those who hold them and those against whom they are held we 
need, first, to examine more closely what kind o f things interests are. As Fabre suggests, 
there are two mistakes we can make with regards to the concept of interest: we may 
define interests exclusively by what their holder wants; or we may define them as things
41 A more sophisticated way o f resolving conflicts between rights is probably the German-born principle 
o f proportionality. For an influential account, see Robert Alexy, A. Theory of Constitutional Tights (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), specially the Postscript.
42 See, for example, Hart’s criticisms o f Nozick and Dworkin in H.L.A. Hart, 'Between Utility and 
Rights', Columbia Taw Review 79, no. 5 (1979).
25
that contribute to her good, irrespective o f what she wants.43 If we make the former 
mistake, we would be committing ourselves to the implausible view that a drug addict 
has a right that we supply him with heroin; if we make the latter, we might end up 
being allowed to force terminally ill people to follow painful, though life extending 
medical treatments. A more plausible conception o f interest would rely on generally 
making X the final judge about her own good, though it would have to admit that in 
certain situations she would not be in a position to make that judgement44
Secondly, whether A has a right to (p does not merely depend on the importance 
that cp has for her. The fact that I have an interest in watching Lionel Messi play for 
Barcelona F.C. generally does not mean that someone is under a duty to provide me 
with tickets for a match. This is because the importance o f watching a football game is 
arguably not sufficiently important to hold anyone under a duty to provide anyone else 
with tickets. This consideration helps us sort the problem of third-party beneficiaries 
outlined above. Indeed, it would hardly be the case that M’s (A’s mother) interest in 
being looked after while A is absent is a sufficient reason to hold B under a duty to do 
so. This explains why M lacks that right against B. By contrast, the interest that A might 
have in B fulfilling their contract might well be an interest that, all things considered, 
justifies holding B under a duty to look after M. Much more moral argument is needed 
in order to make this case. Yet, the point here is simply to suggest that in order to 
assign A. the right to cp we need to identify an interest which is sufficiendy important to 
hold someone else under the relevant duty, liability, etc.
Finally, this interest need not be an interest of A’s. Take the following standard 
example I mentioned above: under most legal systems A holds, in certain situations, the 
power to sell some good G to C that she has stolen from B. In other words, if C did 
not know that the good was stolen, the transference of property rights over G would 
be perfecdy valid. It would of course be wrong for A to do that, that is, she would not be 
under a liberty to do so; but this is besides the point. The point is rather that if A holds
43 Fabre, Whose Body Is It Anyway?, 17.
44 This also applies when X  stands for a polity or an artificial person. On this see Chapter 3 below.
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that normative power, it would clearly not be because she has an interest in selling G 
herself. That interest can hardly warrant the protection of a right. If there is some 
interest that explains this particular power, it has to be the interest of individuals in that 
society (and C in particular) in their commercial transactions on certain goods being 
easy and relatively secure.
This point can help us solve a well-known challenge to the interest theory of rights. 
Peter Jones among many others has argued that the interest theory is unable to explain 
powers invested in particular offices.45 The argument goes: we normally say that a judge 
J has the legal power to sentence criminal offenders; however, it is unclear how his 
holding that right stems from an interest she may have in doing so. One could say that 
she would probably have an interest in holding that power because she receives a salary 
for doing so and that is her job. Few people would accept, however, that this interest is 
a sufficient reason for holding some other person (O) to be under a liability to have her 
right to, e.g., liberty modified by J.
In short, this objection fails because it conflates J ’s rights in her individual capacity 
with the rights that belong to the public office she holds, i.e., to the state. It is not 
individual J who has the power to sentence criminal offenders but rather it is any 
person occupying her office. Indeed, once she finishes work, hangs her robe, and goes 
home J lacks the normative power to punish the thief who tries to steal her purse in the 
tube. There seems to be no other way of explaining how these rights are transferred 
from judge J to judge Z when, e.g., J goes on holiday, or is on leave for illness and Z 
decides an urgent pending case. Once J is back to work it would be awkward for her to 
say that her rights have been infringed by Z. The only plausible way of explaining the 
situation is by saying that these powers belong to the state, and that they are assigned to 
a particular office rather than to a particular person. O f course some individual must 
occupy that office, but this hardly entails that the powers are her own. If we consider 
that power as belonging to the state (as an artificial person) then the interest that
45 In Jones, Rights, 31-32. See, also Wenar, 'The Nature of Rights', 242. For a different response to this 
conceptual difficulty see N. MacCormick “Rights Claims and Remedies” in M. A. Stewart, haw, Morality, 
and Rights (Dordrecht, Holland: ReideL, 1983), 165-167.
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explains that power is probably not the individual interest of the office-holder, but a 
collective interest in the state having that legal power.
I will not try to argue for this further claim here. Rather, I will point to a specific 
feature of the justification for this kind of power that will be o f crucial importance in 
this thesis. In some cases, it is not enough for X to have the power to cp, that an interest 
of X's would be served by the conferral o f that power; X must also have the authority 
to cp.46 Suppose A needs drug D to fight some illness o f hers and that B knows about 
this illness and knows that drug D would be appropriate. Although B would be justified 
in prescribing D to A, she would not have the normative power to do so. This is not 
because A lacks the relevant interest in getting the drug or B lacks the relevant interest 
in selling it to her, but rather because B lacks the authority to prescribe it. Similarly, it 
might well be, for instance, that the state on which a particular offence was committed,
i.e., the territorial state (TS) would be justified in punishing O. This only means that 
someone has a relevant interest in TS punishing O that is sufficiently important to be 
protected by a power. However, we may refuse to assign to TS that power because it 
would decide whether O should be punished, e.g., solely on the basis of a confession 
extracted by torture. That is, although TS would be justified in punishing O, it would 
lack the authority to do so.
3.4 Who can have rights: individual interests and the state
A final point needs to be made before we can proceed to examine the normative 
challenges that extraterritorial punishment raises. Under the version of the interest 
theory of rights endorsed here, X would have a right if and only if X is the kind of 
entity that can have interests. It would seem clear that human beings are the kind of 
beings that can have interests and that some of these interests are sufficiently important 
to be protected by rights. It is also quite uncontroversial that states and international 
institutions also are the type of entities that can have rights. Raz makes this point 
explicitly when he argues that X is capable of having rights if and only if either his well­
46 Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 101.
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being is of ultimate value or he is an ‘artificial person’ (e.g. a corporation).47 This point, 
however, should not be conflated with the one about whose interest explains the rights 
that states have. That is, for the time being I need not take side here with either the 
corporate or the collective theory of group rights.48 Irrespective o f whether states have 
rights as a result o f their being of ultimate or merely derivative or instrumental value, 
the fact is that the claim that they can have rights hardly needs any defence in the light 
of the current literature. What kind of rights states have and why they do so is the topic 
of the next section.
4. The normative challenges faced by an account of extraterritorial punishment
In order to understand the type of case I need to make in this thesis, I need first to 
identify the specific normative challenges that the issue of extraterritoriality faces. As 
suggested above, the account of extraterritorial punishment I will develop relies on the 
proposition that the extraterritorial scope of a X’s power to punish a given offender (O) is 
largely determined by the reasons that justify X holding this power in the first place. 
Accordingly, the answer to the question about the challenges lies with a significant 
feature of the concept of normative justification, namely, with the question regarding to 
whom we have to justify the power of a particular body to mete out legal punishment to 
a particular offender. Standard accounts of legal punishment have been concerned with 
justifying this power vis-a-vis the offender. The account of extraterritorial punishment I 
develop here is also concerned mainly with this issue. Yet, it deals with a particularly 
demanding variation of this traditional problem, namely, the need to justify the power 
to punish an offender by an extraterritorial body. This issue will be tackled in Chapters 2 
and 4.
However, extraterritorial punishment has also been considered inconsistent with, 
or at least problematic under the light of the principle of state sovereignty.49 This is
47 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 166.
48 On this debate see below.
49 See, e.g., Larry May, Crimes against Humanity. A. Normative Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), Introduction.
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because sovereign states usually claim an exclusive right to regulate the conduct of 
individuals within their borders. Analytically, the classical doctrine of state sovereignty 
can be conceptualized in terms of three basic propositions. A sovereign state is, first of 
all, a “political authority which recognizes no superior”, i.e. that claims supreme law­
making and enforcement authority50 over a certain territory.51 Secondly, sovereignty 
entails the “claim [of every state] to be politically and juridically independent”.52 Finally, 
not only can each state claim independence of any political superior for itself, but each 
must also recognize the validity of the same claim by all the others.53
This traditional account of state sovereignty as the constitutional doctrine o f the 
laws of nations would bar any exercise of extraterritorial punishment unless explicidy 
authorized by the territorial state. This is entirely incompatible with how international 
law currendy regulates the lawful exercise of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, which 
authorizes certain states or international criminal tribunals to punish certain individuals 
extraterritorially irrespectively of the opinion of the territorial state. Accordingly, it 
seems unpromising as a starting point for this enquiry. Ultimately, I will argue that a 
convincing account will need to justify the imposition o f legal punishment also to the 
individuals in the state on whose territory the offence was perpetrated. However, a 
more nuanced conception of sovereignty is required for this purpose. The purpose of 
this section is, therefore, to clarify precisely what sort of normative challenge state 
sovereignty poses for an account of extraterritorial punishment.
There have been three main traditions o f political and philosophical thought that 
have tried to make sense of the concept of sovereignty. For the sake of simplicity, I
50 Martin Wight, Systems of States (Swansea: Leicester University Press, 1977), 23 and 129; also in Charles 
Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979).
51 Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, 150 and Wight, Systems of States, 129. See also article I o f the Montevideo 
Convention and Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Taw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 70,105 and ff.
52 Wight, Systems of States, 130. Sovereignty is “the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority 
in the political community ... and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere” argued Hinsley in 
what is probably still the standard text in the field (Francis Harry Hinsley, Sovereignty (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1966)).
53 Wight, Systems of States, 23.
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shall distinguish them under the names of Realists, Social Liberals and Cosmopolitans.54 
I will not address here this body of literature at any length; that is beyond the scope of 
the present enquiry. Rather, I will defend a standard version of the cosmopolitan 
position. My main purpose is to explain how this position accounts for certain specific 
rights that states hold, and which raise normative problems for the justification o f the 
issue of extraterritorial punishment. But before going into this, I must briefly explain 
why I set the Realist and Social Liberal positions aside. I will examine here only a 
schematic version o f each of them which nonetheless captures, or so I claim, their 
central gist.
These positions have several features in common. They are both state-centric. 
They portray international society as a state-of-nature situation between (generally self- 
interested) state-actors.55 Realists and Social Liberals base their positions on a two-level 
argument. First, they assume what has been called the domestic analogy, i.e., that states 
in the international sphere are analogous to individuals in the interpersonal realm. The 
second step, however, is different for each of them. Realists use the philosophical 
apparatus of a Hobbesian state of nature, i.e., they claim that sovereigns are in a state of 
war of every sovereign against every sovereign.56 Social Liberals, by contrast, describe it 
more in Lockean terms; they acknowledge the existence of international moral norms 
or a “law of nature that obliges every one” but are concerned with the lack of
54 I follow here Charles Beitz in the Afterword to his Political Theory and International Relations, 214-215. 
David Held presents these trends as three historically subsequent paradigms that replace one another 
(see David Held, 'Law o f States, Law o f Peoples', Legal Theory 8, no. 2 (2002)). They have received, 
however, different names in the literature. Hedley Bull calls them Machiavellians (or Hobbesians), 
Grotians and Kantians (see his introduction to Martin Wight, International Theory. The Three Traditions 
(London: Leicester University Press, 1991). In the same book, Martin Wight refers to them as Realists, 
Rationalists and Revolutionists. Caney adds to this threefold distinction the Nationalists (Caney, Justice 
Beyond Borders).
55 This is true of many o f the classical scholars of international theory or international law. Among them 
are the classical works by Hobbes, Locke, Wolff, de Vattel and Puffendorf.
56 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 76. Standardly, Hans Morgenthau argued 
that there is “a profound and neglected truth hidden in Hobbes’s extreme dictum that the state creates 
morality as well as law, and that there is neither morality nor law outside the state” (quoted in Gerry 
Simpson, "The Guises o f Sovereignty," in The End of Westphalia, ed. Thakur and Sampford (United 
Nations University Press, 2006) 11).
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centralized enforcement.57 Ultimately, they build their normative argument on both 
individuals’ and states’ claim to negative liberty, by which they mean the right to non­
intervention or non-interference in their internal affairs.58
Regardless of other considerations, I suggest that these two positions share a 
common weakness: namely, that they rely too heavily on the domestic analogy. States 
are portrayed in the international arena as artificial persons and they are recognized as 
having roughly the same capacities and rights that individuals would have in a similar 
state-of-nature situation. Hence, both the Realists and Social Liberals consider states as 
the ultimate units of moral concern for the purposes of any discussion on principles of 
international justice. This analogy is problematic. States, unlike individuals, are formed 
by a multiplicity of persons and groups who are to be considered distinct from the state 
and who are themselves units of moral concern. Moreover, states lack the unity of 
consciousness and are not organic wholes with the integrity attached to persons qua 
persons.59 As Peter Jones puts it “ [w]hen an individual sacrifices one of his desires for 
the sake of another of his desires, the individual who sacrifices is also the individual 
who gains. When a society sacrifices the good of some individuals for the good of other 
individuals, the losers are not identical with the gainers”.60 Thus, while the first case is 
generally unproblematic, the second one can often be morally unacceptable. This point 
has implications for the second step of these arguments.
In the case of Realists, the state-of-nature argument standardly grounds an absolute 
right to self-preservation. This is not meant only as an empirical or explanatory thesis 
but also as a normative one. “The necessity (or ‘duty’) to follow the national interest is 
dictated by a rational appreciation of the fact that other states will do the same, using
57 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) II, Ch. VI.
58 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 69-70. I follow him in his distinction between negative 
autonomy —justifying the right to non-intervention — and positive autonomy — that explains the right to 
self-determination (ibid, 92-93). While the former requires only that states do not interfere in any way in 
the internal affairs of other states, e.g., by punishing offences committed in their territory, the latter 
“requires that the internal authority o f international order be changed and might support intervention by 
third parties in a group’s struggle for independence from foreign rule” (ibid). Only the former notion is 
needed to justify state sovereignty under the lines described above.
59 ibid, 81.
60 Jones, Rights, 63.
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force when necessary, in a manner unrestrained by a consideration of the interests of 
other actors or of the international community”.61 The corollary of this is that “every 
Common-wealth, (not every man) has an absolute Libertie, to doe what it shall judge ... 
most conducing to their benefit”.62 A first difficulty with this position lies with the 
notion of national, or better state interest and how best to define it. As argued in 
section 3.3 above, a plausible conception of interests can be defined neither on purely 
objective (e.g. “physical survival, autonomy, and economic well-being”)63 nor on purely 
subjective grounds. Realists do not provide a solution to this difficulty.64 I have argued 
that, with certain restrictions, interests must generally be defined by those who hold 
them. But this obscures rather than clarifies the challenge that sovereignty poses for 
extraterritorial punishment. If states are morally entided to pursue their national interest 
and each one of them is the relevant judge as to what that interest is, there seem to be 
no moral grounds on which they can oppose or criticize the extraterritorial application 
of other states’ domestic criminal law or of international criminal laws on their territory. 
Thus, regardless o f its expl^nao^y power in terms of how states actually behave, the 
realist position is unable to account for the normative challenge that the principle of 
state sovereignty arguably raises vis-a-vis the justification for extraterritorial punishment.
Besides, the realist position would make for a very poor start for our enquiry for an 
even more fundamental reason. In short, one may readily argue that many of the 
empirical premises on which the Hobbesian state of nature argument stands are simply 
inaccurate. That individuals are the only actors in interpersonal relations, that they are 
relatively equal in power, that they are entirely independent of each other, and that they 
cannot have reliable expectations of reciprocal compliance, are arguably false as 
plausible empirical descriptions applicable to states the international society.65 If this is 
so, this undermines the normative implications of the argument, to wit, that we ought
61 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 28.
62 Hobbes, Leviathan, 149.
63 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
235-237, cited in Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, 8.
64 Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, 8-9.
65 See Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 36. For an instructive discussion about the lack o f  
accuracy o f this assumptions on empirical grounds see pages 37-50.
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to recognize in states the kind of unfettered liberties which this argument would grant 
individuals in that state-of-nature situation.
A similar objection may be raised against the Social Liberals’ second step. 
Individual liberty is generally considered of moral value because we assume that each 
individual is in a better position than anyone else to decide what is good for her. This 
explains the individual right to non-interference in a state-of-nature situation. States, so 
the argument goes, may also claim a right to non-intervention on the grounds that they 
are also in a better position to decide what is good for them. So far, so good. However, 
as previously argued, states differ from individuals in that they are formed by 
independent units which are themselves of significant moral concern. An absolute 
principle of state sovereignty qua negative liberty (non-intervention) would thus be 
problematic precisely because it would allow unlimited conflict with the right to the 
negative liberty o f individuals in that state. This is of particular relevance in a world, 
such as our own, in which a number o f states persist in carrying out mass atrocities 
against parts o f their own populations. Put differently, it is precisely because individuals 
must be respected as sources of moral concern that we should not allow all states to 
claim a right to non-interference analogous to that which individuals hold in a Lockean 
state-of-nature situation.66
Let me clarify my position further. My point here is not that these two-level 
arguments are not useful as analytical or explanatory devices. The domestic analogy, for 
one, might be useful to examine the right of states to use force in self-defence in the 
light o f the more familiar discussions on self-defence at the interpersonal level. But this 
should not be conflated with the claim that these two rights are both justified by the 
same underlying moral argument. In effect, most elaborate moral accounts on this 
particular issue provide a much more careful explanation o f states’ right to use force 
than simply equating their position with that of individuals in an interpersonal 
situation.67 The contention I advocate is that, if ultimately grounded on this analogy,
66 ibid, 81.
67 See Jeff McMahan, 'The Ethics o f Killing in War', Ethics 114, no. 4 (2004) and David Rodin, War and 
Self-Defense (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).
34
state sovereignty can be consistently defended as a matter o f principle neither on the 
basis of a Hobbesian state-of-nature justification, nor on the grounds of an analogy 
between individual and state negative liberty.
These considerations have led many scholars to deny that the principle of 
sovereignty is of any moral worth. In some recent work, sovereignty seems to be one of 
the major threats to the accomplishment of certain goals that are deemed of great value 
such as the protection of individual rights.68 According to this point of view, the 
principle of state sovereignty necessarily contains the “unfortunate implication of 
providing legitimacy for the national repression of citizens, or at least impunity for 
tyrants”.69 However, this conclusion is unwarranted. This line o f argument seems to 
overlook the fact that sovereignty has often been praised for its emancipatory potential 
and its status as a bulwark against imperialism.70 State sovereignty it is not an 
anachronistic political concept with just a long history on its back and a bunch o f un­
presentable moral credentials. Rather, I suggest that sovereignty can not only be made 
compatible with the fundamental rights of individuals; it can also be justified by 
reference to their own status as ultimate units of moral concern.
In order to provide such an account I will draw on two different sources. On the 
one hand, I will rely on a standard version o f the cosmopolitan position. 
Cosmopolitanism can be succincdy defined by three basic propositions: a) individuals 
are the ultimate units o f moral concern; b) this status of ultimate unit of moral concern 
is attached to every single human being; and c) this special status has global force, that 
is, individuals are ultimate units of moral concern for everyone, not only their fellow 
nationals, co-religionists, etc.71 A clarificatory remark is in order here. So defined, 
cosmopolitanism is not necessarily committed to advocating global institutions. Indeed, 
we should not conflate this set of basic moral tenets (moral cosmopolitanism) with the
68 See, for instance, Antonio Cassese, InternationalHaw in a Divided World (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 148, 
and Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes against Humanity (London: Allen Lane, 1999).
69 Martti Koskenniemi, 'The Future o f Statehood', Harvard International Haw Journal 32, no. 2 (1991), 397.
70 Frederic Megret, The Politics o f International Criminal Justice', European Journal of International Haw 13, 
no. 5 (2002).
71 T. Pogge, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’ in Chris Brown, Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical 
Perspectives (London: Roudedge, 1994), 89-90.
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issue of its proper institutionalization (institutional cosmopolitanism).72 As argued 
above, my purpose in this thesis is to examine the morality of current practices of 
extraterritorial punishment, not to provide a set o f innovative institutions or principles 
that should ideally regulate this field.
On the other hand, my account will draw on the conceptual analysis of rights 
elaborated in the previous section. I will argue that to clarify the normative challenge 
that the principle of state sovereignty creates for an account of extraterritorial 
punishment it is necessary to identify not only the rights entailed by this principle, but 
also the specific Hohfeldian incidents involved. This will provide us with a great deal of 
clarity and precision. Moreover, each one of these incidents must be explained by 
reference to a particular interest. This leads us to an important analytical point. It is 
plausible to assume that most if not all the rights associated with the principle o f state 
sovereignty should be conceived as group rights. There are two conceptions of group 
rights in the literature, collective and corporate rights. While the former are based only 
on a joint interest in a good that justifies the imposition o f duties, liabilities, etc. upon 
others, and take individuals as the ultimate unites o f moral concern,73 corporate rights 
are based on the attribution of moral standing to a group that is somehow separate 
from, and not wholly reducible to, the moral standing of the individuals who constitute 
the group 74 I will present here an argument for assigning certain rights to states which 
is based on the collective conception. I suggest that this analytical conception o f group 
rights is not only compatible with the cosmopolitan moral position I have endorsed, 
but that it also avoids the shortcomings of the Realist and Social Liberal positions.
72 For this distinction see C. Beitz, ‘Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the States System’, in ibid, 124-126.
73 Peter Jones, 'Group Rights and Group Oppression', The Journal of Political Philosophy 7, no. 4 (1999) 
quoting Joseph Raz who, in turn, argues that, in order to be a collective right, the following conditions 
must be met: “First, it exists because an aspect of the interest o f human beings justifies holding some 
person(s) to be subject to a duty. Second, the interests in question are the interests o f individuals as 
members o f a group in a public good and the right is a right to that public good because it serves their 
interest as members o f the group. Thirdly, the interest o f no single member o f that group in that public 
good is sufficiently by itself to justify holding another person to be subject to a duty.” (Raz, The Morality 
of Freedom, 208).
74 Jones, 'Group Rights and Group Oppression', 362-363.
36
O f the many cosmopolitan arguments underpinning the principle of state 
sovereignty available in the literature, I will examine here only two.75 The first one is 
based on the idea o f physical protection of individuals. The second one rests on the 
concept of self-determination or, more precisely, self-government. Each o f them can be 
translated, I shall argue, into the language of rights and they are both ultimately based 
on the well-being of individuals. I will argue that together they explain some of the core 
features of the principle of state sovereignty without necessarily falling into any o f the 
flaws considered above. However, each one of them accounts for different incidents. 
The argument based on physical security will only entail states holding a claim-right to 
territorial integrity. By contrast, the argument based on self-government will account 
for states’ power to dictate legal rules and, crucially, to their holding an immunity against 
extraterritorial authorities dictating legal rules on their territory. I will therefore argue 
that it is this latter argument that explains the normative challenge that state sovereignty 
creates for the justification of extraterritorial punishment.
Let me turn, first, to the physical security argument. “One o f the most common 
arguments in favor o f sovereignty ... is that [sjtates do a reasonably good job of 
protecting the well-being and freedom of individual subjects”.76 This position suggests 
that “ [t]he moral purpose of the modem state [lies on] the augmentation of individuals’ 
purposes and potentialities, in the cultivation of a social, economic and political order 
that enables individuals to engage in the self-directed pursuit o f their ‘interests’”.77 This, 
of course, is grounded on the assumption that it is only within a state that individuals 
can enjoy sufficient physical security to act autonomously and achieve a significant 
amount of well-being. In Antonio Cassese’s words, “[tjoday it could be maintained with 
greater truthfulness that without the protection of a [s]tate human beings are likely to 
endure more suffering and hardship than what is likely to be their lot in the normal
75 For a good summary of the variety o f cosmopolitanisms see Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, chapter 5.
76 May, Crimes against Humanity, 10.
77 Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1999), 123.
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course of events”.78 To complete this argument, however, it is necessary to bring in the 
assumption that there is no world state or sovereign. As Grotius argued, state 
sovereignty is important largely because there is no world state that can easily protect 
individuals from attacks by enemy and competing states or groups.
A plausible version of the physical security argument would unfold like this:
1. Individuals’ well-being is o f great moral worth;
2. Individuals can only enjoy a decent amount of well-being when they have some 
degree o f physical security;
3. In the absence of a world state, states provide individuals with a significant level of 
physical security;
4. States can only provide this security when they are granted a right to territorial 
integrity.
5. Thus, this joint interest shared by individuals in a given state is sufficiently 
important to warrant conferring upon that state a prima facie right to territorial 
integrity.
It is worth examining the precise implications o f this argument. First, the right to 
territorial integrity is a right that only states can claim. Yet this argument is o f an 
instrumental kind, i.e., it is morally justified on the basis of individuals’ well-being. As a 
result of this, it is not an absolute right; it is valuable only insofar as it provides 
individuals with a significant amount o f physical security and contributes, thereby, to 
their well-being. The problem with this argument, however, is that it does not capture 
the real normative difficulty that state sovereignty creates for the power to punish O 
extraterritorially. It only provides a justification for a claim-right held by states against 
other extraterritorial bodies physically intervening on their territory. This is all a state 
needs to be granted in order to supply individuals with this amount of security that is 
assumed in 3, and this claim-right is entirely compatible with any form of extraterritorial 
punishment. Indeed, it is widely accepted that when PS wants to lawfully prosecute O
78 Antonio Cassese, International haw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 4.
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for an offence she committed on TS, it has to request O ’s extradition and request TS’s 
assistance for any investigatory activities on TS’s territory. Put differendy, the physical 
security argument does not give us any clue as to what the problem would be with 
extraterritorial law-making provided that the prosecuting state avoids sending its police 
to enforce a particular decision without the territorial state’s consent.
Self-government constitutes the other standard justification for the cluster of rights 
arising from the principle of state sovereignty.79 Its value, it has been suggested, is the 
value of entrusting political power over a group and its members to the group itself.80 
This proposition already has an important limit built into it: not every decision is 
subject to this right, but only political matters are. I cannot examine this issue here in 
any detail but it should suffice to note that this consideration makes room for the 
important liberal intuition that there are certain private matters which neither the state 
nor any other political authority should hold the power to regulate. An obvious 
example would be the choice of sexual partners. In any event, insofar as this thesis does 
not deal with issues of ctiminali2ation, this aspect is largely unproblematic for the 
account of extraterritoriality I will elaborate here. The criminal law, at least when it 
refers to standard cases such as murder, rape, etc. is unanimously considered a public 
matter. A convincing explanation o f the value o f this right goes as follows:81
1. Individuals’ well-being is of moral worth;
2. Membership of certain encompassing groups, such as nations, has a profound and 
far reaching influence on individuals’ lives;
79 There are two different questions related to the right to self-determination or self-government that 
need not be conflated. One o f  them has to do with who has the right to make certain decisions on 
public matters? A related, although different (and possibly prior) question is who has the right to answer 
that first question? The answer to these two questions may overlap; however, the justification for both 
these answers would be different. For the purposes o f this thesis, only the first question is relevant. The 
literature on secession, the field in which this general right has been more extensively discussed, is 
concerned with the second question.
80 Joseph Raz and Avishai Margalit, "National Self-Determination," in Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, 
126.
811 follow their core argument as stated in ibid.
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3. To some significant extent, the well-being of these individuals depends on the 
prosperity and self-respect o f the group to which they belong;
4. The prosperity and self-respect of the group is aided by, or it might be impossible to 
secure without, the group enjoying political sovereignty over its own affairs;
5. Hence, the enjoyment of political sovereignty by the group is an important aspect of 
the individual well-being of its members and, as such, sufficiendy important to 
warrant the protection of a prima facie right.
As it stands, this argument has at least three important features. First, it is direcdy 
related to the question of political authority. It answers the question, “who has the right 
to decide?” Secondly, self-government accounts for the main features o f the principle 
o f state sovereignty as a normative power to dictate legal rules which are binding on a 
given territory, namely, it is an explanation of the basis of its jurisdictional competence. 
But at the same time, the interest that individuals in a given state have in enjoying 
political sovereignty over their own affairs explains why states also hold an immunity 
against extraterritorial authorities dictating criminal legal rules which are binding on 
their own territory. That is, this explains the fact that criminal rules dictated by Turkey 
are in principle invalid on the territory of South Africa.
Finally, this argument contains two inter-related qualifications. The right to self- 
government as advocated here is a collective, not a corporate right; it is based on the 
joint interest of individuals in TS not on the interest o f TS itself. Unlike corporate 
rights, collective rights need not stand on the controversial assumption that states bear 
rights because they have themselves a particular moral standing. This lack of autonomous 
moral standing has an important implication: collective rights are not inclined to allow 
the moral standing of the state to displace that of individuals and sub-groups who fall 
within the group’s compass.82 As a result, they do not generally pose a serious threat to 
the rights of individuals belonging to the group. Secondly, this argument also stands on 
instrumental grounds. The power and immunity that it entails have no intrinsic value.
82 Jones, 'Group Rights and Group Oppression', 377.
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They are valuable only insofar they contribute to the well-being of the members o f that 
group. This right is neither absolute nor unconditional. It is limited both by the 
interests o f non-members and by the interests of members other than their interests as 
members (e.g. their fundamental individual interests, or their interests as members of 
other relevant groups).83 This means that TS’s immunity against PS’s dictating criminal 
rules on its territory could be defeated if the individuals in PS have an interest which is 
sufficiendy important to confer upon PS the power to do so, and if this interest is 
sufficiendy important to outweigh the interest on which TS’s immunity is based. 
Moreover, this also means that TS’s immunity can be also overridden on the basis of 
some fundamental interest of the individuals in TS.
To conclude, the self-government argument accounts for the specific normative 
challenge that the principle of state sovereignty poses for the justification of 
extraterritorial punishment. It identifies a particular joint interest shared by the 
members of TS that is sufficiendy important to warrant conferring upon TS a prima facie 
immunity against extraterritorial bodies dictating criminal rules on the territory of TS. It 
is against this prima facie immunity that an extraterritorial authority will have to justify 
holding the power to punish O to individuals in TS.
5. An overview of the thesis
Having clarified the methodological framework I will use in this thesis and precised the 
challenge that the principle of state sovereignty raises vis-a-vis the justification for 
extraterritorial punishment, I shall briefly summarize the structure of this thesis. 
Chapter 1 presents a justification for the power to punish which is based on the interest 
o f individuals in a given state in there being a system of rules prohibiting murder, rape, 
etc., in force. I will argue not only that X holds the power to punish O, but it is also at 
liberty to do so. In order to substantiate this latter claim I will suggest that when 
perpetrating a criminal wrong, O forfeits her claim-right against being punished. I will 
defend this argument in its own terms and suggest it has at least two significant
83 Raz and Margalit, "National Self-Determination," 139.
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advantages over other competing arguments available in the literature. First, it accounts 
for the fact that the right to punish O is a normative power,; and not simply a liberty to 
inflict suffering upon O. Secondly, that it can accommodate the fact that both states 
and international criminal tribunals claim the power to punish an innocent individual 
(by mistake), while at the same time retaining the core intuition that it would be wrong 
for them (i.e., that they would not be at liberty) to do so.
In chapter 2 I will argue that this justification is the best suited to account for the 
strong intuition that the right to punish should be primarily territorial in scope. I will 
show that, by contrast, some of the most influential justifications for legal punishment 
available in the literature either entail a commitment to universal jurisdiction for any 
domestic offence or find it problematic to explain a state’s power to punish a foreigner 
for an offence committed on its territory. I will also challenge the widely-held views 
that states are justified in claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis o f the 
nationality of the offender (nationality principle) or that o f the victim (principle of 
passive personality). I will argue that the standard arguments on which these principles 
are normally advocated either beg the relevant question they are meant to answer or 
simply lead to broader, and arguably less appealing rules on the extraterritorial scope of 
the power to punish. O f the rules of international law granting extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over domestic offences currently in force I will defend the principle of 
protection, that is, states holding extraterritorial jurisdiction over offences committed 
against their sovereignty, security or important governmental functions.
The following part o f the thesis is concerned with international criminal laws. 
Chapter 3 presents a jurisdictional theory of international crimes. I argue that the 
defining feature of the concept of an international crime is that it warrants conferring 
upon some extraterritorial authority the power to punish their perpetrators. I submit that 
the main arguments available in the literature fail to account for this specific feature 
mainly because they are entirely unrelated to the reasons that justify meting out legal 
punishment to offenders in the first place. By contrast, I suggest that the argument 
provided in Chapter 1 allows me to explain precisely this normative implication for
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standard cases of international crimes. I will use different varieties of terrorism to 
examine the explanatory potential of the view I endorse here. Chapter 4 provides a 
fresh look at the issues o f international and universal jurisdiction, i.e., at the theoretical 
explanation for the scope of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
and the proposition that every state should have the right to punish O for international 
crimes. It challenges the standard position that seeks to explain the territorial scope of 
the ICC’s jurisdiction by reference to state consent or delegation of powers and rejects 
arguments for universal jurisdiction based, e.g., on the pursuit of peace, and the 
interests of humanity as such.
The final chapter of the thesis provides a theory of legitimate authority to try 
offenders. It applies Joseph Raz’s influential service conception of authority to the 
question o f what conditions a given body should meet in order to claim, itself, the 
power to punish O. This will enable a philosophical examination o f certain charges 
often raised against extraterritorial prosecutions. I will examine issues such as “show 
trials”, victor’s justice, “clean hands”, tu quoque, and trials in absentia or against 
defendants who have been abducted abroad. I will ultimately argue that although some 
of these considerations might undermine a particular state holding the power to punish 
a given offender, they are all unrelated to the fact that it purports to punish O 
extraterritorially. In other words, I will argue that although the argument for a given 
body’s authority is necessary in order to provide a complete justification for this body 
holding the power to punish O, it is conceptually and normatively mistaken to consider 
these obstacles as bars to extraterritorial jurisdiction. A conclusion will summarize the 
central findings of the thesis and suggest possible avenues for future research.
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1
An interest-based justification for S’s right to punish O
1. The right to punish
In the general Introduction I have suggested that in order to explain the extraterritorial 
scope o f the right to punish we need to look at the reasons that justify S holding the right 
to punish a particular individual in the first place. I will argue for this position in the 
next four chapters of this thesis. For present purposes it suffices to note that this 
position is common in discussions regarding other aspects o f the scope o f S’s right to 
punish, such as sentencing severity, or the kind of penalties that might be morally 
warranted.1 Deterrence, retribution and moral reform, for example, standardly lead to 
different normative implications in particular situations. They would deal differently, 
for instance, with an otherwise peaceful offender who has murdered an unfaithful 
partner or with a recidivist shoplifter. I will argue that this same reasoning applies, 
mutatis mutandi, to the analysis o f the extraterritorial scope of the right to punish. This is 
therefore where we must start our enquiry.
In this chapter I will provide an explanation for the proposition “S has a moral right 
to punish O ”. But in order to do this, I first need to provide a more detailed analysis of 
the structure of this right. This has significant implications for the account of 
extraterritorial punishment I put forward. I have argued, following Hohfeld, that the 
proposition “S has a right to cp” may take the form of a claim, a liberty, a power or an 
immunity. Within this framework, the right to punish involves first and foremost a 
normative power. When an individual (O) is convicted in a criminal trial, she enters the
1 Michael Moore goes as far as arguing that retributivism determines, in fact, also what we should punish 
(Michael S. Moore, PlacingBlame : A  Theory of Criminal Taw (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 169-170). 
For critical remarks, see Leo Zaibert, Punishment and Retribution (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), chapter 6.
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courtroom holding certain rights and leaves it with some of her rights altered.2 Usually, 
she would be imprisoned, some of her property would be taken away from her, or 
some other burden will be imposed upon her.3 In other words, her moral boundaries 
are redefined. However, when we say that S has the right to punish O, we not only 
mean that she holds the normative power to alter O ’s rights in this harmful way, but 
also that it is permissible for her to do so. Yet, as argued in section 3.1 o f the general 
Introduction, the fact that someone holds such a power to modify these rights in the 
relevant way does not per se entail that she is at liberty to do so. These notions are of a 
different order. Thus, a justification for this moral right would characteristically require 
also an account of S being at liberty to punish O.4
Finally, it would hardly make sense to say that S has a right to punish O if the 
exercise of this normative power and her liberty were not protected by certain claim- 
rights. First, it usually requires a claim against O and other parties interfering or 
resisting its exercise. Secondly, in contemporary societies individuals are not only under 
a duty not to interfere with the state punishing an offender; they are also under a duty 
to contribute financially and in some other ways to the exercise of this right.5 To sum 
up, the right to punish is a complex molecular right. I will not be able to fully address
2 This normative change (criminal sanction) must not be conflated with the force exercised to enforce it. 
I assume, throughout, that officials o f the legal system concerned are authorized (i.e. morally justified) to 
use force in order to enforce this decision within the territorial boundaries of the political organization 
they belong to. This right to use force comprises, however, only a liberty and a claim-right. Thus it is on 
a different level than the power to punish. On the right to territorial integrity see the general Introduction 
to this thesis.
3 As a matter o f fact, many more rights are altered depending on the jurisdiction and the legal order. For 
example, a person’s rights regarding the education o f her children, some o f her political rights, her right 
to privacy, etc. The power to alter these rights is different to the power considered here but a full 
account o f this issue is beyond the scope o f this thesis.
4 This is the core incident o f the right to punish in Alan John Simmons, The Lockean Theoiy of Rights 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 162. For a criticism o f this view, see Daniel 
McDermott, The Duty to Punish and Legitimate Government', The Journal of Political Philosophy 7, no. 2 
(1999). However, unlike mine, McDermott’s point is not that as a matter o f analytical jurisprudence the 
right to punish is a power-right. Rather, he argues that “punishment requires the existence o f some sort 
o f authoritative hierarchical relationship in order to qualify as punishment” {ibid). This insight is 
captured in this thesis in Chapter 5 below and stands, I suggest, on very different considerations.
5 People are usually under a duty, inter alia, to go to court as witnesses, to hand in any evidence that a 
tribunal requests, to act as members o f the jury.
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each one of its incidents here.6 I will only concentrate on S’s power and its liberty to 
punish O as these incidents arguably conform the core of this right. Yet, I will argue 
that all the normative work needed in this thesis will be carried out by the first o f these 
two incidents.
According to the theory of rights I have endorsed in this thesis, each o f these two 
incidents will have to be explained by reference to certain relevant interests o f particular 
individuals. Thus, I will examine some of the leading justifications for legal punishment 
under this interest-based framework and find them wanting. The reason for this is that 
they either fail to identify a particular interest which would be sufficiently important to 
warrant the protection of a right, or because the interest on which they are based would 
lead to harsher and morally unacceptable practices. I will argue, by contrast, that a state 
S’s prima facie power to punish O is based on the joint interest o f individuals in that state 
in its criminal laws being in force (section 3.1.2). This is because having a system of 
criminal law in force constitutes a public good that benefits individuals who live under 
it in a certain way. Furthermore, I will argue that legal punishment o f the guilty is also 
morally permissible. This is explained by the fact that criminal wrongdoers forfeit their 
claim-right against S punishing them (section 3.2). Accordingly, S not only holds a prima 
facie power to punish O, it is also prima facie at liberty to do so.
It is important to bear in mind that each of these arguments provides a justification 
only for a prima facie right.7 This means that rights are assigned in abstract, without 
consideration o f the particularities of the context. In short, an obvious concern would 
be that there might be certain countervailing considerations that might, all things 
considered, argue against S holding, e.g., a power to punish O. Take for example the 
case in which O can claim a prima facie immunity against S punishing her. This may be 
because she has already been punished in another jurisdiction, or because she happens 
to be the head of government of another state. Indeed, it might be the case that the
6 A complete justification o f the right to mete out legal punishment would also need to examine whether 
A is under a duty to exercise this particular power. In other words, whether punishment is morally 
required. I will not address this issue here.
7 Indeed, when I refer to a power or a liberty in this chapter I am in fact talking about prima facie powers 
and liberties. For simplicity, I will not repeat this formulation every time.
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interest that justifies O holding a prima facie immunity overrides the interest on which 
S’s prima facie power to punish her rests. I will not address these countervailing 
considerations in this thesis.
Two final points of clarification are in order. Throughout this chapter, I will 
distinguish between contingent and non-contingent justifications for legal punishment 
and stress the importance of providing a unitary, non-contingent explanation for this 
moral right.8 I use the notion of contingency here in the restricted sense of arguments 
that apply in some circumstances in which punishment seems warranted, but are unable 
to accommodate other standard cases. I shall provide an explanation that, I contend, is 
suitable for all possible scenarios in which punishment is arguably warranted. I assume 
that a contingent explanation is unsatisfactory even if, when it works, it is more 
appealing than the non-contingent one. Preferring a non-contingent argument is not a 
matter of personal taste. A unitary justification contributes significandy to the clarity 
and workability of the argument.
Finally, the argument I will present in this chapter is not a complete justification 
for S holding the power to punish O. The aim of this chapter is to identify a particular 
interest that is sufficiendy important to warrant conferring upon S the normative power 
to punish 0. Yet, as I suggested in the general Introduction, in order to claim that S 
holds the power to punish O it does not suffice that I can identify a particular interest 
which is sufficiendy important to be protected by a right; I also need to provide an 
account for S having the authority to do so. I will provide such an account in the final 
chapter of this thesis. Accordingly, and for the sake o f simplicity, I will assume here 
that S does fulfil the relevant conditions for her to have the authority to punish O.
So much for the introduction. I will present my justification for the right to punish 
in section 3. In section 2 ,1 provide a definition o f legal punishment.
8 This distinction is meant to supersede Nozick’s argument against teleological justifications o f  
punishment. In fact, I suggest that his problem with that kind o f justifications is not their moral 
structure per se (i.e., that they are teleological) but, rather, that the teleological arguments he discusses 
(such as moral reform) are contingent. This is because he mistakenly assumes that every teleological 
argument is necessarily contingent. See his Philosophical Explanations, 372-4.
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2. A definition of legal punishment
Punishment constitutes the distinguishing feature o f any system o f criminal law.9 
Clarifying the concept of legal punishment is necessary to any justification of this 
practice mainly because of the strong tendency to conflate conceptual elements with 
normative ones.10 Legal punishment has been influentially defined as an evil or a 
deprivation of a good (1), visited intentionally qua evil by human beings other than the 
offender (2), on someone “considered” an offender (3), for his offence (4), by a human 
agency which is authomed by the legal order (5).11 Hart noted that while assessing any 
definition o f punishment it is important to avoid what he calls the ‘definitional stop’, 
i.e., “an abuse of definition ... in arguing against the utilitarian claim that the practice of 
punishment is justified by the beneficial consequences resulting from the observance of 
the laws which it secures”.12 In other words, he warns us against using conceptual 
analysis to rule out one justification or the other, that is, to make a normative point. 
Accordingly, when punishment is defined as involving the visitation o f hard treatment 
upon someone “for his offence” (4), this should not be construed as claiming that the 
reason we have for punishing O is that she committed an offence. This would be 
smuggling a normative point under a conceptual disguise. All this element involves is 
the purely descriptive statement that S punishes O stating that O has committed some 
criminal wrongdoing.
As a result, this definition, pace Hart, is perfectly consistent with utilitarian 
justifications. Let me explain. The standard objection against utilitarianism is that it
9 The U.S. Supreme Court, e.g., invokes the notion o f punishment as the relevant criterion to decide 
whether a given sanction is criminal in nature. See Kennedy v  Mendo%a-Martine%.
10 A further problem is that the concept of punishment is also used in many and diverse contexts in our 
social life. It belongs, quite comfortably, in educational and religious contexts, but also in relations 
between friends, couples and even strangers. Some o f the conceptual obscurities and problematic 
intuitions affecting the justification for legal punishment, I suspect, stem from the fact that it is difficult 
to isolate this practice from the moral intuitions or principles that work or shape punishment in other 
social contexts. Admittedly, it is not always clear one should do this, but at least it seems plausible that 
many o f these practices are sufficiently dissimilar to merit their own set o f rules governing them (on this, 
see P. F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, and Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1974), 19-20 and, 
strongly against my position here, Zaibert, Punishment and Retribution).
111 follow the Flew-Benn-Hart definition as stated in H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in 
the Philosophy of haw (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978), 4-5.
12 ibid, 5.
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cannot help but justify punishing the innocent given certain circumstances which I will 
not try to specify here. Hart feared that someone might feel tempted to take a shortcut 
and argue that became utilitarianism justifies punishing the innocent, and punishment is 
an institution that by definition entails punishing the guilty, it is not punishment that 
utilitarians justify but something else. However, this will clearly not do. Punishing the 
innocent may be a normative difficulty, but is clearly unrelated to the concept of 
punishment that utilitarians (as well as retributivists) endorse.
Ironically, the definitional stop might have been working in the opposite direction 
to the one that concerned Hart. This definition seems quite well suited to 
accommodate consequentialist justifications such as deterrence, moral reform or 
rehabilitation but not some of the other arguments that have been advanced.13 In trying 
to achieve a purely analytical definition Hart overlooked a conceptual element that is at 
the core o f the practice o f legal punishment.14 By defining punishment purely as a form 
of external behaviour, Hart fails to distinguish between sentencing and exacting 
compensation. Both are deprivations of goods (evils), visited intentionally qua evils by 
human beings other than the offender, on her, for her breach of a rule, and are 
imposed by a human agency which is authorized by the legal order. But certainly the 
latter is usually distinguished from legal punishment and regulated by a different set of 
rules. Thus, there must be something missing.
An influential trend in the literature has argued that what is missing is the further 
expressive or communicative element involved in legal punishment.15 Thus, the 
argument goes, punishment is not only a deprivation of a good but also, and crucially, a 
kind of language. Punishment, in Feimberg’s words, is not a mere price tag paid for
13 Igor Primoratz, 'Punishment as Language', Philosophy, no. 64 (1989).
14 Hart himself makes this mistake when he assesses the merits o f the denunciatory or expressive theory 
o f punishment. By portraying it in purely normative terms he ignores the crucial conceptual point on 
which it relies and, as a result, his conceptual definition ends up being normatively biased. See Hart, 
Punishment and Responsibility, 169-173.
15 See famously “The expressive function of Punishment” in Joel Feinberg, Doing &  Deserving Essays in 
the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974) and Antony Duff, Punishment, 
Communication, and Community (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). I do not rely here on 
D u ff s distinction between expression and communication.
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some already consumed good.16 It is an act o f moral communication and, more 
precisely, of moral criticism. Punishment expresses condemnation of the crime. It also, 
and crucially for our purposes, communicates to individuals that the criminal law that 
the offender has violated is in force. And it is precisely this expressive or 
communicative element that punishment has and torts lack.
We must be careful, however, not to turn this conceptual point into a normative 
one.17 But ignoring this feature narrows by definition the kind of normative argument that 
may be used to justify legal punishment. How deeply entrenched this communicative or 
expressive element is in the standard practice of legal punishment is insightfully shown 
by Nozick’s observation that punishment is visited “with the desire that the person 
know why this is occurring and know that she was intended to know”.18 Similarly, 
publicity is a widely extended feature of criminal trials which simply means that 
punishment is visited also with the desire that society at large know that punishment is 
occurring and why.19
The coexistence o f these two elements (a certain external behaviour and a symbolic 
element) is thus crucial to understanding what legal punishment is. The relationship 
between them, however, needs further elaboration. The position I advocate does not 
entail that the notion of legal punishment is constituted by an element of hard 
treatment and another element expressing censure. Rather, it is the hard treatment itself 
or the external behaviour in general that usually expresses this condemnation or 
censure. As Feinberg puts it, “the very walls of his cell condemn him”.20
3. A normative justification for the right to punish
My point of departure is, then, that the tight to punish O is a complex molecular right. 
Analytically, it comprises first a normative power to change O ’s moral boundaries in a
16 Feinberg, Doing &  Deserving.
17 Among scholars who consider this expressive element a defining element o f legal punishment one can 
distinguish, following Primoratz, between extrinsic expressivist arguments (consequendalist) and 
intrinsic expressivism (deontological). See Primoratz, 'Punishment as Language'.
18 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), 368.
19 On publicity see D uff et al, The Trial on Trial. Vol. 3.
20 Feinberg, Doing &  Deserving, 98.
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way that entails visiting hard treatment or some form of burden upon her.21 The fact 
that someone holds this power means that someone else, O, is under a liability to having 
punishment inflicted upon her. Secondly, this right usually involves also being at liberty 
to change O ’s moral boundaries in this particular harmful way. Being at liberty to mete 
out punishment means that O lacks a claim-right against suffering the harm involved in 
legal punishment. I take it that S has a power to punish O if and only if an aspect of 
someone’s well-being (an interest of her) is a sufficient reason for holding O under a 
liability to undergoing this kind of treatment. I also take it that S is at liberty to exercise 
that power if no aspect of O ’s well-being is a sufficient reason for holding S under a 
duty not to do so.
3.1 The justification for S’s power to punish O
The purpose o f this section is, thus, to identify a particular interest in O being punished 
that is sufficiendy important to be protected by a right. Let us begin with a simple case. 
In Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikof famously killed a pawnbroker and 
her sister, who had no other family or descendants. Good or evil, these two women 
had a right to their lives, i.e., they had an interest in remaining alive that was sufficiendy 
important to put Raskolnikof, inter alia, under a duty not to kill them. Moreover, their 
right standardly also entailed a right to self-defence. While Raskolnikof was threatening 
them with his axe, this fundamental interest arguably granted them a liberty to repel his 
attack even at the cost o f his life. On similar grounds, it would have been permissible 
for, e.g., Ivan and Olga, who were just passing by, to use force against Raskolnikof in 
order to rescue the two sisters.22 However, the problem begins once these two women 
are dead, for it cannot possibly follow that their interest in being alive can entail 
conferring a normative power upon third parties to inflict suffering on Dostoyevsky’s
21 Conceptualizing this power as a right is not to say its exercise is discretionary. Powers can also be 
single rights in the sense that they can confer nondiscretionary authority. Thus, under mandatory 
sentencing laws judge A would have to exercise this power to sentence O whether he likes it or not.
22 For present purposes I assume that most people would accept the claim that individuals have a moral 
right to resist, repel, ward off or prevent otherwise irreparable unjust harm. On this see Suzanne 
Uniacke, Permissible Killing : The Self-Defence Justification of Homicide (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 227.
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unusual hero.23 Eloquently, both the ‘self-defence’ and the ‘defence of others’ 
justifications in criminal law make it clear that this suffering is permissible if and only if, 
inter alia, there is an imminent attack on someone’s rights and the act of defence a 
necessary means to rescue her from that attack.24 The sisters’ right to life only allows 
this much. Their interest in staying alive cannot ground a right to inflict suffering upon 
Raskolnikof. In this type of situation punishment simply arrives too late.
How inadequate this argument is as an explanation for the right to punish is 
further illustrated by the fact that this interest can only explain a first order incident, i.e., 
a liberty to use force against O. It remains unclear how V’s interest in remaining alive 
can result in O being under a liability to have some o f her fundamental rights altered in 
the way punishment requires.
My point then is quite simple. The difficulty in explaining the power to punish O 
from an interest-based perspective does not arise only from the fact that it implies 
inflicting harm upon a human being but, more crucially, it has to do with the fact that 
this suffering does not seem to be entailed by anyone’s concrete interest. At least it is 
clearly not entailed by a right that O herself has violated or has attempted to violate. 
Admittedly, this particular claim holds only insofar as the victim dies. To this it may 
suffice to respond that an argument for punishment that is unable to accommodate 
precisely the case o f accomplished murder is not only contingent, but utterly 
unpromising. Moreover, it would lead to the absurd conclusion that if O were to 
commit a robbery, she could escape punishment simply by killing her victim.25
23 I assume for present purposes that the dead cannot have rights. Admittedly, this is a controversial 
stance to take (supporting this view see, Fabre, Whose Body Is It Anyway?, 22-23; against it, see Feinberg, 
Harm to Others). To challenge this view, however, it would not suffice to show that the dead can have 
rights. It would have to be argued that they have an interest in O being punished that is sufficiendy 
important to confer upon S, e.g., the power to punish her. In so far as the rescuer’s liberty is grounded 
on V ’s interest in being alive, this is unlikely.
24 For a succinct and clear account, see Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford ; New  
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 139-141.
25 Extending the definition o f a victim, for instance, to her family (as in re Kurt, ECHR, and Barrios Altos, 
ICHR among others) would not solve this difficulty because this rationale could eventually be extended 
to the killing o f her family.
52
Accordingly, these simple points lead to three basic, but important, implications. 
First, S’s power to punish O cannot be straightforwardly based on the interest of 
victims. This is clearly reflected in the fact that in most legal systems victims do not 
have the normative power to waive nor promote the exercise of the state’s right to 
punish, at least with regards to the vast majority o f offences. Thus, if we are to identify 
the interest that grounds this particular right, we need to look elsewhere.26 Secondly, 
the justification for first order incidents, such as the liberty to protect V, should not be 
conflated with the justification for the normative power to punish O.27 The liberty to 
intervene in state S for humanitarian reasons is independent from, and in fact belongs 
on a different level to the power to punish offences committed in S extraterritorially. 
Finally, the points made in the preceding paragraph highlight a significant advantage of 
the rights-based framework I advocate. Namely, that it requires not simply an argument 
that punishment is generally advantageous, but rather that it forces us to identify whose 
interest it serves and what interest this is. In Jeffrie Murphy’s words, even if 
punishment of a person would have good consequences, the question is still what gives 
S the moral right to inflict it upon O.28
This, furthermore, also makes it implausible to argue that this power is justified 
exclusively by reference to the interests o f O. Unless one subscribes to a platonic 
conception of the human being, in which some sort of equilibrium between her 
different “parts” is intrinsically valuable, and assumes punishment would help bring 
about this equilibrium, it would be too cynical to argue that the suffering involved in 
legal punishment would be justified by its contribution to O ’s well-being. Yet, if the 
power to punish O has to be explained by taking into consideration the interests of
26 This argument does not entail taking any stance vis-a-vis the rights o f victims during a criminal trial. 
In fact, I suspect that an interest-based theory o f rights will at least be compatible with granting them 
several procedural rights, such as the right to attend the trial, introduce evidence, be legally represented, 
etc.
27 This is a quite common conflation in the literature on International Criminal Law. See, e.g. Robert D. 
Sloane, 'The Expressive Capacity o f International Punishment: The Limits o f the National Law Analogy 
and the Potential o f International Criminal Law', Stanford Journal of International Law 43 (2007), 45-46.
28Jeffide Murphy, "Marxism and Retribution," in Retribution, Justice andTherapy (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979).
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third parties, surely there must be some sort of forward-looking component to its 
justification.
3.1.1 The interest in retribution
Even those who deny any rational justification for criminal sanctions rely in one way or 
another on an argument of the kind just identified. For instance, Mackie argues that 
retributive punishment is not based on moral reasons, but on feeling or sentiment. The 
justification for legal punishment is based, fundamentally, on what he calls retributive 
emotion. Mackie offers a biological explanation in terms of standard evolutionary 
theory. He begins with the advantage to species and individuals of retaliatory behaviour 
and feeling, and proceeds on the basis of natural selection. This process ends with the 
socialization and moralizing o f retributive emotion.29 It might well be that his 
explanation is descriptively correct. However, it begs the fundamental normative 
question. What his explanation tacitly implies, and does not argue for, is that this 
emotion has arisen because retaliatory behaviour and feeling are advantageous. How are 
these advantageous, for whom, and how much, are precisely the questions any 
convincing account of criminal sanctions would need to address.
There are many different retributive arguments in the literature which provide an 
account of this forward-looking element.30 Antony Duff, for instance, has argued that 
the central point of punishment is to persuade the offender to accept the 
condemnation for her crime and, in accepting it, to repent that crime and reform her 
future conduct.31 Leaving aside the kind of state this view presupposes or what to do 
with offenders who will not possibly reform or even listen, it is hard to see whose 
interest would ground this necessity o f a secular penance, and why this interest would
29 John Mackie, 'Morality and the Retributive Emotions', CriminalJustice Ethics 1, no. 1 (1982).
30 I take retributivism in a broad sense here. There is quite a bit o f controversy as to precisely which 
doctrines are stricdy retributivist. For conflicting views see, e.g., John Cottingham, 'Varieties o f  
Retribution', Philosophical Quarterly 29, no. 116 (1979), David Dolinko, 'Some Thoughts About 
Retributivism', Ethics 101, no. 3 (1991), and Zaibert, Punishment and Retribution, chapter 6.
31 See Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community. See also Uma Narayan, 'Appropriate Responses 
and Preventive Benefits: Justifying Censure and Hard Treatment in Legal Punishment', Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 13, no. 2 (1993), 174. For a standard criticism of this view see von Hirsch, ‘Punishment, 
Penance and the State’ in Matt Matravers, Punishment and Political Theory (Oxford: Hart Pub., 1999).
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be important enough to justify O ’s liability to suffering the harmful consequences that 
legal punishment involves. That is, unless some further benefit is identified.
Ted Honderich, for his part, suggests that the truth in retributivism is that 
punishment is justified pardy or wholly by grievance-satisfaction.32 This seems more 
plausible. However, in a case such as Raskolnikov’s it is unclear whose grievance this 
would be. I suspect that every reader feels more grief for his fate, or for Sonia’s, than 
for the two women. More importandy, perhaps, an argument needs to be made as to 
why we should protect this interest in the first place. The fact that we have this feeling 
does not entail that it merits the protection given by a right. Punishment cannot be 
valuable just because it is wanted.33 Indeed, not many people would argue for a right to 
exercise vengeance upon O even if this were also deeply desired. Those who desire it 
must also believe it is valuable and do so only on the condition that it is valuable. This 
is precisely what Honderich’s argument needs but fails to show.
3.1.2 The interest in having a system of criminal rules in force
The justification for this normative power I advocate is based, by contrast, on the claim 
that having a system of criminal law in force constitutes a public good that benefits the 
individuals who live under it in a certain way. This proposition rests on a conceptual 
and a normative claim. Conceptually, it implies that there is a necessary link between a 
legal system being in force and S having the power to punish those who violate these 
rules. It has been plausibly argued that a system of criminal law is in force if and only if 
both those subject to it and external observers have reasons to believe so.34 For this to 
obtain, three conditions must be met: i) those who violate these criminal rules should 
be punished; ii) they should be punished for committing the offence; and iii) this
32 Ted Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1984), 233-234.
33 See on this my discussion o f what kind of interest merit the protection o f a right in section 3.3 o f  the 
general Introduction to this thesis.
34 Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 171. On this, see also, H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Taw (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997). For standard criticisms, see J. M. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1980) and Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1978). For a very good analysis o f this issue endorsing the conceptual claim defended 
here, see Nicola Lacey, State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values (London: Routledge, 
1988), Chapter 4.
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punishment ought to be meted out by a body expressly authorized by that legal system. 
From the normative point of view, I will argue that having a set o f legal rules 
prohibiting murder, rape, etc. in force contributes to the well-being of individuals by 
giving them a sense of dignity and security. I will argue that the collective interest of the 
members of a society in having a criminal law system in force is sufficiendy important 
to put O under a liability to be punished.
Legal systems are commonly regarded as social institutions meant to regulate 
behaviour and setde disputes within a society. However, unlike other public goods, 
such as bridges or a water-supply system, their existence is not easy to establish. They do 
not allow people to cross over a river or get drinking water out of a tap. Laws exist in 
an altogether different way. Usually, we say that they exist when they are in force.35 
However, the meaning of this proposition needs further elaboration. Most people will 
agree that in order for a legal system to be in force it needs to enjoy some level of 
compliance. Albeit necessary, this is hardly a sufficient condition. British citizens may 
conform to a significant extent to the German criminal laws, but this hardly entails that 
these are in force in the UK. Moreover, the significance o f this requirement should not 
be overstated. Joseph Raz has plausibly argued that for a legal system to be in force it is 
not necessary that the population at large follows the law, nor that the laws constitute 
valid reasons for action for the people subject to them.36 Indeed, law-violations are 
quite common in every law-regulated society, and people usually act on extra-legal 
reasons (moral convictions, social condemnation, etc.). Rather, for a legal system to be 
in force it is necessary that people believe that laws are valid reasons for action, i.e., that 
they believe they are bound by them.37 Put differently, when we say that British laws are 
in force in the UK, it is because both British citizens and external commentators 
generally believe that these laws are binding there. In this particular sense we may claim, 
for example, that laws regulating the slave trade were in force in the Roman Empire.
35 See, for example, Joseph Raz, The Authority of Taw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 104.
36 Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 171.
37 ibid.
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The existence of a legal system, however, cannot depend merely on a psychological 
fact. That is, not any kind of belief would do. For instance, the fact that many 
American “bom  again” Christians believe that the Laws of God are in force in the US 
does not entail that, as a matter of fact, this is the case. Therefore, the question we must 
answer is: what kind of reasons must this belief be grounded on for the legal system to 
be in force? To answer this question, Raz points to the role that courts —i.e. law- 
applying institutions— play in a legal system.38 Legal systems standardly contain not only 
norms guiding individuals’ behaviour, but also an institutionalized way of creating laws 
and evaluating the conformity of that behaviour to the law. The existence of courts 
indicates that the legal system provides for an institutionalized way of determining legal 
situations. Their role mainly is to determine normative situations authoritatively and to 
do so in accordance with pre-existing norms which they are bound to apply.39 
Moreover, courts apply legal rules to the exclusion o f other conflicting considerations 
(unless the laws themselves allow them to do otherwise). Following Raz, I suggest that 
these exclusionary authoritative judgements constitute the basis on which officials, 
subjects and commentators must ground their belief if we are to assert that the legal 
system is in force. These considerations account for the fact that the right to punish 
takes the form of a normative power, and not merely a liberty.
Criminal sanctions are but one type of these norm-applying decisions. They are, 
however, necessary for any criminal law system to be in force.40 This proposition seems 
commonplace, but let me explain the reasons why I submit this is so. Possibly, many 
people would think that this is mainly because punishment deters potential offenders 
and a system can be said to be in force only if it achieves a certain level o f compliance. 
The argument might run along the following lines. Even if moral inhibitions are
38 ibid, 137.
39 ibid, 134.
40 Raz argues that although sanctions are as a matter o f fact necessary for a legal system to be in force, 
this is not logically so. Provided human nature were different, he claims, it would be possible to have a 
sanction-less legal system (ibid). I cannot address this issue here. Yet, I do not need to. I can simply 
stipulate that this argument holds provided that human nature is not radically modified in a relevant 
way. I willingly accept that the argument I provide is liable to this contingency charge. But this, I 
suspect, is a charge no moral argument can be free from.
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sufficiently strong to keep most people from committing serious crimes, whether this 
would hold true in a society without a machinery of criminal punishment seems more 
dubious.41 That individuals would not be deterred in such a society, however, does not 
need be so. It is arguably not clear that this minimum level o f compliance with basic 
moral norms would not be achieved if, for example, there is an effective police force 
authorized to prevent crimes and use a ‘shoot to kill’ policy against offenders caught 
red-handed. This, in fact, may be more determinative than the lack of courts and 
prisons in ensuring compliance with the law. The situation o f violent struggle in Iraq over 
the last couple of years, where courts are functioning but police prevention is not, 
illustrates this point neady.42
By contrast, I argue that the exercise of the power to punish offenders is necessary 
for a system of criminal law to be in force essentially because it grounds the belief that 
the rules o f the system are binding. It is usually accepted that when O murders V she 
not only causally determines his death; she also violates the legal rule prohibiting 
murder or prohibiting violations of the right to life. Similarly, punishment comprises 
both an element of hard treatment and an element o f censure which, though 
conceptually distinct, go together in practice. I contend that both elements are 
necessary to ground this belief in the bindingness o f criminal laws. Expressing censure 
in a purely symbolic way would be perceived as mocking this rule rather than affirming 
its existence. Only by depriving O of some good of hers would we take the existence of 
that legal rule seriously. Punishment is therefore needed “as a means of making the 
standards o f the criminal law real’, as a way of stating that the meEting o f those 
standards is a matter o f duty or obligation ... rather than merely a matter of 
exhortation or aspiration.”43 Similarly, the hard treatment element per se (as purely 
external behaviour) would not do either. To use von Hirsch’s metaphor, treating people
41 Johannes Andenaes, Punishment and Deterrence (Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press, 1974), 124. 
He quotes some cases in which due to police strikes or breakdown o f the state there was a very 
significant increase in the amount o f offences (ibid, 128 and 51). Unfortunately, I cannot evaluate here 
the pertinence and weight o f these examples.
42 It is also instructive to see what happened in East Timor after the Indonesian retreat.
43 Lacey, State Punishment, 182, emphasis in the original.
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‘like tigers in a circus’ by incapacitating them is merely like ‘neutralising a risk’.44 Such 
treatment denies rather than communicates the fact that their behaviour is bound by 
legal rules. Indeed, it would make litde sense to impose rules on tigers or hurricanes. 
Accordingly, a response to criminal behaviour that lacks this expressive or 
communicative element, and thereby treats O as a pure risk, would not be able to 
convey the message that the system of criminal law exists.
Moreover, in order for O being punished to ground the belief in the criminal law 
being in force, it has to be the case that she is punished for her offence. By this I do not 
mean that O has to be in fact guilty o f the particular wrongdoing. As it will become 
apparent below, it might be that she is innocent. Yet, the reason she is being punished 
must be that she allegedly has, to the relevant standard of proof required, perpetrated 
the offence. As Hart rightly points out, this is a conceptual not a normative point.45 The 
point is that convicting an innocent individual qua innocent would undermine rather 
than enhance the belief in the legal system being in force and, with it, the sense of 
dignity and security of individuals living under that legal system. Moreover, even the 
general perception that O is being punished for some reason other than the fact that 
she committed a criminal wrong, would undermine the message legal punishment needs 
to convey to the relevant stakeholders. To illustrate, although he was eventually 
imprisoned, the fact that A1 Capone was famously convicted for income tax evasion 
could have hardly contributed to the belief in that the laws against, e.g., homicide and 
other acts of racketeering were in force in Chicago in the 1930s. This is because, I 
suggest, his being punished is often perceived as an excuse to have him locked up, i.e., 
incapacitated.46 Even if individuals may feel safer because O is in prison, this would not 
reinforce their belief that the criminal laws are in force.
Finally, in order for a criminal sanction to restore the belief in the legal system 
being in force, it is necessary that this power is exercised by someone expressly
44 Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford; New York; Clarendon Press; Oxford University 
Press, 1993), 11.
45 See section 2 above.
46 On this, see my criticism o f Saddam Hussein’s trial in Chapter 5 below.
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authorized by that legal system. Indeed, in most legal systems only if a court of justice 
sentences an offender, its subjects and external commentators would agree that this 
system’s legal rule has been enforced.47 Private retaliation and harms imparted by 
natural forces may be expressions o f natural or poetic justice, but they cannot ground 
the belief that the relevant legal rule is in force. Similarly, the fact that German courts 
would claim the power to punish every act o f arson perpetrated in Korea would hardly 
ground the belief in Korea's criminal laws against arson being in force.48
This completes the conceptual analysis of the connection between S  holding the 
power to mete out legal punishment upon O and S ’s criminal law system being in force. 
I must now turn to the normative argument on which my account relies. I contend that 
S’s power to punish O is explained by the interest of individuals in having a criminal 
law system in force containing rules prohibiting murder, rape, torture, etc. I believe this 
interest is sufficiently important to warrant conferring the power to punish those who 
violate these rules. This is because, or so I claim, such a system contributes to the well­
being o f individuals in at least one important way. In Feinberg’s words, the criminal law 
“not only regulates my liberty by imposing duties and extending liberties to me, it also 
confers rights on me against my fellow citizens and thereby protects me from them in 
the exercise o f my liberties.”49 The fact that we believe that these rules are in force means 
that we consider not only ourselves, but also people around us bound by them. The 
criminal law, thus, contributes to our sense of being right-bearers and that the legal 
system takes the protection of our rights seriously. This is all I mean when I claim that 
it contributes to our sense of dignity and security. Admittedly, this is an empirical claim 
which I cannot fully demonstrate here. However, its plausibility can be convincingly 
defended on the basis o f a few standard observations.50
47 This is a factual claim not a conceptual or a normative one. For an argument that this should 
(normatively) be the case, see Chapter 5 below.
48 On this, see Chapter 2 below.
49 Feinberg, Harm to Others, 8.
50 This is not such a great handicap in this area. In Tallgren’s words: “Any analysis [of this issue] 
operates ... in an area o f more or less justified belief.” (Tmmi Tallgren, 'The Sensibility and Sense of  
International Criminal Law', European Journal of International Haw 13, no. 3 (2002), 590).
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The benefit that a system o f criminal laws being in force provides to individuals in 
S is hardly trivial. Consider the alternative. We would probably not want to live in a 
society which only allows for private self-defence and retaliation as responses to 
wrongdoing. Arguably, the situation would quickly deteriorate and individuals would 
end up living in constant fear,51 as living conditions in failed states tend to illustrate. 
Furthermore, legal punishment contributes to our well-being in a way that neither 
effective policing, nor a system of civil compensation can. Regardless o f how many 
resources we allocate to policing or o f whether O would be liable to pay compensation 
to V, if no punishment awaits those guilty of criminal wrongdoing individuals will not 
consider people around them bound by such prohibitions. Imagine what it would be 
like to live not considering people around us bound by a system of legal rules prohibiting, 
e.g., murder, rape, etc.
Moreover, a system o f criminal laws being in force is arguably a necessary 
condition, even if not a sufficient one, to achieve a particular kind of public order. 
Public order is generally considered, in itself, of enormous significance to individuals’ 
well-being. Yet, my argument does not rely on just any kind o f public order. Public 
order could be maintained by means such as terror, as the USSR under Stalin and many 
other brutal dictatorships apdy illustrate.52 By contrast, when the criminal law operates 
in the way advocated here, that is, by a centralized authority enforcing rules against 
murder, rape, etc., it contributes to bring about a kind of order that is based on the 
moral significance o f the rights of individuals. This particular kind of public order is 
quite plausibly of the utmost importance for the well-being of individuals. I suggest that 
the reason why this is so is precisely that, unlike public order in dictatorial regimes, it 
contributes significandy to their sense o f dignity and security.
In sum, this feeling of dignity and security is arguably an essential component of 
our well-being, and possibly a precondition for leading a minimally decent life. These 
considerations show that there being a system of criminal laws prohibiting murder,
51 See, famously, Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 13.
52 Admittedly, this is a matter o f degree. For even the most horrendous regimes do, as a matter o f fact, 
enforce certain actual violations o f basic rights.
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rape, etc. in force is both necessary and important for individuals to enjoy this kind of 
good. Thus, I claim that their interest in these rules being in force is sufficiently important to 
confer upon S the power to punish O.
Three caveats are in order here. First, this justification does not rely on the claim 
that punishing offenders will ground a belief in not being ourselves victims of criminal 
wrongdoing. I am afraid that neither the criminal law, nor any other available social 
institution, would be able to achieve this. Rather, this argument relies only on the 
weaker claim that in the society in which we live we benefit from the fact that there is a 
rule prohibiting, e.g., torture, murder, rape, etc. in force. Thus, the interest we may have 
in minimising such risks should not be conflated with our interest in having a system of 
rules that is binding upon individuals.
Secondly, the interest in having a system o f criminal rules in force is both a 
necessary and a sufficient condition for the allocation of this power. Admittedly, there 
are many beneficial by-products of having these legal rules in force. It is often argued, 
for instance, that punishment enhances social cooperation. Laws against money 
counterfeiting, fraud and other related offences arguably contribute to facilitating trade 
and commercial transactions between parties. Punishment is also said to discourage 
certain violent reactions towards wrongdoing, such as private vengeance or self-help, to 
provide a public record o f the wrong that has been committed, to contribute to 
restoring social cohesion, to appease the grievance desires o f victims, and to provide 
the opportunity to the offender to reflect and resolve to reform.53 Yet, under the 
argument provided here none of these other beneficial aspects o f the institution of legal 
punishment are necessary to justify the allocation of this power.
Finally, this argument is not based exclusively on my interest alone in the system of 
criminal rules being in force, but rather on individuals’ collective interest in this kind of 
good. As we saw in the general Introduction, collective rights are based on a joint 
interest that justifies the imposition o f duties, no-rights, liabilities and disabilities on 
others. Thus, my claim here is that individuals’^ ’#//// interest in having this set of rules in
53 Lacey, State Punishment, 183-184.
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force is prima facie sufficiently important (in terms of its bearing on their well-being) to 
hold O under a liability to have hard treatment meted out upon her.
This consideration helps me clarify the role that victims, interests play in the 
argument here advocated. In the previous section I argued that the interest in being 
protected against a particular wrongdoing can, at best, provide a contingent justification 
for S’s power to punish O. And even this was incompatible with some of our central 
intuitions regarding the practice of legal punishment. Here I want to suggest that 
victims share with other individuals in S the interest in the criminal rules being in force. 
Put differently, their interest has no particular status in conferring upon S the power to 
punish O, as it is illustrated by the fact that in most legal systems victims usually lack 
the power to waive or promote the exercise of the state’s power to punish O.54
By contrast, it could be objected that O may legitimately complain that she does 
not belong to the collective whose interest warrants conferring this power. This is 
because, the argument goes, it is not in her interest to be punished. I disagree. 
Admittedly, O has a clear interest in not being inflicted hard treatment. But this says 
nothing against her (also) having a general interest in wrongdoers being punished. 
Moreover, the former interest is independent from the latter. When she arrives in prison, 
she arguably has an interest in the criminal rule against murder being in force on the 
premises. This is because, or so I claim, this rule would contribute to her sense of 
dignity and security. Put differendy, O benefits herself from this public good and she 
does so irrespectively of whether she would prefer not to enjoy this benefit at all. As a 
result, she cannot claim that she is being alienated from the collective whose interests 
explain S’s power to punish.
To conclude, I suggest that the criminal law shares the main features of what is 
usually conceptualized as a public good.55 In Raz’s words, “a good is a public good in a
54 See footnote 26 above.
551 share with Nicola Lacey the sense that it is crucial to conceptualize the criminal law as a public good 
(see Lacey, State Punishment, Chapter 8). However, I suggest that the liberal framework advocated here 
does much better than her preferred communitarian one, particularly with regards to the territorial and 
extraterritorial scope o f the power to punish. On the relevance o f belonging to a community see my 
discussion in Chapters 2 and 5 below.
63
certain society if and only if the distribution of its benefits in that society is not subject 
to voluntary control by anyone other than each potential beneficiary controlling his 
share o f the benefits”.56 Examples of public goods are public transport or a water 
supply system. But public goods need not be of this sort. Other kinds are things such as 
living in a tolerant society, the flourishing of the arts, etc. Public goods, in short, are all 
sorts o f goods that have the capacity to benefit individuals collectively. Admittedly, they 
allow that someone may not profit herself from this good and, also, that different people 
may benefit from this good to different degrees.57 But nonetheless it does hold that 
what defines this kind of good is the non-exclusivity of their enjoyment.
3.1.3 The interest in reducing crime
One may legitimately wonder whether this is the most important reason we have for 
punishing an offender. At face value, the answer seems to be a plain £N o\ Take 
deterrence, for example.58 This theory broadly argues that punishment is justified by its 
consequences as a means o f protecting individual’s rights and other valuable goods. This 
is achieved, standardly, by deterring potential offenders. There is a reasonable degree of 
consensus that, to some extent, legal punishment does deter criminal behaviour. More 
precisely, the claim is that “ordinary people can sometimes be deterred by both formal and informal
56 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 198.
57 ibid, 199.
58 I will discuss only this type o f consequentialist justification. Admittedly, this means leaving aside 
Braitwaite and Pettit’s republican theory o f punishment (John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit, N ot Just 
Deserts : A  Republican Theory of Criminal Justice (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990)). Although their argument has 
been influential, I will not be able to deal with it here. The main reason I choose to deal with deterrence 
rather than “dominion” is its persistent influence and popularity particularly in debates regarding 
extraterritorial prosecutions. This is true at the level o f policy (deterrence is invoked in the preambles to 
the Security Council resolutions creating the ICTY and ICTR (SC Res. 827 (1993) and 955 (1994), 
respectively) and in the Preamble o f the ICC Statute (see also Prosecutor v  Rutaganda § 456 (ICTR) and 
Prosecutor v  Delalic § 1234 (ICTY)). But it is also true at the level o f theory and doctrine. See e.g. Sloane, 
'The Expressive Capacity o f International Punishment'; Mark J. Osiel, Why Prosecute? Critics o f  
Punishment for Mass Atrocity', Human Rights Quarterly 22 (2000); Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, 
and International Law (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Theodor Meron, War 
Crimes Law Comes of Age : Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1998), 196; 
Tallgren, 'The Sensibility and Sense o f International Criminal Law'; and Lucy Carver and Paul Roberts, 
"Penal Law and Global Justice" (2008), paper cited with permission from the authors.
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sanctionZ’.59 Then, is not protecting people’s rights more important than re-establishing 
their confidence in a set of rules being in force? And, if so, should not this interest 
warrant the protection of a right? In effect, the interest in protecting individuals’ rights 
is arguably stronger than the interest in having a system of rules in force (though they 
are not mutually exclusive). However, I submit that this interest cannot explain S’s power 
to punish O.60
In short, it does not follow from the interest that individuals have in deterring 
potential criminals that we should assign S a normative power to punish O, but rather 
this interest seems to warrant conferring upon S a different type of right. Let me 
explain. If the ‘more’ punishment is exacted, the stronger the deterrence effect, we 
should have no trouble endorsing Feuerbach’s classic formula according to which the 
risk for the lawbreaker must be made so great, the punishment so severe, that he knows 
he has more to lose than he has to gain from his crime. In this light, it is at least 
dubious that our interest in preventing crimes explains O being under a liability to being 
inflicted legal punishment. Rather, this interest is more clearly served by a liberty to stop 
and harm O, rather than by a power to punish her.
There are several examples in the international sphere that illustrate this point well. 
NATO military intervention against Serbia, for one, had a much stronger impact on 
stopping the crimes being perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia against, e.g. the 
Albanian Kosovar population, than the establishment o f the ICTY or any other threat 
o f extraterritorial punishment.61 Similarly, President Reagan characterized the US air 
raid on Libya on April 15, 1986, as being a “pre-emptive action” that would provide 
Col. Kadhafi “with incentives and reasons to change his criminal behaviour”.62 To put
59 Andrew von Hirsch et aL, Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity: A.n A.nalysis of Recent Research (Oxford: 
Hart Pub., 1999), 1 and 33-37. They emphasize, however, that twenty years before, the overview carried 
out in the US by the Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects o f the National 
Academy o f Science still showed some significant doubts regarding this issue (at 12-13 and 47).
60 In this chapter I provide certain reasons against deterrence as an adequate justification for the power 
to punish O in its own terms. In Chapter 2, however, I will argue that deterrence is worse suited to deal 
with the issue o f extraterritoriality than the argument advocated here (see section 6).
61 Indeed, the massacres in Srebrenica occurred two years after the creation o f the ICTY, and the 
atrocities in Kosovo were perpetrated almost six years later.
62 D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International haw (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), 936.
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it bluntly, then, deterrence would advocate summary executions or pre-emptive military 
attacks rather than cosdy criminal trials and long prison sentences.
Moreover, the connection between the power to punish O and deterrence must be 
critically examined under the light of the admittedly limited empirical data available. For 
it to work, deterrence depends on two separate and accumulative causal links. First, the 
visitation of punishment needs to result in actual deterrence of potential offenders. 
Secondly, the deterrence of potential offenders should cause a reduction in the overall 
number of offences.
The first causal link is of particular relevance for us here.63 Indeed, the link 
between the visitation of legal punishment and the actual deterrence it achieves is 
significandy conditioned by the fact that deterrence is a subjective phenomenon. 
Accordingly, what matters is not so much the actual infliction o f punishment but, 
rather, what potential offenders believe the threatened consequences to be and how 
they evaluate them.64 Available empirical studies suggest that the relationship between 
actual behaviour and future consequences (offences and punishment in particular) is far 
more complex than it is intuitively thought, and that it sometimes conflicts with the 
principles that traditional deterrence has embraced.65 Behavioural studies argue that it is 
not clear that potential offenders take into consideration future consequences often 
enough when deciding to commit an offence.66 This is even more notorious in violent 
crimes, in which an emotional component is usually involved.67
63 The second link is affected by phenomena such as ‘destigmatization’, ‘deterrence decay’, mass 
incarceration, etc. See e.g. von Hirsch et al., Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity, 8 and Daniel Nagin, 
"Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset o f the Twenty-First Century," in Crime and Justice: A. Review 
of Research, ed. Michael Tonry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). On the detrimental effects 
of mass incarceration in the U.S. see James P. Lynch and William J. Sabol, 'Assessing the Effects o f  
Mass Incarceration on Informal Social Control in Communities', Criminology and Public Policy 3, no. 2 
(2004).
64 von Hirsch et al., Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity, 6-7.
65 Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, 'Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science 
Investigation', Oxford JournalofLegal Studies 24, no. 2 (2004), 182.
66 On top of the standard characteristics that make potential offenders a group less inclined to think 
about future consequences o f their conduct (risk seekers, impulsiveness, and alcohol and chug 
consumption), several studies include other temporary state o f mind that are likely to drive out rational 
considerations o f  punishment. These include desires for revenge or retaliation, rages or angers, paranoia, 
manic-depression, and other personality features that would not be considered illnesses such as low
66
This criticism could be raised even more forcefully in the context o f genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes or other crimes committed extraterritorially. As 
Roberts and Carver suggest, “[rjational calculation is especially liable to be displaced 
where perpetrators link criminality with personal survival or the defence o f their 
national or ethnic identity, and where immediate group norms exert more direct 
influence over behaviour than phenomenologically distant international legal codes”.68 
Thus the weakness in deterring potential offenders extraterritorially is due, inter alia, to 
the limitation of resources and limited number o f prosecutions, the lack o f political 
legitimacy o f most extraterritorial courts from the point o f view of the targeted groups 
or individuals, but also to the collective nature o f these crimes and the psychological 
pattern of the leaders.69 Admittedly, we do not have empirical studies that actually 
prove these hypotheses. Yet, given the doubts that studies raise in purely domestic 
settings, we have good grounds to suggest that whether deterrence is achieved is a far 
more tenuous and complicated process than it is intuitively assumed.70
Finally, if still committed to translate this interest into a normative power, the 
obvious problem that the deterrence theorist will face is its well-known inflationary 
character. Deterrence seems committed to the claim that the ‘more’ punishment is 
exacted, the stronger the deterrence effect of criminal law would be and, as a result, the 
fewer violations of these rights and goods would obtain. In particular, the deterrent
ability to delay gratification or lack o f self-control (ibid, 179-180). von Hirsch et al, refer in this sense to 
the strong presence o f need or even ‘desperation’ and the conscious decision not to dwell on the 
possibility o f getting caught leading to this same results (von Hirsch et al., Criminal Deterrence and Sentence 
Severity, 36).
67 See Stephanie Carmichael and Alex R. Piquero, 'Sanctions, Perceived Anger, and Criminal Offending1, 
Journal of Quantitative Criminology 20, no. 4 (2004) on the relevance o f anger in particular. I do not know o f  
other studies working on the basis o f other emotional states.
68 Roberts and Carver, "Penal Law and Global Justice", 30.
69 See, e.g., Sloane, 'The Expressive Capacity o f International Punishment', 72-73; Tallgren, 'The 
Sensibility and Sense o f International Criminal Law', 571-572. As Drumble suggests, “many perpetrators 
want to belong to violent groups”, and they often believe “they are acting for the benefit o f the 
collective, not their own personal gain” (Drumbl, Atrocity, "Punishment, and International Law, 171, with 
reference to Jaime Malamud-Goti, 'Transitional Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State 
Criminals', Human Rights Quarterly 12, no. 1 (1990)).
70 In fact, studies do not talk about causality but rather about the weaker notion o f correlation. On this 
and on the particular problem o f simultaneity see von Hirsch et al., Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity, 
17 and 20.
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effect has been said to depend on the certainty, severity and celerity of the 
punishment.71 The problem is that it would be committed to justifying and endorsing 
every bit of harm inflicted, as long as it does not outweigh the harm prevented. As 
suggested, this reasoning would be particularly problematic in the domain of 
extraterritorial punishment. Accordingly, deterrence would advocate a power to punish 
that is entirely incompatible with the way in which this power is currently construed. It 
would, for instance, offer no argument against altering O ’s moral boundaries in ways 
that allow for corporal punishments, including torture. Under certain circumstances, 
such as the context of grave crimes under international law, it would probably warrant 
conferring a power to alter not only O ’s moral boundaries, but also those of her family 
and friends. To clarify, all these implications should not be construed in deondc terms. 
The point here is that deterrence fails to account for certain key features of the 
normative power to punish O as it currently stands, i.e., what states can validly do, not 
that it leads to morally impermissible outcomes.72 That will be the topic o f section 3.2 of 
this chapter.
3.1.4 Three Objections
Before closing this section I will examine three lines of criticism that can be levelled 
against the argument I presented here. On the one hand, it may be argued that the 
explanation for the power to punish O I advocate stands on instrumental grounds. This 
would make it liable to the charge of contingency raised above against victim-based 
arguments. In effect, my account entails that punishment is only of derivative value. Its 
value depends on it contributing to the well-being of individuals. Yet, despite being 
instrumental, I argue that the relationship between punishing an offender and 
reasserting our confidence in the bindingness of a legal rule is intrinsic and necessary, 
not purely contingent. There are neither epistemological difficulties nor exceptions for 
which this justification does not hold. Whenever an offender is punished, for her
71 Bentham, Jeremy, The Rationale of Punishment (London: 1830), chapter VI.
72 On the relevance o f standard practices see section 1 in the general Introduction to this thesis.
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offence, and by a particular body expressly authorized by a particular legal system, this 
necessarily conveys the message that the rule o f that legal system O violated is in force. 
Also, I suggest that these legal rules prohibiting murder, rape, etc. being in force 
necessarily contribute to individuals’ sense of dignity and security. Thus, the 
instrumentality charge cannot ground its purported implication, namely, that an 
instrumental account of legal punishment will not be able to explain all the standard 
cases.
On the other hand, the argument advocated here would seem to collapse into a 
purely consequentialist account, therefore being liable to the criticisms raised in section
3.1.3 against deterrence. However, this perception is based on a mistaken 
understanding of the role that consequences have in the argument I have presented. We 
can plausibly define a consequentialist doctrine as one in which “the good is defined 
independently of the right” and which argues that “the right is maximizing the good as 
already specified”.73 Deontological theories, by contrast, should therefore be “defined 
as non-teleological ones, not as views that characterize the rightness o f institutions and 
acts independendy from their consequences.”74 Under the light of these rough 
definitions, the argument defended here does not define the good as individuals’ well­
being and then tries to maximize its overall level. Rather, the point is whether the 
interests of X, Y, and Z warrant conferring upon S the power to punish O even if, 
overall, that would lead to a suboptimal level o f well-being. In other words, although it 
takes consequences into consideration, my argument does not simply add them in a 
broad calculation of utility, crime-reduction, or overall individual well-being.
In effect, we must be careful not to make the mistake of misrepresenting the 
specific interest on which the argument rests. The argument defended here does not 
explain S’s power to punish O on the basis of an increase in the sense of dignity and 
security that individuals enjoy in S. This would admittedly lead to trying to maximize this 
sense of dignity and security. Rather, the relationship of implication works in the
73 Rawls, A  Theory of Justice, 22.
74 Rawls adds: “all ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging 
rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” (ibid, 26).
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opposite direction. It is because having certain criminal rules in force contributes to our 
sense o f dignity and security that a state (S) holds the power to punish an offender (O). 
Thus, this argument relies on the interest individuals in S hold in these laws being in 
force rather than directly on the interest they have in their security. Once there is a 
certain level of law enforcement we can safely argue that the legal system is in force. 
This is all this argument requires.
Accordingly, this justification is free from the harshness charge raised against 
deterrence. Indeed, individuals’ belief in the existence o f a rule need not entail a power to 
alter any right held by O, such as the right not to be tortured. A brutal penalty, such as 
boiling an offender in oil, could express that a rule against, for example, robbery is in 
force. And some people may even say that it would do so more convincingly than a 
prison sentence. However, this rights-based justification does not entail such power.75 
First, imprisonment and other more lenient penalties clearly suffice to communicate that 
a particular criminal rule is in force.76 Moreover, when these more lenient means work, 
one arguably lacks the power to use a harsher one. Let me illustrate this point by 
reference to a different right. In a situation of self-defence in which Arnold, a trained 
Samurai, is coming towards Victor armed with his katana to kill him, it is usually 
conceded that Victor is at liberty to use a bazooka to repel the attack, provided he does 
not have a less harmful means at hand. However, most people will similarly agree that 
this liberty would not obtain had he the possibility to use a pistol with a paralyzing dart, 
which would be equally effective. Moreover, the fact that he can use the pistol does not 
make it simply a preferable means within the legitimate exercise of his right to self- 
defence. Rather, it is generally believed that in the second situation Victor would be
75 A penalty that is too harsh, by contrast, can undermine rather than enhance the belief that individuals 
are right-bearers and that these rights should be respected. I suggest that would be the case, e.g., if  O 
were tortured to death or the state were to sentence all her (innocent) family to forced labour.
76 Admittedly, this point touches upon the question o f cardinal levels o f punishment: why imprisonment 
or fines instead o f physical punishments or death? This is an extremely difficult philosophical question 
that is beyond the scope o f this thesis. Indeed, I am not defending imprisonment or any other specific 
penalty per se; rather, my point only is that although the argument I advocate requires some level o f  hard 
treatment (sufficient to convey the existence o f a criminal rule), it does not lead to disproportionate or 
brutally harsh penalties.
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under a duty not to use the bazooka.77 This is usually described as proportionality. 
Mutatis mutandis it is clear that in order to assess the allocation of a power to punish O, 
it is also necessary to assess whether the means which one intends to use are 
appropriate, and whether there are no less harmful means available. Altering O ’s right 
to liberty, for instance, may be one such less harmful means. This explains why this 
argument construes S’s power to punish O in a way that entails S holding the power to 
alter neither all of O ’s rights, nor, for instance, the rights of her family and friends to 
their personal liberty. To be clear, my position here is not, or not simply, that it would 
be wrong for S to punish O by torturing her, or by imprisoning her family. The point is, 
rather, that this would be for S to act ultra vires.
There is one final objection to consider: that my argument commits me to the view 
that S holds the power to punish the innocent (IN). Indeed, as I suggested above the 
requirement that someone must be punished for her offence does not mean that she has, 
as a matter o f fact, to have committed that offence. It only means that this is the reason 
for which she is being punished or, in other words, that S can punish neither the 
innocent qua innocent, nor the guilty for the wrong reasons. I must admit this charge is 
accurate. Yet, instead of considering it a fatal objection to this account, I will suggest 
that with this feature lies a significant strength o f the account of legal punishment I 
advocate. By distinguishing between S’s power to punish IN and it being at liberty to 
do so, this account can accommodate the fact that states hold the power to punish 
innocent people, while at the same time being able to claim, as I will do in the next 
section, that punishing IN would be wrong. This means, in short, that IN’s conviction 
and her sentence would be valid, i.e., her moral and legal boundaries would be 
effectively modified by S.78 However, it would be impermissible for S to punish her. 
There is no contradiction here. As stated in the general Introduction to this thesis,
77 Uniacke, Permissible Killing: The Self-Defence Justification of Homicide.
78 On why and under what conditions can S claim the authority to punish IN, see section 3 in Chapter 5 
below.
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sometimes it is possible to have a power which one is not at liberty to exercise or, in 
less technical terminology, a right to do wrong.79
Admittedly, I have also argued that there are certain situations in which the wrong 
involved in modifying certain rights is such that it precludes the modification itself.80 I 
suggest that this is not the case with punishing IN under the framework I advocate. But 
before arguing for this, it is worth situating this issue within my broader argument. My 
position is that in order for S to have the power to punish X, not only some interest of 
its members should be sufficiently important to confer upon S this power, but also S 
must have the authority to do so. As I will argue in Chapter 5 below, S can claim the 
authority to punish X only when X receives a fair trial, she is convicted after a thorough 
investigation and S is credibly punishing her because it is satisfied to the relevant 
standard of proof that X is guilty. Put differently, my account only commits me to the 
view that S has the power to punish IN when it makes a reasonable mistake.81 This 
removes much o f the sharpness in this charge. Establishing a system of criminal laws 
ultimately entails accepting the possibility of punishing the innocent in some measure, 
at least with current levels of technology. Besides, as long as S can justify to IN why she 
is being punished and this justification is reasonable, her being punished would not 
undermine the sense of dignity and security that S’s criminal laws being in force 
provide, even if her conviction is mistaken.
This separation between first and second order incidents, that is, between powers 
and liberties, explains at least two familiar implications. First, it follows that if IN can 
demonstrate that she was mistakenly convicted, she would be entitled to be 
compensated for the harm she suffered. Moreover, if her innocence can be 
demonstrated she should be immediately released. Yet, these new changes in her moral 
boundaries are not automatic. They would be the result o f a further decision by a court 
of law, i.e., an authority expressly authorized by the legal system, restoring IN ’s moral
79 A typical example is that of A’s power to sell B a good she knows is stolen.
80 See section 3.1 in the general Introduction above.
81 See section 3 in Chapter 5 below, specially my discussion o f the authoritativeness o f  mistaken 
decisions (infine).
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and legal boundaries (when possible).82 Secondly, the legal power to release and 
compensate IN is required by the overall argument I have advocated. It would not be 
the case any longer that IN would be punished for her offence. Once her innocence has 
been demonstrated her remaining in prison or being censured can hardly convey the 
message that the criminal rule she had allegedly violated is in force. Her remaining in 
prison would undermine, rather than enhance the dignity and security of individuals 
living under that legal system. It is quite likely that a state which imprisons the innocent 
will be perceived as oppressive and as a threat to the rights of individuals in it.
To conclude, none of these objections actually harm the argument I have 
presented. It is time to tackle the remaining incident.
3.2 The justification for S’s liberty to punish O
As suggested above, a complete justification for legal punishment does not merely need 
to argue that S holds the power to punish O; it must also argue that it is right for S to do 
so. In Hohfeldian terms, the purpose of this section is to argue that S is also at liberty to 
punish O. This argument can be made in two different ways. One way would be to 
argue that an interest of individuals in S is sufficiendy important to put O under a no­
right not to be punished. The other way would be to argue that O lacks herself a claim- 
right against having punishment inflicted upon her. In Razian terms, we can invoke an 
overriding consideration or a cancelling condition.83
Deterrence provides an argument of the first kind. I suggest, however, that it also 
fails to provide a convincing justification for the permissibility o f legal punishment. In 
short, the problem with deterrence is that, because of its consequentialist structure, it 
fails to take into consideration the value and separateness of individuals. I have argued 
above against deterrence as an explanation for S’s power to punish O. I now claim that 
it is also lacking as an explanation of its liberty. The reasoning goes as follows. Because
82 Interestingly, states do not normally have the power to overturn convictions reached by other state’s 
courts.
83 Raz, Practical Reason and Norms. See also Mitchell N. Berman, 'Punishment and Justification', Ethics 118 
(2008).
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the interest of individuals in deterring future offences often overrides the interest of an 
innocent individual in not being punished, the prima facie liberty to inflict punishment 
upon O would outweigh O ’s prima facie claim-right against suffering that kind of 
treatment. This is highly problematic. For one, it means that even if O were innocent 
she would not be able to claim compensation for having been wrongly convicted. 
Moreover, a deterrence theorist would also be committed to reject prosecuting Judge J 
for knowingly convicting an innocent person.
I will follow, by contrast, a cancellation strategy. I will argue that O lacks a claim- 
right against being punished by S. There are at least two possible lines of argument for 
this case. I can either argue that O has forfeited her claim-right, or I can suggest that her 
general claim-right not to suffer this kind of treatment does not include a protection 
against legal punishment. I will defend here a version of the forfeiture argument.
Standardly, the forfeiture of a right makes reference to a right lost due to some 
crime or fault, breach or neglect of rules on the part o f the person who is said to be 
responsible for it.84 The concept o f forfeiture is used in legal and moral discourse often 
enough not to warrant any kind of conceptual clarification here. The normative work 
forfeiture does, by contrast, needs to be carefully examined. Within the rights-based 
literature, Daniel McDermott provides an account of how this mechanism works that 
merits careful consideration.85 He argues that when O wrongs V say, by stealing £100 
from him, V suffers two losses. First, she loses her money and, secondly, she does not 
receive the treatment due to her as a right-holder. As a result, O incurred a debt for each 
of them. Just as she forfeited her right to £100, she forfeited her right to some moral 
good of hers. However, unlike the £100, O cannot restore to V the treatment she did 
not provide her. So in a moral community in which all members are entided to certain 
benefits and burdens, “[b]y failing to provide their victims with the treatment they owe 
them as right holders, wrongdoers incur debts to their victims o f the value of this moral 
good, and, as a result, they forfeit their rights to other, equally valuable, moral goods.”86
84 Uniacke, Permissible Killing: The Self-Defence Justification of Homicide, 201.
85 Daniel McDermott, The Permissibility of Punishment', Law and Philosophy 20 (2001), 424.
86 He then goes to examine, as I will need to do below, which moral goods wrongdoers forfeit.
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Punishment is thus a means of denying these forfeited moral goods to the 
wrongdoers.87
Needless to say, I am sympathetic to this general approach. However, it seems that 
by using the notion of moral debt to justify O ’s loss o f her right, McDermott is unable 
to explain to whom that debt would be owed if V dies. Admittedly, if O shoots V and V 
goes to hospital, O would incur a debt for hospital charges as well as other damages. 
Pace McDermott, she would also incur a moral debt for having violated V’s rights. But 
in a Raskolnikof-type case, O ’s material debt is extinguished with the sisters’ death. 
Why would O ’s moral debt not be extinguished precisely in the same way? 
McDermott’s main strength, i.e., the fact that “there is nothing at all mysterious about 
the claim that committing a debt-generating act changes a person’s moral status”88, 
seems to condemn his explanation to contingency — particularly so as he explicitly 
rejects explaining this moral change by resorting to the idea that an offender incurs a 
debt towards the society in which she lives.89
Albeit ultimately unsuccessful, this approach shows precisely the kind of 
explanation I need to provide. What needs elucidation is the mechanism by which O 
committing a wrong results in a change in her moral boundaries that makes S punishing 
her permissible. Before addressing this issue, though, two clarificatory points are in 
order. First, it is often argued that an offender forfeits some of her rights. Yet, it is very 
unclear what right would an offender allegedly forfeit, or better, what type o f right this 
is. Most of the accounts in the literature fail to distinguish between first order and 
second order Hohfeldian incidents. They fail to characten2e the right to punish as a 
power. Accordingly, these accounts need the forfeiture argument to do all o f the 
normative work, namely, to account for O ’s lack of an immunity and a claim-right 
against being punished. By contrast, in this account the forfeiture argument explains
87 This argument should not be conflated with the unfair advantage theory once defended by Andrew 
von Hirsch and Herbert Morris, among others (see Andrew von Hirsch, Doing Justice : The Choice of 
Punishments (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976) and H. Morris, 'Persons and Punishment', The Monist 52 
(1968)). For criticisms, see Dolinko, 'Some Thoughts About Retributivism' and von Hirsch, Censure and 
Sanctions.
88 Daniel McDermott, 'Debts to Society', The Journal of Political Philosophy 10, no. 4 (2002), 441.
89 ibid.
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only why the offender lacks a claim-right against S exercising the power to punish her. By 
definition, to argue that O lacks the claim-right against being punished by S, means only 
that S is at liberty to do so.90
Secondly, it is important to clarify precisely what normative work the forfeiture 
argument is doing in my overall explanation. As discussed in the previous section, S 
holds the normative power to punish an individual who is in fact innocent (IN), to wit, 
who by definition has not forfeited any claim-right of hers.91 This is not just a 
normative claim but also, and crucially, a fairly accurate descriptive one. Yet, if this is 
the case, what does it mean to argue that S is under a duty not to punish IN? The 
implication is that, whenever possible, S should restore IN to the situation she was in 
before being punished, and when this is not possible she should compensate her for the 
wrong she suffered. Moreover, if S’s judge J knew that punishing IN was wrong 
because she was innocent, J could herself be criminally prosecuted. By contrast, to say 
that S is at liberty to punish O, or similarly that O lacks the claim-right against S doing 
so, is to say that O is owed nothing. So if she is punished and afterwards pardoned she 
does not get to be compensated for the time she spent in prison.
Having clarified this, it is time to explain how the forfeiture mechanism works. 
This is an extremely difficult philosophical question. It is behind, for instance, most 
attempts at capturing what it means for O to deserve being punished, or to claim that 
punishing her is intrinsically good. I can only provide here a succinct explanation. In any 
event, this should suffice for present purposes. As it will be clear throughout this thesis, 
the extraterritorial scope relies on the argument I have made in support of S’s power to 
punish O.
I suggest that the doctrine of forfeiture o f rights simply accounts for the fact that 
the protection that rights provide every individual is not unconditional. Rather, this 
protection is usually conditional upon conduct. To give a quick example, if I arrive late 
at the Opera, I would probably be denied access to my seat. This means that my claim-
90 On this, see section 3.1 o f the general Introduction to this thesis.
91 Subject to S meeting the requirements for claiming  authority to punish that innocent individual. On 
this see section 3 in Chapter 5 below.
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right against being stopped at the door is not absolute; it is conditional upon me 
arriving on time. The penalty for being late is, in the language I have chosen, that I have 
forfeited the claim-right I had against the theatre management letting me in.92 This 
means, in short, that I am not being wronged by the doorman who refuses me entry; she 
is at liberty (and probably under a duty) to stop me. Accordingly, I cannot claim 
compensation for having missed the show, nor am I entitled to get new seats for the 
next performance. The only remaining question is, then, whether this particular 
limitation to my right (being refused access) is a legitimate one to impose. Analogously, 
we may say that individuals have a claim-right against being punished by the state. This 
means that the state is under a duty not to punish them, and if it violates this duty, it 
should (at the very least) compensate them. But this claim-right is neither absolute nor 
unconditional. Individuals are entided to its protection provided they do not perpetrate 
a criminal wrongdoing.
The reason why I suggest this precise limitation is legitimate is disappointingly 
simple. I argued that legal punishment is a form of moral language that allows S to 
censure O and to convey to individuals in S the belief that a set of criminal rules are in 
force. I now contend that since O committed a wrongdoing she cannot complain about 
being censured for having done so. With her act, O put into question the existence of 
the relevant prohibition. She cannot pretend not to be strongly censured for her 
conduct and reminded that this prohibition is binding upon her. To reject this particular 
limitation would entail recognriing this claim-right as having a kind of unconditionality 
that no plausible theory of rights would be willing to endorse. This is, in short, what is 
meant when we say that by committing a crime, O forfeited her claim-right against 
suffering this kind of treatment. It is not the fact that the interest of individuals in S 
overrides O’s interest in not being punished. Accordingly, this explanation has the further
92 This is surely not the only way in which I can forfeit this right. Shouting or misbehaving during the 
performance will generally entail a similar consequence. Unless, o f course, it’s the unorthodox, albeit 
popular “buuuuu” against the regisseur.
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advantage of being able to explain precisely why it would be wrong, i.e., impermissible 
to punish IN.93
Let me clarify my position by pointing out two important features of this 
argument. First, this forfeiture claim does not necessarily entail that anyone is at liberty 
to punish O for her offence. O can be said to have forfeited her claim-right in rem, i.e. 
against the world at large, or in personam, namely, against certain individuals or bodies.94 
Forfeiture arguments are normally construed in the former sense. Yet, as Cecile Fabre 
has suggested, this is too hasty. It does not follow from the fact that O has forfeited her 
claim-right that no one punishes her, that anyone can do so. Rather, a more plausible 
version of the forfeiture argument is that “it is no longer the case that everyone is under a 
duty not to” punish her.95 In other words, the forfeiture argument explains why 0  has 
lost her claim-right against S punishing her; the reason why this liberty is conferred 
upon S (and not S2) is explained, rather, by the interest that justifies S in particular 
holding the power to punish O. This means that it would not only be ultra vires, but also 
impermissible for S2 to punish O for a theft she committed in S. If S2 were to punish 
O, the sentence would not only be void, but she would be entided to compensation.
Secondly, this explanation does not lead to the implausible position that denying 
that O holds a claim-right against being punished amounts to denying O ’s interest in not 
being punished. The fact that an interest warrants the protection of a right should 
clearly not lead us to conflate the two. Most probably O would still have an interest in 
not being punished, just as the late-comer to the Opera would keep her interest in 
seeing Pavarotti. The only thing she has lost, according to the view I defend, is the 
moral shield that protected this interest.
To conclude, the theory of forfeiture I propose explains precisely why S would be 
at liberty to punish 0. I make this argument by claiming that in committing an offence, 
O forfeited her claim-right against being punished. If this argument is sound and, as a
93 My explanation here owes a significant deal to von Hirsch in his Censure and Sanctions.
94 On this distinction, see section 3.1 in the general Introduction above.
95 Cecile Fabre, 'Killing Culpable Attackers in Defence o f Others', 2008, unpublished paper cited with 
permission from the author, 4.
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result, O cannot legitimately claim a protection to this particular interest after 
committing a criminal offence, it follows that she would not have a reason to complain 
or receive compensation for being punished by S.
4. Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that in order to provide an explanation for the 
proposition CS has the moral tight to punish O ’ we need to distinguish between the 
different incidents that form this molecular right. I have only put forward here an 
argument for S’s power and its liberty to punish O. I argued that S’s power to punish O 
can be plausibly explained by reference to the collective interest of individuals in S in its 
criminal laws being in force. This is because a system of rules prohibiting murder, rape, 
etc. being in force constitutes a public good that contributes to their well-being. I 
suggested that this interest is sufficiendy important to put O under a liability to being 
inflicted legal punishment. By contrast, I argued that standard versions of retributivism 
or deterrence theory fail adequately to account for the allocation of this normative 
power.
Moreover, I argued that S’s liberty to exercise this normative power against a 
particular offender is explained by her having forfeited her claim-right against being 
punished. By definition, the fact that X lacks a claim-right against being (pied by Y 
means that Y is at liberty to <p X. The forfeiture mechanism has been explained by 
reference to the fact that the claim-right against being punished, like almost every other 
moral right, is conditional upon the conduct o f its holder. In particular I argued that the 
claim-right against being censured in the way punishment requires is conditional upon 
O not committing a moral wrong.
Let me close this chapter by assessing the relevance of this general argument for 
the purposes o f my overall project and elaborate further how it is situated vis-a-vis 
other accounts within the literature on legal punishment. The argument I have 
developed is arguably a version of a hybrid or dualist justification of which the most 
famous and influential examples are probably those developed by Herbert Hart and
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John Rawls.96 However, it is unique in its use of the Hohfeldian analysis of rights. I will 
argue throughout the thesis that this argument will prove much more convincing than 
its rivals in the way it deals with the issue of extraterritoriality. For present purposes, 
however, I suggest that its reliance on Hohfeld provides it with a crucial advantage over 
standard dualist accounts.
On the one hand, Hohfleld’s analysis accounts for the precise normative 
implication of each of the arguments I have presented. While my initial argument 
explains O ’s liability to being punished, the argument developed in 3.2 explains her lack 
o f a claim-right against this (i.e., S’s liberty). This cannot really be said of Hart’s 
distinction between the general justifying aim of the institution of punishment and the 
right principles of its distribution. On the other hand, my analysis provides a sound 
criterion of how the different arguments relate to each other. The fact that liberties and 
powers are of a different order is an important feature of Hohfeld’s analysis of rights. 
This means for our purposes that in some cases S would have the power to do 
something which she is not at liberty to do. Put differendy, this argument is able to 
explain why states unanimously hold the power to punish innocent individuals, while at 
the same time maintaining that it would be wrong for them to do so. Finally, in the 
following chapters I will argue that the justification for conferring upon an extraterritorial 
body X the right to punish O depends on whether someone’s interest does in fact 
warrant conferring upon that particular body X the power to punish O. Thus, 
distinguishing the grounds of these two incidents will allow me to address precisely 
what is at issue in this thesis.
96 Hart, Punishment and Responsibility and John Rawls, "Two Concepts o f Rules," in Philosophy of Punishment, 
ed. Robert M. Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum (New York: Prometheus Books, 1988). For a more recent 
version see von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions. Unlike these three accounts, I deny that any o f the 
considerations on which my argument rests is consequentialist in structure.
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2
Extraterritoriality and the Right to Punish
‘The Spaniards violated all rules when they set themselves up as judges of the 
Inca Atahualpa. If that prince had violated the law of nations with respect to 
them, they would have had a right to punish him. But they accused him of 
having put some of his subjects to death, of having had several wives, tee­
things, for which he was not at all accountable to them; and, to fill up the 
measure of their extravagant injustice, they condemned him by the laws of 
Spain. ”*
1. Introduction
In the previous chapter I presented a general justification for the power to punish O. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 o f this thesis are concerned with the extraterritorial scope of this 
power. While the present chapter addresses the extraterritorial application of a state’s 
domestic criminal rules, the following ones will deal with the power to punish crimes 
under international law. As a matter of law states characteristically claim the power to 
punish certain domestic offences extraterritorially. Under the Sexual Offences Act 
2003, e.g., English and Welsh courts have the power to punish nationals or residents of 
these countries who commit certain types of sexual crimes, e.g., on a holiday trip to 
South-East Asia. Similarly, under article 113-7 of its Penal Code, France claims 
jurisdiction over any felony committed anywhere in the world when the victim is a
1 Emmerich de Vattel, Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of 
Nations and Sovereigns (New York: AMS Press, 1773), 110 Although this quotation eloquendy shows 
precisely what is at stake in this chapter, a point o f clarification is in order. De Vattel got the facts 
wrong, possibly following the at his time well-known account o f Garcilazo. In short, the Inca Atahualpa 
was not tried through a fair procedure as sometimes suggested but rather executed, in haste, on 
expediency grounds. Cortes and some o f his men feared an attempt to rescue him while waiting for 
reinforcements. Moreover, he was allegedly executed for offences against Cortes and the Spaniards, not 
for offences against his own people. Incidentally, Cortes’ decision was heavily criticized in Spain on 
grounds that he lacked the right to try a King. For a good account o f this story see J. Hemming, The 
Conquest of the Incas (London: Papermac, 1993).
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French national at the time the offence took place. Most states criminalize conduct 
such as the counterfeiting o f their currency, espionage or treason regardless of where 
they happen to be performed. In short, although the criminal law is usually regarded as 
primarily territorial in its application, these types of provisions are fairly standard in the 
vast majority of states. For some reason, however, the issue of extraterritoriality has not 
received much attention from either scholars working on the philosophy of 
international law or on the justification of legal punishment. I purport to address this 
gap in the literature and challenge some widely held views regarding the extraterritorial 
scope of states’ power to punish O.
The extraterritorial scope of states’ right to punish is ultimately governed by 
international law. States are free to decide whether and when they will exercise this 
right, but they can do so only within the constraints imposed by the international legal 
system. By and large, there are currently three different grounds or principles on which 
a state (S) can base its power to punish an offender (O) extraterritorially. These are 
commonly known as the principles of nationality, passive personality and protection 
and they rely, respectively, on whether the offence was committed by one of S’s 
nationals, as under the Sexual Offences Act above, against one o f its nationals, as in the 
French provision cited, or against the sovereignty or national security of that state, as 
with the counterfeiting of national currency.2
This chapter examines the moral foundations o f this well-established legal 
framework and finds them lacking. By contrast, it advocates a more restricted 
extraterritorial scope for S’s power to punish O. In section 2 I will argue that the 
territorial scope of S’s right to punish O is determined by the reasons that justify S 
holding the power to punish wrongdoers generally. On this basis, I will provide an 
explanation for the primarily territorial character o f domestic criminal law. This theory 
entails that although we have good reasons to warrant states extending the scope of this
2 Sometimes other bases o f jurisdiction are articulated, such as the floating territorial principle, 
jurisdiction on embassies abroad, in aircrafts (B.J. George Jr., 'Extraterritorial Application o f Penal 
Legislation', Michigan Law Review 64, no. 4 (1966), 609 and Michael Hirst, Jurisdiction and the Ambit of the 
Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), specially chapter 6). These ‘quasi-territorial’ bases 
o f jurisdiction are not covered in this chapter.
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tight extraterritorially on grounds of protection (section 5), i.e., over crimes which 
affect their sovereignty or security, doing so on the basis o f the nationality of the 
offender or that of the victim would be to act ultra vires (sections 3 and 4, respectively). 
Moreover, I will contend that the arguments on which both these principles are 
standardly grounded either beg the fundamental question which they are meant to 
answer or collapse into much broader claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction that few of 
their supporters would be prepared to endorse. In section 6 I will examine two possible 
lines of criticism to the framework put forward. On the one hand, I will discuss 
whether my theory is too restrictive and, as a result, unconvincing in a world in which 
crime is increasingly becoming globali2ed. On the other hand, I will examine whether 
other justifications for the right to punish available in the literature may be, overall, 
better suited to explaining the way in which international law regulates states’ 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.
Before going any further, three caveats are in order. First, I have suggested that the 
right to punish O can be best portrayed as a normative power to alter certain of O ’s 
moral boundaries, usually by inflicting some form of harm on her, coupled with a 
liberty to do so and a claim-right not to be interfered with.3 I am concerned here only 
with this power to punish offences committed extraterritorially. So defined, the power to 
punish does not entail that S is at liberty to obtain custody over her by force, or to 
pursue an investigation on the territory of a foreign state without that state’s consent. 
The question examined here, then, is whether, for example, Israel had the power to try 
Eichmann when he was already on its territory, not whether it was at liberty to ‘arrest’ 
him in Argentina and held a claim-right against Argentina not to interfere with that 
arrest.4 To avoid any possible equivocation between these incidents I will assume 
throughout that the defendant is present on the territory o f the state that claims 
jurisdiction over her at the point when it wants to exercise its power.
3 See Chapter 1, section 1 above.
4 On the normative independence of these two incidents under public international law see, generally, F. 
A. Mann, "Doctrine o f International Jurisdiction," in Further Studies in International Fan> (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990) 19 and 21. For a dicussion on whether states have the authority to try offenders 
abducted abroad see section 6 in Chapter 5 below.
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Secondly, this chapter examines the grounds on which S’s courts can claim 
jurisdiction to punish an offender (O). It deals with the question of whether a particular 
state can claim to have, or adequately serve, the interest that justifies it holding a power 
to punish O. This question should not be conflated with that regarding the particular 
conditions that each concrete state court should meet in order to claim, itself, the right 
to do so. As I have argued in the general Introduction to this thesis, in order to confer 
a power to punish O upon S it is not enough that someone’s interest would be served 
by the conferral of that power; S must also have the authority to punish O. Let me 
briefly illustrate this distinction. A court o f a prosecuting state (PS) may serve an 
interest o f the population of the state in whose territory an offence was committed (TS) 
in trying O for an act of murder she committed in TS.5 This particular court, however, 
may at the same time fail to meet the conditions that justify it, in particular; holding such 
power. This may be because, for example, it would normally decide on O ’s culpability 
on grounds o f confessions extracted by torture. It is only the former question that will 
be tackled here. 6 Yet, as I will argue throughout this thesis, it is this particular question 
that largely determines the extraterritorial scope of S’s power to punish O.
Finally, the argument provided in this chapter is limited to domestic offences. In 
other words, when examining the distribution of criminal jurisdiction among states 
three sorts of considerations are often considered relevant: the territory on which the 
offence was committed, the nationality of the people involved in the offence (offender 
or victim), and the kind of offence the court is dealing with, i.e., whether the act is 
allegedly a domestic or an international offence. As regards the latter distinction, this 
chapter only examines power of states to punish offences under their municipal 
criminal laws. It does not address what are often considered offences under 
international criminal law such as, for instance, genocide, war crimes or crimes against 
humanity. These will be addressed in chapters 3 and 4 below.
5 For simplicity, I will use throughout PS for the state that wants to prosecute O, and TS for the state on 
whose territory the offence was committed. When these two are the same state I refer to it as S.
6 The question o f S’s authority will be examined in Chapter 5 below.
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2. The Territorial Scope of S’s Power to Punish O
“by what Right any Prince or State can p u t to death, or punish an Alien, 
fo r any Crime he commits in their Country. T is certain their Laws by virtue 
of any Sanction they receive from the promulgated W ill of the legislative, reach 
not a Stranger.
The territorial scope of a state’s criminal law is commonly regarded as a manifestation 
o f its sovereignty. This entails that a state has the normative power to prescribe 
criminal rules which are binding on every person who is, for whatever reason, on its 
territory.8 Crucially for our purposes, it also entails the normative power to punish 
those who violate its rules within its territorial borders. I will not address the issue of 
when a particular offence can be said to be committed on the territory of a particular 
state. That is a complicated enough question whose consideration merits a treatment 
that is beyond the object of this enquiry.9 Thus, I will normally tackle the standard cases 
in which, for example, both the conduct of O and its result (e.g., V’s death) occurred 
on the territory o f state S. As a legal basis for criminal jurisdiction, territoriality raises 
litde controversy.10 However —or perhaps precisely for this reason— any justification for 
the power to punish concerned with evaluating its extraterritorial application needs, 
first, to be able to account convincingly for this basic principle.
In order to account for the territorial scope of S’s right to punish O I claim that we 
need to look at the reasons that justify S holding the power to punish O in the first 
place. The justification for this normative power I have proposed in Chapter 1 is based 
on the claim that having a system of criminal law in force constitutes a public good that 
benefits the individuals that live under it in a certain way. This proposition involves a 
conceptual and a normative claim. Conceptually, it implies that there is a necessary link
7 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, §9, 273.
8 On this, see section 4 o f the general Introduction to this thesis.
9 The standard doctrine distinguishes between subjective and objective territoriality, and the more 
controversial effects doctrine. For a good discussion on this see the classical piece by Michael Akehurst, 
'Jurisdiction in International Law', British Yearbook of International Law 46 (1972-1973), 145 and, more 
recently, the monograph by Hirst, Jurisdiction and the Am bit of the Criminal Law, chapters 3 and 4.
10 See, for example, 'Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime', The American Journal of 
International Law 29, no. Supplement (1935), 480 and Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 299.
85
between a legal system being in force and the power to punish offenders. From a 
normative point of view, I suggested that having a set of legal rules prohibiting murder, 
rape, etc. in force contributes to the sense of dignity and security o f individuals in any 
particular society. Ultimately I suggested that the collective interest individuals have in 
this system being in force, i.e., binding on them, is sufficiently important to warrant 
conferring upon S the power to punish O. However, how does this argument account 
for its territorial scope? This is simple: I suggest that S’s normative power to punish O 
is justified by the collective interest of its members in having a system of laws prohibiting, 
murder, rape, etc. in force.
Someone might object, however, that this argument falls short of fully explaining 
the territorial scope of S’s power to punish O.11 By grounding S’s rights on the 
collective interest of its members it may seem that this argument explains only why S 
has a power to punish those who commit an offence on its territory against a resident of 
S.12 Put differently, it would certainly be an unfortunate implication of my argument 
that the residents of S have not, themselves, an interest in their criminal laws protecting 
foreigners on holidays. However, this is not the case for two reasons. First, because 
offences against foreigners committed in S do, as a matter o f fact, undermine S’s 
criminal laws being in force, thus affecting this public good. When O murders V in S, 
she puts into question the existence of S’s legal rule prohibiting murder. This reasoning 
holds even if both O and V are not members of S, who happened to be accidentally on 
the territory o f S (e.g., on holiday). Moreover, I believe it holds even if V is targeted 
because he is not a member of S. If an English football fan is killed after a match in 
Germany by German fans, this would certainly undermine the confidence o f the people 
in Germany in the rule against murder being in force. This explains why states, which 
are often portrayed as self-interested machines, characteristically prohibit the murder of 
any person on their territory, and not only the murder o f their nationals/residents. 
Indeed, we should not conflate the belief that a rule is in force with the somewhat
11 This objection is important because, as I will argue in section 6 below, it creates a significant difficulty 
for one o f the most influential alternative arguments for legal punishment available in the literature.
12 For present purposes I treat nationals and permanent residents alike.
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different one that I, in particular; am less vulnerable to being a victim of a criminal 
offence. Criminal laws, I have suggested, can ground the former belief, but not the 
latter.
Secondly, this alleged difficulty is created by a rather oversimplified answer to the 
question of whose interest explains S’s normative power to punish O. This collective 
interest is also shared by individuals who happen to be in S accidentally, or for a very 
short period of time. The interests of temporary visitors also matter.13 It is the interest 
o f every individual in S that collectively grounds S’s power to punish O, not merely the 
interests o f the nationals or members of S. To illustrate: Manuel is a Colombian 
national. When he travels in Italy on holiday, he has an interest in people there abiding 
by most of the Italian criminal laws. While walking down an alley in Rome or dining in 
a festive Trattoria in Naples, Manuel has an interest in most o f Italy’s criminal laws 
being in force. Although it might not be as strong —after all he will probably be out of 
the country in a matter of days— this interest is similar to that of any other Italian 
national or permanent resident sitting next to him. Albeit temporarily, I suggest that 
Manuel’s interest is part o f the collective interest that justifies Italian courts holding a 
power to punish those who violate Italy’s criminal rules. In other words, if the power to 
punish offenders is grounded on the interest of certain individuals taken collectively, 
there do not seem to be any grounds on which we could simply override the interest of 
non-residents who are temporarily in S. O f course, permanent residents arguably have a 
stronger interest in S’s criminal laws being in force over time. For the sake of simplicity, 
I will keep on referring to the members of S as the holders o f the relevant interest. 
This, however, should be understood with the caveat made in this paragraph.
These considerations, then, fully explain the territorial scope of the criminal law 
system to the extent that it involves S holding a normative power to punish anyone who 
violates its criminal law within its borders. Let us now examine whether S can claim an 
exclusive right to do so, or whether other states (PS, PS2, etc.) could claim the power to
13 Indeed, this position is not only compatible but also required by the moderate cosmopolitan position 
I endorsed in section 4 o f the general Introduction.
87
exercise their criminal jurisdictions concurrently. I suggest that extraterritorial states 
(PS) are under a prima facie disability to punish offences perpetrated in TS. This claim 
needs to take into consideration two relevant issues.
First, one may argue that the population in PS lacks an interest in enforcing its 
domestic criminal laws on the territory of TS. That would be true in most cases, but not 
in all. Clearly, the people living in Uruguay do not usually have an interest in the 
Uruguayan criminal laws being in force in Sweden that is sufficiently important to 
warrant conferring upon Uruguay a power to punish offences committed on Sweden’s 
territory. To that extent, this argument entails that Uruguay itself lacks a prima facie 
power to punish O for an offence she committed in Sweden. But this explanation only 
provides for a conditional conclusion. Under certain circumstances, which will be 
explored below, individuals’ living in Uruguay may have an interest in their criminal 
laws being in force also in Sweden. A standard case could be when O is counterfeiting 
Uruguayan currency. Hence this argument explains only why states may lack 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in those cases in which their members lack a 
collective interest in their criminal laws being in force abroad.
The second issue we have to consider has to do with the interests o f the members 
o f TS. These interests may seem more robust and far-reaching. I suggest that they are 
not. In the general Introduction to this thesis I argued that states hold a right to self- 
government. This right does not merely include the power to criminali2e certain 
behaviours. It also entails an immunity against other states dictating and enforcing their 
criminal rules on the territory of TS. This entails, e.g., that the UK has a prima facie 
immunity against Sri Lanka dictating criminal rules that apply on its territory. However, 
I also argued that this prima facie immunity is neither absolute nor unconditional. It is 
limited, inter alia, by the interests of non-members.14 Accordingly, the interest that 
explains TS’s immunity does not necessarily preclude PS holding a power to punish O 
for crimes committed in TS. Where individuals in PS have a significant interest in their
14 See section 4 below.
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criminal laws being in force in TS, TS’s prima facie immunity can be outweighed by PS’s 
prima facie power.15
To sum up, this section fully accounts for the territorial scope o f TS’s power to 
punish.16 I have shown that TS can claim a power to punish violations of its criminal 
laws when those violations occurred on its territory, regardless of the nationality of 
either O or V. Also, TS holds this right exclusively in so far as other states do not have 
an interest in punishing O that is sufficiendy important to override its prima facie 
immunity. It is now time to turn to the extraterritorial scope of this power.
3. The Nationality Principle
The issue at stake here is whether PS has a normative power to punish O for a crime 
she committed on TS, on the grounds that O is a national of PS. This basis of criminal 
jurisdiction often comes accompanied by other considerations. Most commonly, it is 
provided for offences that affect the security of the state17, or that are committed 
against a national of PS. For the sake of clarity, I will consider cases in which the 
nationality of the offender constitutes the only basis for the criminal jurisdiction of PS. I 
will examine other grounds of criminal jurisdiction below, under the protective and 
passive personality principles.
Akin to the principle of territoriality, this basis for criminal jurisdiction is also quite 
uncontroversial under existing international law.18 In fact, it has been generally
15 A note o f caution is in order here. Just as I have argued that only a certain specific interest can explain 
S’s power to punish O, it is not the case that any interest that S2 may have would suffice to override S’s 
immunity. On this, see sections 4, 5 and 6 below.
16 I cannot examine here distribution o f criminal competences within federal or multinational states such 
as the U.S. or the UK. Yet, I suggest that the territorial considerations that are at play internationally also 
apply domestically. In other words, provided that there are different legal systems in place, the argument 
applies to California’s power to punish offences committed on its territory and its prima fade immunity 
against Texas doing so. This immunity, however, would not necessarily affect federal statutes much as in 
the same way that TS’s immunity might not apply in cases o f international crimes.
17 United States v  Bowman.
18 See Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim et al., Oppenheim's International haw /  Vol. 1, Peace (Harlow: 
Longman, 1992), V. Lowe ‘Jurisdiction’ in Malcolm D. Evans, International haw (Oxford ; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 345, and Akehurst, 'Jurisdiction in International Law'. For more 
cautious positions, albeit considering it uncontroversial, see Brownlie, Prindples of Public International haw, 
301-302 and Antonio Cassese, International Criminal haw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 281.
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recognized that the original conception o f law was personal, and that only the 
appearance of the territorial state gave rise to the right to subject aliens to the lex loci}9 
Recently, this basis of jurisdiction has been growing significandy in some states, and 
some lawyers even advocate making it a general basis for criminal jurisdiction in the 
UK.20 Although many countries have self-imposed restrictions on the application of 
this basis of jurisdiction it is generally argued that, as a matter o f principle, there is no 
rule against extending it as far as they see fit.21
Before going any further, a conceptual point is in order, namely, whether this 
principle gives PS the power to punish its nationals, its citizens or its residents. In an 
important early work in this area, Donnedieu de Vabres pointed out that, historically, it 
was the domicile of the accused rather than her nationality which provided the basis of 
this type of jurisdiction.22 However, nowadays this principle is taken to mean that states 
have the right to prosecute their nationals. Assimilation of residents to nationals in this 
area has been objected as wholly undesirable and is not clearly part o f existing public 
international law.23 The word nationals has different meaning when used in public 
international law and international political theory. Lawyers mean membership o f a 
state, not of a nation. I do not need to enter this type of debate here. The nationality 
principle only makes reference to membership to a state. Thus, by way o f stipulation I 
will use nationals to refer only to the citizens o f a state.
I have argued that PS’s normative power to punish O is explained by the collective 
interest of the members o f PS in having a system of criminal laws in force. I now claim
In article 12 b) o f the ICC Statute this basis o f jurisdiction stands side by side with the territoriality 
principle.
19 James Leslie Brierley, 'The Lotus Case', haw Quarterly Review 44 (1928), 155-156.
20 See the Sex Offenders Act 1997, Landmines Act 1998 and the Nuclear Explosions (Prohibition and 
Inspections) Act 1998. Also, P. Arnell, The Case for Nationality Based Jurisdiction', International and 
Comparative haw Quarterly 50 (2001), 961.
21 Regarding self-imposed restrictions, in some countries the law requires that the offence be a crime 
under the law o f the state in whose territory it was committed (e.g. Egypt, see Cassese, International 
Criminal haw, 281). In others, it is only provided for certain particularly serious offences (e.g. France).
22 Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, hes Principes Modemes Du Droit Penal International (Paris: 1928), 66-68
23 'Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime', 533. The only exception to this being, 
plausibly, stateless persons. In the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime the only 
persons assimilated to nationals are aliens who “discharge ... a public function which he was engage to 
perform for that State” or who are personnel o f a ship or aircraft o f that State’s flag (see art. 6).
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that this justification cannot accommodate the nationality principle. In short, there 
seems to be no way in which PS’s criminal rules being in force require punishing O for 
a robbery she committed in TS, simply on the grounds that she happens to be a 
national of PS. For one thing, it seems odd to say that O has violated the laws of PS. 
But even granting this proposition for the sake o f argument, the collective interest of 
the members of PS in the sense of security and dignity that criminal laws provide them 
does not seem to be affected by a robbery in TS. Inhabitants of PS may feel horrified 
by a particular crime committed outside PS’s territory, but the sense of dignity and 
security they enjoy as a result o f system of criminal rules under which they live being in 
force is not undermined by these offences. This conclusion is at odds with current 
international law as well as, to some extent, with common sense morality. In the 
remainder o f this section I will examine the arguments put forward to justify this basis 
for extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.
Nationality-based criminal jurisdiction has been defended, for instance, on the 
basis o f the proposition that the way in which a state treats its nationals is, in general, 
not a matter for international law or foreigners to have a say on (unless there is a gross 
violation of human rights). In Vaughan Lowe’s words, “[i]f a State were to legislate for 
persons who were indisputably its nationals, who could complain?”24 This argument, 
however, begs the relevant question, i.e., it assumes rather than explains what particular 
interest of PS (or, more precisely, of the members of PS) is sufficiendy important to 
ground O ’s liability to have punishment inflicted upon her. Likewise, it fails to take 
seriously TS’s immunity against having criminal laws being prescribed on its territory by 
foreign authorities. These two are precisely the issues we need to explain if we are to 
suggest that an argument for the nationality principle is to hold water.
One response to the first of these questions has been: the right of PS to punish, for 
example, certain sexual offences committed by its members in TS is justified by the
24 Vaughan Lowe in Evans, International Imw, 347. See also 'Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with 
Respect to Crime1, 519.
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possibility o f recidivism within PS.25 A first remark that needs to be made here is that, 
if anything, this argument provides a justification for punishing PS’s residents and not 
its nationals. It cannot explain why the UK would hold a power to punish a British 
national residing in Spain for an act she committed in Spain. This argument would 
therefore change the scope of this basis of jurisdiction in a way that, to some extent, 
would be controversial under current international law.26 But leaving this aside, the 
problem with it is that it has to justify the power to punish on the basis of 
incapacitation or, to a lesser extent, the moral reform of the offender. At the level of 
philosophical argument this is hugely problematic. Most legal and political philosophers 
reject these normative arguments as a plausible justification for legal punishment 
simpliciter. There is nothing in the extraterritorial application of criminal laws that would 
override these well-established moral considerations.
In a different vein, it has been claimed that nationality constitutes an ‘evolution’ 
from the ‘narrow’, ‘self-interested’ territorial purposes o f the state.27 The criminal law of 
England and Wales would now ‘protect’ children extraterritorially against, e.g., certain 
sexual offences committed by nationals or residents of these countries.28 However, if 
the extraterritorial exercise of criminal jurisdiction by PS is justified by the extra 
protection awarded to these children, it is open to question on what possible grounds 
this right could be limited to PS’s own nationals. Put differently, if what does the 
justificatory work is the extra ‘protection’ awarded, for example, to children abroad, a 
strict application of this argument would lead to the principle of passive personality, 
i.e., jurisdiction based on the nationality of the victim (if victims in TS are in a 
particularly vulnerable position), or eventually to universal jurisdiction, but not to the 
nationality principle. To that extent, this argument can be readily rejected as a basis for 
this particular principle.
25 Arnell, The Case for Nationality Based Jurisdiction', 961 and Lowe, jurisdiction’, in Evans, 
International haw, ?>A1.
26 See text to footnote 23 above and Theodor Meron, 'Non-Extradition o f Israeli Nationals and 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Reflections on Bill No.1306', Israel Law Review 13 (1978), 221.
27 Amell, 'The Case for Nationality Based Jurisdiction', 960.
28 Sex Offenders Act 1997 s7(2).
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Some further arguments try to ground this particular power on an interest other 
than the interests of the members of PS. For example, it has been based on the interest 
o f O in having a fair trial, or not facing capital punishment.29 This argument might 
show that certain states, namely those which cannot guarantee a fair trial or which 
provide for capital punishment, would lack the power to punish O.30 But it simply does 
not follow from this that the state of which O is a national holds the power to punish 
her. Somewhat differently, the power o f PS has been based on an interest of the 
members of TS. The argument goes: TS might have an interest in not being forced to 
face the option of either punishing O (and face diplomatic pressure and bad 
international publicity) or simply releasing her.31 This realpolitik argument is again 
based on a non sequitur. TS may have an interest in avoiding such a nasty scenario; this 
would probably depend on the identity of PS and TS, as well as plausibly o f V and O. 
But even if we accept that this is necessarily the case for the sake of argument, this 
claim does not warrant the stated conclusion. Rather, TS’s interests seem to grant it a 
power to decide whether to: a) exercise its power to punish O itself (despite diplomatic 
pressure); b) simply release her; or c) have PS punish O. This interest entails that it is 
up to TS, and only up to TS, to decide. Thus, this argument cannot justify PS's own 
power to punish O. All it can show is that TS should hold a normative power to 
authorize other states, such as PS, to punish O, and this is not the same as claiming that 
PS is justified in doing so.32
Other scholars are concerned with what they call jurisdictional gaps and the need 
to fight ‘impunity’. Two different scenarios are often mentioned. First, this problem 
would obtain when O returns to her country (PS) after committing an offence in TS.
29 Amell, ’The Case for Nationality Based Jurisdiction', 959.
30 Indeed, I will argue that states which cannot guarantee a fair trial lack the power (authority) to punish 
O, regardless o f what the basis o f its jurisdiction is (see Chapter 5 below). I will argue there that this 
issue is entirely unrelated to the extraterritoriality o f the prosecution. The question o f capital 
punishment is a more difficult one that, unfortunately, is beyond the scope o f  this thesis.
31 Amell, 'The Case for Nationality Based Jurisdiction', 960. A. contrario, suggesting that PS has an 
interest in punishing O to preserve its good relations with TS, see Geoffrey R. Watson, 'Offenders 
Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal Jurisdiction', Yak Journal of International haw  14 (1992), 
68-69. My rebuttal to both arguments is the same.
32 This issue will be examined in more detail in section 6 below.
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Extradition laws in many states claim at least a right not to have their nationals 
extradited.33 From a moral point of view this is of little relevance. Someone advocating 
this view would need to provide an argument to show that states hold a right not to 
have their nationals extradited, something which is open to doubt. Even if we grant for 
the sake of argument that states do hold that right, it once again does not follow that 
PS would, as a result, have the power to punish O. The fact that the members of PS 
have an interest in not extraditing O that is sufficiently important to grant PS a liberty 
not to do so, is simply unrelated to the question of whether they have an interest in 
their state punishing her or not. These incidents are of a different order. If avoiding 
impunity is so important to the members of PS, then it should simply extradite O.
A somewhat more difficult case is that in which the offence is committed on a 
territory on which no state has jurisdiction (terra nullius). In effect, the nationality 
principle was argued as a basis for criminal jurisdiction when O, a U.S. national, killed 
V on a Guano Island.34 But if we recognize PS the power to punish O in this case on 
the grounds that we have an interest in avoiding impunity, it does not follow that only 
the state o f which O is a member has a right to punish her. Rather, the logical 
implication of this argument is that any state would have the right to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over O, not just the state to which she belongs. Thus, the aim of avoiding 
impunity simply does not explain the nationality principle either.
Finally, it is often argued that the nationality principle is based on the special 
relationship that links individuals to the state o f which they are members. This 
relationship is usually referred to as allegiance.35 This argument depends on what exactly 
this relationship amounts to. A first consideration that needs to be made here is that
33 Some states, such as most European countries, go further and claim to be under a duty not to do so. 
See Christopher L. Blakesley, 'A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction over 
Extraterritorial Games', Utah Law Review 1984 (1984), 709.
34 Jones v  United States (1890).
35 Eg. Blackmer v United States (1932) and United States v  King (1976) quoted in Watson, 'Offenders 
Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal Jurisdiction', 68. If this were the only justification for 
the right to punish in these cases, it seems that this would exclude the practice o f some states that claim 
jurisdiction over O even if  she acquired her nationality after they committed the crime (see art. 5 o f  the 
French Code dins fraction Crimnelle, quoted in 'Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime', 
522.
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none of the well-known arguments defending the intrinsic ‘ethical significance’ of 
nationality seem to entail the application of PS’s criminal laws to its nationals abroad.36 
These arguments are meant to explain why states have the duty to give priority to their 
own nationals in matters such as the protection of their interests or, at least, the right to 
do so.37 Therefore, they do not directly support the principle of nationality. If  anything, 
they may provide an argument for the principle of passive personality, i.e., the right of 
PS to protect V (wherever she is) by punishing those who violate her rights. Claims of 
that kind will be examined below.
Alternatively, we may build this allegiance relationship under the terms of a ‘mutual 
exchange of benefits’ scheme.38 Defenders of this argument would suggest that because 
O receives protection and other benefits from PS, she also has to bear the burdens of 
her membership to PS. A first objection against this argument is that it does not seem 
to apply to every state. Indeed, not every state seems to confer enough benefits upon 
their members so as to claim from them a duty to bear their burdens while abroad.39 
Members of PS who had to flee on humanitarian or economic grounds, for example, 
would seem to be excluded from this argument. Crucially, however, even if O is under 
certain obligations towards PS, this approach still begs the crucial question, namely, 
what is the interest of the people in PS that justifies O being under a duty to comply 
with PS’s criminal rules abroad.
361 borrow the expression from David Miller, 'The Ethical Significance of Nationality', Ethics 98, no. 4 
(1988).
37 On this, see standardly David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Samuel 
Scheffler, 'boundaries and Allegiances : Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 
1993).
38 Miller, On Nationality, 61. This is, roughly, how fair play theories o f punishment justify this power. See, 
e.g., Richard Dagger, 'Punishment as Fair Play', Res Publica 14 (2008). They too are liable to this line o f  
criticism.
39 Interestingly, until well in the 20th Century many European powers had ‘national courts’ in the 
territories o f other states (e.g., Persia, China, the Ottoman Empire, etc.) to try their citizens for crimes 
committed there. This jurisdiction, however, was based on capitulation treaties and not on a right held 
by the European powers themselves. See W. E. Grisby, 'Mixed Courts o f Egypt', Law Quarterly Review 12, 
no. 3 (1896), 252 and A. M. Latter, 'The Government o f the Foreigners in China', Law Quarterly Review 
19, no. 3 (1903), 316.
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Consider the following case: O travels to TS and robs a bank. When he is back in 
PS, he is prosecuted under PS’s criminal law and punished. Now, it is unclear here what 
is PS’s interest in O respecting PS’s laws abroad. Certainly, the power to punish O is 
not based on PS’s members enjoying the sense of dignity and security that their system 
of criminal laws provides them. O ’s act has not undermined PS’s criminal rules or the 
sense of dignity and security of the people in PS in any meaningful way. Other interests 
that PS may put forward would collapse into unappealing justifications for the power to 
punish (incapacitation or moral reform), or into some form of universal jurisdiction 
(deterrence or retribution).40 In other words, I contend that unless there is a specific 
element in the offence itself (e.g., its effects or purpose) that affects the public good 
that individuals in PS themselves enjoy, PS would lack the power to enforce its criminal 
rules against O.
A defender of the allegiance argument may reply that individuals in PS would at 
least have an interest in O not being able to make fraude a la loi o f PS, i.e., go abroad to 
do something criminalized at home. This argument, again, seems not to stand on the 
grounds of the nationality o f the offender but of her residence. But leaving this issue 
aside, it might seem persuasive. However, I suggest that it gets its intuitive plausibility 
from something other than the nationality o f the perpetrator or, for that matter, her 
permanent residence. Suppose O goes with V to the border between PS and TS, tricks 
her into stepping across into TS, beats her up, and then both return to PS. Would not 
individuals in PS have an interest in seeing O punished in order to be reassured that the 
laws are effectively in force? I suggest they would. Individuals in PS have an interest in 
not being tricked or forced into a position in which PS lacks the power to punish O. 
Their sense of dignity and security while in PS requires this. However, this has nothing 
to do with O ’s nationality or her permanent residence. The rationale for conferring PS 
the power to punish O would hold even if both O and V were tourists on holidays. 
Accordingly, this argument cannot ground the nationality principle. Rather, it seems to 
rest on territorial, or quasi-territorial, considerations.
40 See section 6 below on deterrence and retribution.
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I conclude, therefore, that as a basis for criminal jurisdiction the nationality 
principle is altogether unjustified. Moreover, I have contended that most of the 
arguments that are usually put forward to defend this widely accepted legal right either 
beg the relevant question or ultimately justify the jurisdiction of PS on other more 
controversial grounds, such as universality or passive personality.
4. The Principle of Passive Personality
Let us now examine whether PS has the moral power to punish O for a crime she 
committed abroad on the grounds that V is a member of PS. This basis of criminal 
jurisdiction is among the most contested ones in contemporary International Law.41 It 
is the only regular basis o f extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction that was not included in 
the 1935 Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime. However, it 
has been increasingly adopted by states.42 Although there currently seems to be a trend 
to endorse it, this trend relates to crimes under international law, such as genocide. It 
does not have to do with the extraterritorial application of a state’s municipal criminal 
law.43 In any event, there currently seems to be no rule under international law 
prohibiting this basis for criminal jurisdiction.
Does the justification for punishment outlined in this chapter endorse the passive 
personality principle? The question is, once again, whether the members of PS have a
41 Oppenheim says it is inconsistent (Oppenheim et al., Oppenheim's International Law /  Vol. 1, Peace, 468). 
It was heavily criticized by Judge Moore in the Lotus case, and even there the majority, which accepted 
that Turkey had the right to punish Mr. Demons, did not fully endorse the principle o f passive 
personality.
42 The Harvard Research project (1935) contains a list o f 28 states that have adopted this principle; 
many o f them still endorse it (see ibid, 472). France, for example, objected vociferously against the 
application o f this principle by Turkey in the Lotus case. Before 1975, it recognized jurisdiction on this 
basis but it was rarely applied. To do so it required a decision o f the Ministere Public that it was in the 
public interest to do so. This occurred when the offence had some territorial effects or endangered the 
security o f the state. To that extent, it is hard to say that jurisdiction was based on passive personality 
alone. France’s Criminal Procedure Law provides for its criminal jurisdiction over crimes (as opposed to 
delits) committed extraterritorially against its nationals (art. 689 o f its Code the Procedure Penal referring to 
art. 113-7 o f its Code Penal). The US has relied (partially) upon this principle in US v  Yunis (No. 2), to try 
a Lebanese national for hijacking a Jordanian airliner in which US citizens were travelling, even if it had 
objected to Mexico exercising extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction on this basis in the Cutting incident o f  
1887.
43 Lowe, ‘Jurisdiction’ in Evans, International Law, 351. See in particular, the Joint Separate Opinion o f  
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal in the Arrest Warrant case, at 11.
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collective interest in their criminal laws being in force abroad vis-a-vis offences 
committed against a co-national. In the previous section, I have argued that individuals 
in PS lack an interest in having PS’s criminal laws enforced against them or their co­
nationals (or co-residents) abroad. The opposite proposition, however, might seem 
promising. I suggest it is nothing of the kind. Advocates of the passive personality 
principle would need to show that, in fact, O ’s act puts into question the bindingness of 
the criminal rules in PS. This is not an easy task. If V, a German citizen, is assaulted by 
a group of infuriated monks while visiting a Tibetan monastery in the Himalayas, this 
would hardly affect the confidence of individuals in Germany in the German criminal 
laws being in force.
More generally, I suspect that it is not even true that German citizens abroad have 
an interest in the German criminal law being in force extraterritorially that would be 
sufficiently important to confer upon Germany the power to punish O in this type of 
cases. The reason for this is, in short, that German criminal law cannot provide abroad 
the benefits that justify Germany’s criminal jurisdiction at home. An example will 
clarify my point. While walking through an alley in Buenos Aires it would be awkward 
for a German citizen to feel that his rights are to some extent granted by the German 
criminal law. This would hold, I suggest, even if the German criminal law system did 
provide, as a matter of law, for extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction on the grounds of 
passive personality. This is because the power to punish O is explained here by 
reference to a public good. This public good benefits the individuals within a particular 
territory. Because of the features of this public good, it cannot be enjoyed by the 
members of PS extraterritorially. In fact, this is the case with most public goods offered 
by PS, such as public health or transport. While V is abroad, the only system of 
criminal law that can contribute to her (relative) sense of dignity and security is the 
criminal law of the territorial state. This is so, I suggest, at least when we refer to 
municipal offences. It therefore follows that PS would lack a power to punish O 
extraterritorially on the grounds that one of the victims is a member o f PS.
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But what if there is no territorial state that provides this public good? Indeed, there 
are several places in which no territorial system of criminal law is in force. Cases that 
come to mind immediately are Antarctica or some small island in the middle of 
international waters.44 Would PS have a power to punish violations to her criminal rules 
extraterritorially in these circumstances? To answer this question we have to examine, 
once again, whether the members of PS have a collective interest in their criminal law 
system being in force in those areas where no territorial system is in force. I submit that 
people in, e.g. Japan, would lack an interest in their criminal law system being in force 
in Antarctica sufficiently important to ground O ’s liability to being punished. This is 
because the fact that a Japanese national is killed there does not seem to affect the 
sense o f dignity and security that the Japanese enjoy in Japan. That killing, as I argued 
above, does not affect the Japanese rules against murder being in force. Moreover, the 
Japanese criminal law cannot really be in force in Antarctica, at least while it maintain its 
current legal and demographic situation. This does not mean that, absent a territorial 
authority, no authority should have the power to punish in Antarctica. It only entails 
that the fact that V is a national of PS does not seem to do any justificatory work in 
terms o f providing PS, in particular, a power to exercise its criminal jurisdiction on terra 
nullius.
It is time to tackle the arguments proposed by those who defend the ethical 
significance of nationality. These arguments generally endorse the proposition that 
individuals have certain special obligations towards their co-nationals.45 Although they 
vary with regard to the duties each one gives rise to, it seems safe to assume that all of 
them entail that PS has a special obligation to protect the interests o f its nationals. This 
special obligation implies that it also has a right to do so.46 Now, if the nationality bond 
intrinsically requires PS to fulfil these special duties, it seems that the proponents of 
special obligations to co-nationals are committed to extending this protection abroad.
44 See Jones v  United States (1890).
45 The standard arguments are made by Miller, On Nationality; Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, 60, 79; 
Tarim, Liberal Nationalism, 137.
46 This argument is also used in Cassese, International Criminal Law, 282.
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So far, so good. However, to assert a power to punish on the basis of this proposition 
is a non sequitur. The liberty to protect V cannot per se entail a power to punish O. In 
short, we are usually ready to recognise S’s power to punish O for a homicide even if 
V’s rights cannot be protected anymore.47 But, to go from protection to punishment a 
further argument is needed. The only way in which we could meaningfully bridge this 
gap is to say that legal punishment is justified by its deterrent effects or eventually by 
incapacitation.
I have argued against deterrence as a justification for the power to punish O in the 
previous chapter. In section 6 below I will argue that this justification leads to assigning 
the normative power to punish O to every possible authority, that is, to universal 
jurisdiction. As for incapacitation, I doubt that it is considered a serious explanation for 
the moral power to punish O. As it is commonly suggested it violates O ’s status as a 
person by treating her merely as a tiger. Yet, the problem for our purposes is that it 
leads to the same problematic jurisdictional implications. After all, what difference does 
it make where O is kept as long as she is incapacitated? I argue that the right to protect 
one’s fellow nationals does not lead to jurisdiction based on passive nationality. It 
collapses into a universally held power to punish O.
5. The Protective Principle
The protective principle is invoked when PS claims criminal jurisdiction to punish O 
for offences against its security, integrity, sovereignty or important governmental 
functions committed on the territory of TS.48 It is beyond the scope o f this enquiry to 
clarify the scope of this principle, i.e., which offences do in fact meet the test of 
affecting these goods or which goods in particular do warrant PS having jurisdiction on
47 On the contingency of this argument, see section 3.1 in Chapter 1 above.
48 See Christopher L. Blakesley, "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction," in International Criminal Caw, ed. M. Cherif 
Bassiouni (Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1998) 54 and Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, 
'Countering Terrorism: Frome Wigged Judges to Helmeted Soldiers — Legal Perspectives on America's 
Counter-Terrorism Responses', San Diego International Caw Journal 6 (2004-2005), 258. This principle has 
also been extended to the ‘protechon’ o f the interests o f members o f  military allies; France and the 
Communist countries constitute regular examples o f this (see Akehurst, 'Jurisdiction in International 
Law', 159).
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these grounds. I shall concentrate for present purposes on certain offences for which 
the principle is standardly invoked, such as those committed against PS’s governmental 
authorities, its military forces, counterfeiting of currency or public documents issued by 
the state. It seems safe to argue that currently this basis for criminal jurisdiction is 
reasonably well established under international law.49 It should be noted, however, that 
states have had diverging attitudes towards this principle. While Continental Europe 
and Latin America have often advocated this basis of jurisdiction, the Anglo-American 
world has traditionally been reluctant to accept it. However, more and more the US and 
the UK have tended to come to terms with it and use it for their purposes.50
There are several arguments that purportedly justify PS’s criminal jurisdiction on 
grounds o f ‘protection’. Among the most popular ones are self-defence, deterrence, and 
protection stricto sensu. I will not deal with them here in any detail. Rather, I will make 
my own argument for that conclusion. The reason for this is that although I disagree 
with the specific consideration on which they rest, I agree with the conclusion they 
reach.51
I have argued that the justification for PS’s power to punish O is based on the 
collective interest of the members of PS in having a system o f criminal laws in force. This
49 Art. 8 o f the 1883 the Institute o f International Law adopted a resolution which contained the 
following principle (in Oppenheim et al., Oppenheim's International Law /  Vol. 1, Peace, note 28 at 470). See 
also the 'Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime', 543 and 551, for a list o f 43 states 
that provided for it either in their legislation in force or in their projected criminal codes. More recendy, 
see art. 694 o f the French Code de procedure penal. The U.S.’s Omnibus Diplomatic Security A ct o f 1985 is 
broadly based on the protective principle, although it does rely also on passive personality. For an 
exception, see Manuel R. Gartia-Mora, 'Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreigners for Treason and Offences 
against the Safety o f the State Committed Upon Foreign Territory', University of Pittsburgh Law Review 19, 
no. 3 (1957-1958), 567.
50 At least until the late 1950s, the UK and the US both seemed to have rejected this basis o f jurisdiction 
unless a bond o f  allegiance between the offender and the sovereign was found. Treason seemed to have 
been the overarching concern. I believe that Joyce v  DPP should be understood as an example of this 
principle being relied upon by a British Court. Hirst rejects this understanding of Joyce (Hirst, Jurisdiction 
and the Am bit of the Criminal Law, 49). Although I disagree with him on this, this issue is beyond the scope 
o f  the present chapter.
51 On deterrence as a justification for the protective principle see Recent Developments, 'Protective 
Principle o f Jurisdiction Applied to Uphold Statute Intended to Have Extra-Territorial Effect', Columbia 
Law Review 62, no. 2 (1962), 375. Self-defence, e.g., was articulated in the Bayot case by the French Court 
o f Cassation (1923) and its decision in the Fomage case (1873). For a careful, though not necessarily 
critical, treatment of the other arguments see Garcia-Mora, 'Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreigners'.
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is because, or so I claim, this system is a public good that provides the members o f PS 
with a relative sense of dignity and security thereby contributing to their well-being. 
Thus, the relevant question is whether the members of PS have a collective interest in 
their criminal laws being in force extraterritorially vis-a-vis certain offences against, for 
example, the security and political independence of the state. I contend they do. Let me 
illustrate this point:
The scene was Washington, November and December 1921. The world's naval 
powers had come to negotiate limits to shipbuilding to prevent a runaway naval 
race and save money. The point in contention was the ratio of tonnage afloat 
between the three largest navies, those of Britain, the United States, and Japan. The 
US proposed a ratio o f 10:10:6. ... But the Japanese were unhappy and would not 
budge from their insistence on a 10:10:7 ratio—  Calculations difficult to 
summame here meant that Western navies would be at a disadvantage in Japanese 
waters with a 10:10:7 ratio, but would have ships enough to dominate even far 
from home ports if they could insist successfully on 10:10:6. ... Two years earlier 
after months of work [Herbert O.] Yardley had solved an important Japanese 
diplomatic code; ... on December 2, as the naval conference struggled over its 
impasse on the ratio, a copy of a cable from Tokyo was delivered to Yardley's team 
and deciphered almost as quickly as a clerk could type. The drift of the message ... 
was an instruction to Japan's negotiators to defend the ratio tenaciously, falling 
back one by one through the four positions only as required to prevent the 
negotiations from breaking down entirely. As Yardley later described..., position 
number four was agreement to the 10:10:6 ratio. ‘Stud poker/ Yardley wrote, ‘is 
not a very difficult game after you see your opponent's hole card.’ So it proved. On 
December 12 the Japanese caved."52
This act o f espionage is as harmful to Japan’s interests (and those of the Japanese) as
52 Taken from T. Powers, 'Black Arts', New York Review of Rooks 52, no. 8 (2005).
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acts of espionage against Japan on its own territory. In other words, it makes little 
difference where the secret message was intercepted. But then, if Japan has the power 
to punish those who carry out acts of espionage against Japan on its territory, it must 
follow that it would have to hold this power extraterritorially. Unlike cases o f theft or 
murder against V, espionage against PS, even if carried out on TS, will affect the 
interests of the members of PS in PS. For them to be able to enjoy the thin protection 
that that rule being in force provides, the rule has to be binding on O irrespective of 
where she commits the act of espionage. Moreover, this argument does not collapse 
into a wider basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The members o f PS have an interest in 
PS prosecuting and punishing espionage against PS, but not against PS2. In our 
example, China would be disabled from prosecuting Mr. Yardley. Finally, PS would 
hold this power regardless of whether TS decides to prosecute O itself or not.
It should be noted, however, that this basis of criminal jurisdiction has not been 
free from criticism. The underlying preoccupation focuses on the rights of those 
individuals subjected to this type of prosecution. On the one hand, it has been argued 
that these trials will be necessarily biased or politically conditioned.53 This objection, 
however, affects only some of the offences that usually give rise to the protective 
principle, but not necessarily many others such as counterfeiting currency or public 
documents, or even perjury to the detriment of national authorities abroad. More 
importantly, perhaps, even with regard to those offences for which this objection may 
have some bite, such as treason, espionage or crimes with a political element in general, 
the difficulty it creates has nothing to do with the extraterritorial character of the 
prosecution. Rather, it affects this ltind of trial, period. The Dreyfus affair in late 19th 
Century France and, more recendy, the trials against Mossaui in the U.S., and members 
o f ETA in Spain illustrate this neady.54 Ultimately, however, this type o f consideration 
does not undermine the interest that justifies holding the power to punish O, nor does it 
present a countervailing interest of sufficient entity to provide O with an immunity
53 Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreigners'.
54 On the ETA trials and its complaints see, e.g., the Adolfo Arai^ Ylamariqe et al. by the Spanish 
Constitutional Court (1999).
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against S’s power. Rather, it affects the conditions that any given body (be it territorial 
or extraterritorial) must fulfil in order to claim, itself, the normative power to punish O. 
In other words, lack o f impartiality affects the moral credentials of S’s authority to 
punish O, not the fact that it has a valid reason to do it.55
On the other hand, it has been argued that this type o f jurisdiction lends itself to
inadmissible extensions.56 This is historically true. Famously, Professor Jessup cites a 
case in which, during the Nazi period, a German court approved the prosecution in 
Germany of a Jewish alien who had extramarital intercourse with a German girl in 
Czechoslovakia on the grounds that it affected the “purity o f the German blood.”57 
Salman Rushdie’s death fatwah constitutes another powerful illustration of this danger. 
Without going that far, many provisions that invoke the protective principle are 
unacceptably vague. For example, the Hungarian Penal Code at some point provided 
for extraterritorial jurisdiction over any act against ‘a fundamental interest relating to 
the democratic, political and economic order o f the Hungarian People’s Republic’.58 As 
it is often said, however, the fact that PS can abuse a right it has is hardly a conclusive 
argument against PS holding that right in the first place. These examples show cases of 
blatant abuse of this doctrine, but they say very litde about its application to offences
that do in fact affect the security or political independence of PS.
Finally, one should ask whether PS’s laws being in force abroad can provide the 
members of PS with any sense of dignity and security in this type of case, for I have 
argued that the public good that punishment provides benefits the individuals on the 
territory of the state where they happen to be. For instance, I argued that a German 
citizen, while abroad, cannot enjoy the sense of dignity and security provided by the 
German criminal laws, but rather, it is the criminal laws of the country where she is
55 See Chapter 5 below.
56 Garda-Mora, 'Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreigners', 583.
57 Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1956), 50.
58 In Akehurst, 'Jurisdiction in International Law', 58.
104
(TS) being in force that can contribute to her sense of dignity and security.59 Would 
that not undermine the argument I make in this section?
I suggest it would not. In this case we are not considering the sense o f dignity and 
security that the German criminal laws provide to, e.g., Germany’s Chancellor abroad. 
The issue at stake here then is not her sense of dignity and security. In effect, Angela 
Merkel herself, on a visit to Patagonia, would have an interest in Argentine?s criminal 
laws being in force. This will contribute to her sense of dignity and security. Rather, the 
protective principle is explained by the sense of dignity and security that a criminal 
prohibition provides to the German people in Germany regarding their Chancellor, while 
she is abroad. The Germans have, themselves, an interest in making it their business to 
punish anyone who commits such an act, irrespectively o f where this act takes place 
and of the concurrent power held by the territorial state. Their sense of dignity and 
security with regards to their Chancellor, I submit, German criminal law is perfecdy 
able to contribute to. Finally, the reason why the Germans might have an interest in 
Germany punishing such act has to do with Merckel’s political status, not with her 
nationality. They would have the same interest if their Chancellor happened to be 
Austrian or even Peruvian. It is the position V holds in PS’s government that explains 
PS ’s power to punish O.
6. Two Possible Objections
Before concluding this chapter, I want to examine two possible objections to the 
account of extraterritorial punishment for domestic offences presented here. On the 
one hand, many people would find it simply too restrictive. They will protest, for 
instance, that by preventing states from exercising their criminal jurisdiction 
extraterritorially on grounds other than protection, this approach would preclude joint 
efforts by states to fight certain forms of criminality. This is particularly sensitive in a 
world in which the forces of globalization seem to have bolstered transnational crime.60
59 See the section on passive personality above.
60 E.g., Misha Glenny, Mcmafia : A. Journey through the Global Criminal Underworld (New York: Knopf 
Books, 2008).
This, however, is not what this argument entails. True, it warrants putting PS under 
a prima facie disability to punish O for an offence she committed outside its territory 
unless it threatens its security or political independence. However, I have suggested that 
it might be the case that the members o f TS have an interest in PS being able to 
enforce TS’s criminal laws.61 I now contend that this interest would be sufficiently 
important to warrant conferring upon TS the normative power to authorize PS to do 
so. In other words, the interest o f individuals in TS not only warrants conferring on TS 
a power to punish O for an offence she committed on its territory. It also explains TS’s 
power to authorize an extraterritorial authority to do so, and thereby waive its 
immunity against having foreign criminal rules enforced on its territory. But this is 
simply not the same as arguing that PS, itself has the power to punish O. My argument 
entails only this former proposition.
Let me put this in more concrete terms. Under the argument advocated here, states 
hold a normative power to make treaties granting each other extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction for acts committed on their respective territories. The Conventions o f the 
Council of Europe on Cybercrime (2001) and on Action against Trafficking in Human 
Beings (2005), and the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption are but a few examples 
of this. In addition, states can authorize, as they often do, a particular state to exercise 
jurisdiction on its territory in the context of an extradition treaty; and they can either 
provide PS with a full power to exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction or subject it 
to certain limitations.62 Finally, states have a power to grant jurisdiction to foreign states 
for any sort of domestic crime they see fit. Thus, I willingly admit that, in Chief Justice 
Taft’s words, some offences “are such that to limit their locus to the strictly territorial 
jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness o f the statute...”.63 
However, this does not warrant PS’s having extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction per se.
61 See the section on the nationality principle above.
62 Cryer argues that this regime applies to the terrorism conventions (Robert Cryer, Prosecuting 
International Crimes : Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 80-81). I will advocate a similar understanding o f terrorism in Chapter 3.6 below.
63 United States v  Bowman, at 98. Although in this case the court left open the question o f whether this 
basis o f jurisdiction applied also to aliens, the reasoning seems to lead inevitably to that conclusion.
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My contention is that it is up to TS, and only up to TS, to decide on whether PS will 
hold the power to punish O for an offence she committed on the territory o f TS. This 
explanation thereby accommodates what we may call internationalized criminal law, i.e., 
domestic criminal laws that are enforceable extraterritorially by domestic courts on the 
basis of an agreement.64
It is now time to tackle a second line of criticism. The claim is that there might be 
other justifications for legal punishment that would be, overall, more consistent with 
the way in which international law currently regulates extraterritorial punishment. 
Accordingly, they would probably be preferred over the argument advocated here for 
their explanatory power. This is not the case for two reasons. First, most considerations 
on which these justifications rely lack any clear connection to the territorial scope of 
the power to punish. And secondly, they are usually unable to account for the specific 
considerations on which these jurisdictional bases are grounded. This is true o f most 
consequentialist and deontological considerations such as deterrence, incapacitation, 
moral reform, retribution, etc. Regardless of their interplay within each theory, it is 
simply not true that they are more attuned with our current practices. Rather, most 
justifications for legal punishment tend to advocate broader jurisdictional rules than 
those provided for under international law today.65 I suggest they they risk collapsing 
into universal jurisdiction. Moreover, I will argue below that when certain 
considerations are introduced to limit the extraterritorial scope of S’s power to punish, 
these theories end up being too restrictive or in any event less attuned with some o f the 
core features of the distribution and scope o f states’ power to punish as currently 
regulated under international law.
But first I need to show that the argument advocated in this chapter does not lead 
to any of these unfortunate implications. I have argued that PS’s power to punish O is 
justified by the collective interest of the members of PS in having in force a system of
64 This proposition, however, does not cover ‘purely’ international crimes such as genocide, war crimes 
or crimes against humanity. On this, see chapters 3 and 4 below.
65 Justifications for punishment are notoriously complex and varied. I simplify here the literature in a 
way that takes into consideration at least some o f the most relevant considerations on which 
contemporary justifications rely.
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laws prohibiting, e.g., murder, rape, etc. The question is thus, once again, whether the 
members of PS have a collective interest in their domestic criminal laws being in force 
universally. From the arguments stated so far it should be clear that this is not the case. 
When discussing the nationality and passive personality principles I claimed that there 
seems to be no way in which Finland’s criminal rules being in force requires punishing O 
for a robbery she committed in Nepal. For one, it seems odd to say that O has violated 
the laws o f Finland. But more importantly, I suggest that the sense of security and 
dignity that Finnish criminal laws being in force provides individuals in Finland is not 
affected by a robbery in Nepal. Indeed, the members o f Finland may feel sympathetic 
to the victims of a crime committed elsewhere, but the system of criminal rules under 
which they live is not put into question by that offence. Therefore, Finland would 
simply lack the power to punish O for a domestic offence on universality grounds.
How would a deterrence-based theory analyse this situation? As argued in Chapter 
1, the central claim on which deterrence is grounded is that punishment is justified as a 
means o f protecting individual’s rights and other valuable public goods by deterring 
potential offenders. It is the protection provided that justifies the suffering inflicted 
upon O. Regardless of whether we can limit some of its unappealing implications by 
introducing deontological considerations, deterrence seems inevitably attached to the 
following reasoning: the ‘more’ punishment is exacted, the stronger the deterrence 
effect o f criminal law would be and, as a result, the fewer violations of these rights and 
goods would obtain. In particular, the deterrent effect has been said to depend on the 
certainty, severity and celerity o f the punishment.66 It surely seems that allowing every 
state to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over any given offence will contribute to the 
certainty o f the punishment. More importandy, perhaps, it would contribute to the 
perceived certainty. It is obviously beyond the scope of this enquiry to even begin to 
consider how strong this extra deterrent effect would be. I suspect that will depend on 
the type of crimes and the type of offenders. Shoplifting and money-laundering may
66 Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment (London,: 1830), chapter VI.
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well be differently affected.67 In any event, if we accept that there will be some extra 
deterrence, any justification that relies on deterrence would be committed to granting 
every state the power to punish O. This surely would not prove it wrong but it is hardly 
an implication their advocates would be prepared to endorse.
O f course, the consequentialist theorist might respond that this would be too 
quick. Deterrence is only one consideration that must be included in a broader 
calculation o f utility, i.e., we need to balance it against other countervailing 
considerations, such as for instance the friction that the exercise o f universal 
jurisdiction for domestic offences would create between states. With this further 
consideration in mind, we may admit that a consistent consequentialist would be able to 
deny that deterrence is committed to conferring upon states a power to punish O that 
is universal in scope.
This restatement is certainly more plausible, but I suggest it is ultimately 
unconvincing for two reasons. First, although successful in restricting the 
extraterritorial scope of the power to punish, this move may end up being too 
restrictive. For instance, if avoiding international friction overrides deterrence in the 
overall calculus of utility, it follows that the UK would be unjustified in punishing 
Russian agents for the alleged murder of Litvinenko, which was perpetrated in central 
London.68 This by itself, casts some doubts on how successful this restatement 
ultimately is; the doubts grow when we take into consideration another important 
feature of the right to punish.
Indeed, my second point against this more elaborate version of deterrence has to 
do with what I consider to be, ultimately, an advantage o f the language of rights over 
unfettered consequentialism. In short, if the balance between conflict avoidance and 
deterrence is in favour of the former, the consequentialist would be committed to the 
view that S is unjustified in punishing O. By contrast, to say that S holds the power to
67 I leave aside, for present purposes, the issue o f how this would affect acts that are considered 
offences in S but not in S2, a standard example being that o f abortion. I suspect that advocates of  
deterrence would have to argue in favour o f S having universal jurisdiction over this type o f acts as welL
68 For good coverage o f this affair see, generally, http://topics.nytimes.com 
/  top/reference/timestopics/ people/1/ alexander_v_litvinenko/index.html.
109
punish O means that it is up to S, and only up to S, to decide whether to prosecute O, 
even at the expense of creating friction with S2. Thus, the rights-based account I 
endorse is able to explain an important feature of the current practice of legal 
punishment, namely, that provided that individuals in S hold a sufficiently weighty 
interest in S punishing O, this confers upon S the right to decide whether or not to 
punish a particular offender, even when this would lead to a suboptimal level of utility. 
On the basis o f these two considerations, the argument I advocate is more attuned with 
some o f the central features of the current institution of legal punishment than the 
revised consequentialist argument.
Interestingly, retributivist justifications for legal punishment seem to face a similar 
difficulty. The central tenet o f retributive justifications for legal punishment is th a t‘S is 
justified in punishing O because O deserves to be punished’. A distinction is warranted 
here: some retributivists argue that this proposition only explains why it is permissible to 
punish O.69 In the language of rights I have been using so far, this argument explains 
why O lacks a claim-right not to be punished. It does not explain why PS has the 
normative power to do so. This version of retributivism is not committed to universal 
jurisdiction but it does not, either, provide a complete justification for the institution of 
legal punishment. To that extent, it has litde to say about the issue at hand.
A second type o f retributivist suggests that desert is also a sufficient condition for 
conferring upon PS the power to punish O. I take issue with this claim; regardless of 
what is the precise explanation of the propositions ‘S has the power to punish O 
because O deserves to be punished’ or ‘inflicting punishment to the guilty is 
intrinsically good’, they seem to warrant the conclusion that PS should have the power 
to punish O irrespective of where the offence was committed. This follows, at least, as 
long as retributivism is not able to qualify that tenet by claiming that O deserves to be 
punished by X . But retributivists characteristically do not take that approach. Take for 
example Ted Honderich’s claim that the truth in retributivism is that punishment is
69 McDermott, The Permissibility o f Punishment1.
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justified by grievance-satisfaction.70 Arguably, to the victim and all those who 
sympathise with him it would make litde difference, in terms of grievance satisfaction, 
just which state does in fact punish O, as long as O is effectively punished. It seems, 
then, that most retributivists will also be committed to defending PS’s holding criminal 
jurisdiction regardless o f where the crime was committed.71 Moreover, the nationality 
of both offender and victim seem entirely unrelated to the reason why PS holds the 
power to punish O.
In the remainder of this section I shall concentrate on two arguments that may 
provide a better answer to this problem: von Hirsch and Ashworth’s liberal argument 
for legal punishment and Antony D uffs influential communitarian approach.72 von 
Hirsch and Ashworth see punishment as mainly explained in terms of censure, though 
their justification is supplemented by an element o f deterrence. Deterrence, as we have 
seen, cannot help them circumscribe the scope o f S’s power to punish. On the 
particular issue at stake here their argument goes as follows: a) offences are moral 
wrongs; b) by censuring the offender, punishment provides recognition of the 
conduct’s wrongfulness; c) this recognition should be made by a public authority and on 
behalf of the wider community, because it relates to basic norms of decent interaction among 
individuals;73 d) the state is, so the argument goes, the only body capable of providing 
such public valuation of O ’s conduct.74 The main difficulty their argument faces is that 
it does not identify the wider community on whose behalf censure should be conveyed. 
This may be because their main underlying concern is to establish that legal punishment
70 Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications, 233-234.
71 In effect, Nozick’s influential argument that punishment connects the offender with ‘correct values’ 
will be liable to this charge. See Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations. And so would be M. Moore’s 
claim that the criminal law is to ‘attain retributive justice’ by ‘punish[ing] all and only those who are 
morally culpable in the doing o f some morally wrongful act’. See Moore, Placing Blame : A. Theory of 
Criminal Taw, 33-35.
72 See, respectively, Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing : Exploring the 
Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) and Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community.
73 They refer here to citizens rather than individuals (von Hirsch and Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing: 
Exploring the Principles, 30). However, this cannot be meant in any meaningful way. Otherwise, one would 
have to infer from this argument that as long as the ‘indecent’ interaction is towards an alien, the 
criminal law would have nothing to say on this. Their own liberal stance would most certainly be 
inconsistent with that proposition.
74 ibid, 29-31. Emphasis added.
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is the business of the state rather than of private individuals. However, what it means is 
that they fail to explain which state it is the business of. von Hirsch and Ashworth 
consider themselves conventional liberals. The community they seem to have in mind is 
that of a group of individuals who share some basic norms of decent interaction. But 
then this community would have to include every individual worldwide. After all, most 
moral wrongs do not depend upon territorial boundaries or political allegiances. On 
these grounds, it would be up to them to explain why PS would not be in a position to 
provide a public valuation o f O ’s offence perpetrated in TS. For both PS and TS’s 
decision would amount to a public recognition of the conduct’s wrongfulness. If, as 
they say, the disapproving response to the conduct should not be left to victims and 
others immediately affected, they would need to provide an argument explaining why it 
should have to be left to the state on whose territory the offence was perpetrated.
By contrast, I suggest D uffs communitarian theory of punishment does not 
necessarily collapse into universal jurisdiction. Duff sees punishment as a secular 
penance whose main purpose is to communicate censure to moral agents. He is 
therefore very much concerned with being able to reach the offender’s moral 
conscience. I will not examine the soundness of this argument here.75 My main interest 
is in appraising D uffs position in the light o f extraterritoriality. For punishment to 
reach O ’s moral conscience, PS needs to have the moral standing to censure her for 
that conduct. For PS to have the relevant moral standing, it must fulfil two conditions. 
First, it must have the appropriate relationship to O, or to her action in question.76 This 
implies the existence of a political community on behalf of which punishment is 
imposed, i.e., a linguistic community that shares a normative language and a set of 
substantive values, sufficient to render mutually intelligible the normative demands that 
the law makes on its citi2ens. Secondly, PS must not have lost that standing as a result 
o f some (wrongful) previous dealing with O.77
75 On this see the interesting exchange between D uff and von Hirsch in Duff, Punishment, Communication, 
and Community, von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions.
76 On this particular issue see my discussion o f D uffs argument in Chapter 4 below.
77 This aspect o f D u ff s position is discussed in some detail in Chapter 5, section 4, below.
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D uffs argument does better than most of its rivals in this context. This, I believe, 
is because he is aware that the question about the justification for punishment is not 
just about whether it is permissible to punish O, but rather, and crucially, about 
whether some particular body (S) has the right to do so. Again, the answer to this 
question depends crucially on what constitutes for Duff a political community in the 
relevant sense. If he makes the requirements too thin (i.e., mutual recognition and 
protection of basic human rights) then he would have to admit that almost any body 
would have the moral standing to censure O, and as a result he would end up 
advocating universal criminal jurisdiction for every wrong that ought to be criminalized. 
But arguably this is not what he has in mind. Duff seems to be talking o f a thicker 
notion of political community. Accordingly, his argument would be safe from 
collapsing into universal jurisdiction.
However, it might be that his approach faces other difficulties. D uff has recently 
elaborated on his explanation of when a particular body has the appropriate standing to 
bring O into account for her offence.78 He mainly relies on a theoretical point about 
the conception o f responsibility which is consistent with, but does not necessarily 
depend on, his normative justification for legal punishment. In short, he argues that the 
concept of responsibility has a relational dimension. O is responsible for X to Y, or better, 
O is responsible as W  for X to Y. To illustrate: as a university teacher, D uff claims, 
there are only certain bodies or individuals who can call O into account if, e.g., she 
delivers an ill- prepared lecture. She will not be accountable to “a passing stranger, or to 
[her] aunt, ... or to the Pope”.79 D uff uses this model to argue explicitly against a 
territorial conception of criminal jurisdiction. “c[A]cting within a specified geographical 
area X5 does not by itself have the normative significance that an answer to the ‘as 
what’ question requires.”80 Rather, individuals should respond ‘as citizens’ o f a political 
community. His conception of a political community is not o f particular interest for us
78 Antony Duff, "Criminal Responsibility, Municipal and International," (unpublished manuscript: 2006), 
cited with permission from the author. See also Antony Duff, Answering for Crime : Responsibility and 
UabiUty in the Criminal haw (Oxford ; Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2007), chapters 1 and 2.
79 Duff, "Criminal Responsibility, Municipal and International," 5.
80 Duff, Answeringfor Crime, 44.
here. What matters is the relevance that belonging to this political community has for O 
to be accountable to a particular state for a criminal offence. On this basis, Duff argues 
that “ [t]he wrongs that properly concern a political community, as a political 
community, are those committed within it by its own members”.81
This conception, Duff admits, requires an obvious qualification, i.e., it needs to 
extend to visitors and temporary residents, as well as citizens.82 But this causes 
problems. D uffs argument for O being accountable to S is that O belongs to that 
political community, that she is a citizen of S. But visitors and temporary residents are 
not citizens. With regard to them he claims that they should, as guests, “be accorded 
many of the rights and protections of citizenship, as well as being expected to accept 
some of its responsibilities and duties”.83 Duff does not elaborate on this. He only 
stipulates that “[t]his is not to revert to a geographical principle that grounds 
jurisdiction in the territorial location of crime: what makes normative sense of 
jurisdiction is still the law’s identity as the law of a particular polity”.84 As it stands, his 
argument for this extension seems to rely on the benefits accorded to visitors in terms 
of rights and protections. But this argument undermines his overall explanation. If  all 
we need for O to be accountable to S is that she receives certain rights and protection 
from S, the notion of citizenship, i.e., that she belongs to that political community, ceases 
to do any justificatory work. If, by contrast, Duff wants to maintain that criminal 
responsibility is a relational concept and it makes O responsible to S  on the grounds 
that O is a citizen of S, he seems committed to the claim that temporary residents and 
visitors are not accountable to S. This hardly seems an outcome that he would be 
prepared to endorse. To sum up, then, all that Duff ultimately requires for O to be 
accountable to S is that she receives the kind o f rights and protections that S can only
81 Duff, "Criminal Responsibility, Municipal and International," 13.
82 Duff, Answeringfor Crime, 54-55.
83 ibid, 54.
83 Duff, "Criminal Responsibility, Municipal and International," 14.
84 Duff, Answeringfor Crime, 55.
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provide on its territory, and this looks very much like a territorial conception of 
jurisdiction.85
Moreover, it seems that this is a type of territorial conception that falls short of 
explaining some standard instances o f S’s power to punish offences. On the one hand, 
D uff is reluctant to endorse the principles o f nationality and passive personality.86 With 
this goes the potential explanatory advantage over the account advocated here. On the 
other hand, his position would fail to explain, for example, why Scotland had the power 
to punish anyone (at least anyone who is not a Scottish national) for the Lockerbie 
incident, or why, for example, Uruguay would have the power to punish offences 
committed by foreigners in France against its sovereignty, security or important 
governmental functions (principles of objective territoriality and protection). After all, 
O lacks the relevant relationship to these states, and one can hardly argue that she has 
received any specific benefit or protection from either Scotland or Uruguay. And yet, 
these jurisdictional bases are not only well-established as a matter of law; they also seem 
based on widely held intuitions about the appropriate scope of S’s power to punish.87
Ultimately, the problem with D uffs account lies with the fact that it relies on a 
conceptual point regarding the nature of responsibility rather than on a normative 
argument about the reasons that justify a particular state meting out legal punishment to
O. O f course I do not suggest that geographical location per se is o f particular moral 
relevance. Rather, my claim is that in order to assess the extraterritorial scope of S’s 
power to punish O we must look at the reasons that justify S in particular holding that 
power. It is the normative argument I provide in defence o f that power that is sensitive 
to the issue of where the offence was committed.
85 This, without even beginning to consider the situation o f O, a dual national o f SI and S2, who 
commits an act in S3 that is against the laws o f SI but mandatory under the laws o f S2. The account I 
advocate would be free from these kinds of difficulties.
86 Duff, Answeringfor Crime, 54.
87 In Chapter 4 I will argue, furthermore, that D u ffs argument cannot properly explain why, if 
responsibility is relational, international crimps warrant conferring upon every state the power to punish 
O (universal jurisdiction).
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7. Conclusion
The findings of this chapter are relatively straightforward. I have argued that 
international law theory fails to provide a convincing explanation for the existing bases 
o f extraterritorial jurisdiction over municipal crimes. In order to examine the 
extraterritorial scope of states’ power to punish offenders we need to look at the 
reasons that justify them holding that power in the first place. I argued that the 
justification for the power to punish advocated in Chapter 1 fully accounts for states’ 
power to punish offences committed on their territory or against their sovereignty, 
security or important governmental functions. However, I have rejected the 
propositions that states hold an extraterritorial power to punish O on grounds of her 
nationality or that of the victim. Indeed, the arguments on the basis of which these 
jurisdictional rules are commonly defended either beg the fundamental question they 
are meant to answer or are committed to much broader rules than those in force under 
international law.
The last section of this chapter examined two possible lines o f criticism to the 
theory of extraterritoriality developed here. I first rejected the claim that the framework 
put forward is too restrictive by explaining how the justification for legal punishment 
advocated here can accommodate collaborative efforts to tackle transnational crime 
through international agreements. Finally, I examined whether competing justifications 
for legal punishment based on other grounds have more promise in terms o f being able 
to better explain how international law regulates extraterritorial punishment. I 
suggested that even refined consequentialist and deontological theories ultimately do 
not fare as well as the argument advocated here in accounting for certain core intuitions 
on legal punishment.
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A Jurisdictional Theory of International Crimes
'‘Nothing is more pernicious to an understanding of 
[international crimes such as genocide] ... than the common 
illusion that the crime of murder and the crime of genocide are 
essentially the same. The point of the latter is that an altogether 
different order is broken and an altogether different community 
is violated ’*
1. Stating the problem
In the previous chapter I argued that S’s normative power to punish an offender (O) 
for crimes such as robbery, assault, fraud, etc., is primarily territorial.2 That is, I argued 
that PS lacks the normative power to punish O for an offence she committed on TS, 
unless that offence threatens its sovereignty, security, or important governmental 
functions (principle of protection). I also argued that neither the nationality of O nor 
the nationality of her victim (V) suffice to explain why PS ought to have a power to 
punish O that is extraterritorial in scope. Nonetheless, this general position should be 
qualified. I suggested that these jurisdictional rules apply only to municipal offences. 
They do not purport to apply to offences such as genocide, war crimes or crimes 
against humanity, which I shall call, for present purposes, ‘international crimes’. That 
there is currently such a thing as an international crime as a matter of international law 
is hardly controversial. Paradigmatic examples of prosecutions for this type of crimes 
are probably the trial of Milosevic in The Hague, the extradition proceedings against 
former Chilean dictator Pinochet in the UK, and the indictment of the current
1 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A. Report on the Banality of E vil (New York Penguin Books, 1994).
2 To repeat, I use for simplicity PS for the extraterritorial state that wants to prosecute O, and TS for the 
state on whose territory the offence was committed.
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President of Sudan before the International Criminal Court. The issue at stake in this 
chapter is, generally, what makes a particular offence an international crime? That is, 
what distinguishes international offences from domestic ones? And, furthermore, is it 
possible to provide a cogent theory of international crimes able to accommodate, for 
example, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and terrorism?
This chapter is therefore about identifying the specific features of international 
offences that explain why TS does not have an exclusive power to punish O. But this is 
not yet an endorsement o f the thesis that international crimes warrant conferring upon 
states universal criminal jurisdiction. This position will be advocated in the following 
chapter. It is worth clarifying the division of labour I hereby advocate. In this chapter I 
will only argue that individuals in TS lack an interest in TS holding an immunity against 
extraterritorial authorities punishing O for international offences committed there. This 
means that at least some extraterritorial authority holds the power to punish O. In 
Chapter 4 I will provide an account of the jurisdictional rules applicable to this type of 
offences. There, I will argue that the International Criminal Court (in particular) and 
every state hold the power to punish O for an international crime perpetrated on TS. 
These questions are often conflated. I suggest, by contrast, that as a matter of 
philosophical argument it pays to examine them separately.
Before going any further a few points of disambiguation are in order. First, it must 
be noted that my aim here is not to clarify the main features o f existing offences under 
international law. Nor it is to provide a justification for the criminalization of specific 
behaviours. My purpose is far more limited in scope. It has to do with identifying a 
specific feature or set o f features that would explain why jurisdiction for these offences 
should be broader than the territoriality and protective principles I advocated for 
municipal offences. I shall concentrate on the standard cases in order to provide an 
intelligible rationale for the settled instances of international offences, rather than try to 
provide a test that will solve hard cases.
Secondly, in order to provide an answer to the question at hand I need to specify 
further what is in need of normative justification. After all, both domestic and
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international offences can be characterized as behaviours that warrant meting out legal 
punishment to their perpetrators. However, there are a number of normative 
implications specifically attached to the notion of international crimes. Crucially for our 
purposes tribunals can hold individuals accountable even in the absence o f any 
traditional link or nexus with the perpetrator, the victim, or the offence. This means that 
an authority A  can punish an individual for an international crime even if the offence 
was not committed on its territory, against its sovereignty, or by or against one o f its 
nationals.
Accordingly, for the purposes of the present chapter I shall use the concept o f an 
international offence in a narrow, exclusively jurisdictional sense, as crimes that warrant 
conferring upon some authority extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. In so doing, I 
purport to isolate this issue from other normative and legal consequences (often 
pressing and sensitive) commonly associated with this type of crime such as the 
granting of amnesties or pardons by TS, the applicability or inapplicability o f statutes of 
limitations, or the law on state or diplomatic immunity.3 1 am only concerned here with 
the distinct jurisdictional regime applicable to them. In short, this chapter has to do 
with identifying a specific feature or set of features that would explain why Belgium can 
legitimately claim the power to prosecute and punish two Rwandan nuns for 
participating in a genocide in Rwanda, but cannot prosecute and punish a single murder 
perpetrated in, e.g., El Salvador.
This way of framing the question might be controversial. It may be objected that 
by focusing exclusively on this jurisdictional aspect I am using a single normative 
implication to conceptualize international crimes instead of providing a sound analysis 
of the concept itself. In other words, and as it was put to me, that I am trying to put the
3 See the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability o f the Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
Crimes against Humanity (adopted by G.A. Res 2391). Also, ICC Statute, articles 29 and 27(2) and, e.g., 
the Argentine Supreme Court decision in Arancibia Clavel,’ and the French Court o f Cassation in Barbie. 
Recently, the Audiencia National o f Spain refused to extradite former Argentine President Maria Estela 
de Peron, precisely on the grounds that because the offences she was requested for were not crimes 
against humanity (and therefore international offences) the statutes o f  limitations applied and Argentina 
lacked jurisdiction to try her. See http://www.elpais.com/articulo/intemacional/Audiencia/National/ 
rechaza/extraditar/Isabelita/Peron/elpepuint/20080428elpepuint_15/Tes (last accessed 10 January 
2008).
cart before the horse.4 I disagree. Admittedly, this approach implies a criticism of part 
o f the existing literature.5 It suggests, among other things, that it is not very productive 
to try to determine what humanity stands for in the notion of crimes against humanity, 
and rather seeks to account for a specific implication often associated with this type of 
offences.6 Moreover, this implication is arguably an important reason why these 
offences are referred to as international crimes, and why prosecutions for this type of 
crimes are commonly resisted and criticised.7 Thus, using Rawlsian vocabulary, I 
advocate in this thesis a political conception o f international offences, that is, one that 
sees them as crimes for which extraterritorial authorities can legitimately intervene in 
what would otherwise be the domestic affairs of other state(s).8
The quest for a unified explanation of international crimes is an important one. For 
one thing, it contributes to answering the question of whether there should be a system 
of international criminal law at all by forcing us to clarify its normative underpinnings. 
Furthermore, it has become more pressing as a result of states increasingly claiming an 
extraterritorial power to punish offenders (O) for crimes under international law other 
than piracy. Genocide and crimes against humanity were the first hard cases to be 
decided by a court of law in the aftermath of World War II. More recently, certain 
sexual offences and terrorism have been at the centre o f this debate. Among the 
arguments articulated as an explanation for the particular jurisdictional regime attached 
to international offences we could readily highlight the following: it has been argued 
that they are analogous to piracy in some specific respect; or that they are perpetrated 
in places where law enforcement is simply too weak; that they harm or violate humanity
4 I am grateful to Paul Roberts for pressing me on this issue.
5 Two exceptions are May, Crimes against Humanity and Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes, 75.
6 For examples o f this approach see David Luban, 'A Theory o f Crimes against Humanity', Yale Journal of 
International Law 29 (2004) and Richard Vemon, What Is Crime against Humanity?' The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 10, no. 3 (2002).
7 See the US arguments against Belgium prosecuting Tommy Franks, or George W.H. Bush.
8 In The Law o f Peoples John Rawls sketches a political conception o f human rights as rights which set 
limits to the sovereignty o f states, in that their violation constitutes a reason for other states or 
international bodies taking action against the violator. For a robust defence o f this political conception 
o f human rights see Joseph Raz, 'Human Rights without Foundations', University of Oxford Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series (WP 14/2007).
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itself; that they shock the conscience of humankind, among others. I will divide them 
here into two main groups. In section 2 I shall examine arguments that claim that 
international offences are relevantly analogous to piracy. Section 3, examines the 
arguments that purport to explain them in terms of harm to humanity. Ultimately, I 
shall consider these two families o f arguments unsuccessful. In section 4 ,1 shall present 
my own jurisdictional theory of international crimes. I shall argue that what justifies 
making a criminal rule into an international criminal rule is the fact that it cannot really be 
in force on the territory of TS if it has to rely exclusively on it being enforced by TS. 
Section 5 deals with the objection that international criminal law does not need a theory 
of international crimes. And, finally, section 6 examines whether different variants of 
terrorism should qualify as international crimes.
2. Piracy-based explanations and the history of international crimes
Piracy was undisputedly the first international offence in the specific sense I use here. 
Pirates have traditionally been referred to as hostis humani generis and their actions 
considered cognizable by any state which gets a hold on them.9 Although scholars point 
to the slave trade as another classical example of an international offence, piracy has 
proved extremely enduring and influential both in theory and practice. In short, it 
single-handedly opened the door for the contemporary doctrine of universal criminal 
jurisdiction. During the 20th Century, international law produced a new generation of 
international offences: war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and several 
others.10 These offences are quite dissimilar from piracy. Nevertheless, scholars, 
theorists and courts have repeatedly tried to explain the main features of international 
offences, and in particular their distinct jurisdictional regime, by reference to one or
9 This position on piracy as a matter o f what we currendy call International Law goes back at least as far 
as Grotius. But it has been suggested that this view goes essentially back in time until the period before 
Alexander (Max Radin, 'International Crimes1, Iowa Law Review 32 (1946-1947), 41). On piracy, see 
generally Alfred P. Rubin, The Law of Piracy (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Transnational, 1998).
10 Bassiouni, e.g., mentions torture, apartheid, hijacking, etc. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, 'Universal 
Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice', Virginia 
Journal of International Law 42, no. 1 (2001).
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more of piracy’s specific features.11 Characteristically their reasoning follows the 
following pattern: piracy undisputedly is and ought to be an international offence; war 
crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and the like share feature ‘x’ with piracy; 
thus, they should also be international offences. I will argue that there are two different 
kinds of problems with these arguments. Some misguidedly link universal jurisdiction 
to a particular feature ‘x’ that piracy arguably shares with other international crimes but 
which cannot explain its jurisdictional regime; others, by contrast, fail to make that link 
altogether and argue on the basis of a non sequitur.
Willard Cowles provided one of the few explanations of why war crimes must be 
considered international offences.12 His argument is not purely normative; rather he 
seems to rely also on historical and legal considerations. However, it illustrates quite 
well the kind of arguments this section is about. Cowles represents what I shall call for 
present purposes the ‘scene of the crime’ theory. He argues that the “origin o f the 
jurisdiction over the war criminal must be sought in the ancient practice of 
brigandage.”13 He suggests that the concept o f the war criminal is a legal construction 
o f the 20th Century. Previously, war criminals acting both in a public and a private 
capacity were considered brigands. And brigandism, just as piracy, “stem[s] from the 
fundamental fact o f the lack of governmental control in the areas of their operations”; 
they flourish where political order and law enforcement are lacking, i.e., they 
characteristically grow during periods of war.14 It is in this sense that war crimes are 
very similar to piratical acts: in both situations there is “a lack o f any adequate judicial 
system operating on the spot where the crime takes place” and “both the pirate and the 
war criminal take advantage of this fact, hoping thereby to commit their crimes with
11 See, for example, Israel v Eichmann.
12 In effect, as I argue in section 3 below, most o f them were tailored specifically to tackle crimes against 
humanity. For another argument on war crimes, though far less appealing, see Thomas H. Sponsler, 
'The Universality Principle of Jurisdiction and the Threatened Trials o f American Airmen', Loyola Law 
Review XI (1968-1969).
13 Willard B. Cowles, 'Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes', California Law Review XXXIII, no. 2 
(1945), 181.
14 ibid, 193.
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impunity.”15 Thus, he concludes, “[t]he jurisdiction, exercised over war crimes, has 
been of the same nature as that exercised in the case of the pirate, and this broad 
jurisdiction has been assumed for the same fundamental reason.”16
Cowles’ argument is historically informed, and certainly appealing. However, I 
suggest it is ultimately unsuccessful. The reason for this is that it relies too heavily on 
the pedigree of piracy as an international offence. Put differently, he is so concerned 
with showing that war crimes can be assimilated to piracy, that he overlooks the 
justification for considering piracy an international offence in the first place. I suggest it 
is worth paying a closer look to what is ultimately doing the justificatory work in his 
argument. On his view, international offences are those which are perpetrated in places 
where governmental control is lacking, and where offenders can expect to act with 
impunity. Whether this argument suffices as a historical reason for making piracy an 
international offence is questionable. Many other offences often occurred on the high 
seas, such as assault or murder unaccompanied by robbery, and these were not 
subjected to extraterritorial jurisdiction. Thus, neither the fact that piracy or war crimes 
are difficult to prevent and punish, nor the fact that they are committed in areas where 
there is insufficient presence of a state authority seem to suffice in order to understand 
why they were made into international offences.
Whether Cowles’ argument succeeds as a normative explanation of the jurisdictional 
regime of international offences is even more dubious. Although Cowles does not say 
so explicidy, his argument seems to be that where law enforcement is very weak or 
lacking, such as the high seas or a situation of war, the standard bases of jurisdiction for 
domestic offences would fail to deter potential offenders. This is implied by the 
assertion that in such contexts brigands and war criminals can hope to commit their 
crimes with impunity. I agree with the claim that allowing every state to punish O
15 ibid, 194, 217. Cowles points to other features o f brigandism which, to some extent, might explain the 
expansive jurisdictional rules on it: “it is motivated by no public cause and ... authorized by no state”, 
or it “has been to a large extent international in character”, i.e., international borders are ideal for the 
brigand, and “bands o f brigands are often made up o f members o f more than one nationality” (at 184, 
185, and 186 respectively). But ultimately he relies on the ‘scene o f the crime’ consideration to justify its 
particular jurisdictional regime.
16 ibid, 217.
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would increase deterrence. However, as argued in Chapter 2 above, deterrence as a 
general justification for the power to punish O would collapse the distinction between 
municipal and international offences by providing an extraterritorial Prosecuting State 
(PS) with jurisdiction over both of them. As a result, Cowles’ argument is not an 
explanation of what makes war crimes andpiracy international offences.
The second and perhaps most influential version of these piracy-based 
explanations is the ‘nature of the crime’ theory.17 More precisely, it is often argued that 
the ‘heinousness’ of an offence is what justifies a state with ‘no connection’ at all with it 
holding the power to punish O. This proposition has a number of different 
formulations. The ICC Statute, for instance, talks about ‘unimaginable’ atrocities. 
Similarly, it has been argued that international offences are characterized by “a level of 
callousness that embodies the very essence o f evil itself’18, or that they “shock[s] the 
conscience o f mankind”19, that they have an “added dimension o f cruelty and 
barbarism”20 capable o f “tear[ing] the roots of civilized society”21, and so on. The 
heinousness argument, however, is not used by itself to justify the particular 
jurisdictional rules often associated with international offences. Rather, this implication 
is explained also by way of analogy with piracy.22 Under this argument, it is the 
substantive nature of pirates’ acts, i.e., its heinousness —rather than the location of the 
crime — that makes them cognizable by an extraterritorial authority.23 A crucial
17 Princeton Principles, art. 1.
18 Laurence Thomas, ‘Forgiving the unforgivable’ in Eve Garrard and Geoffrey Scarre, Moral Philosophy 
and the Holocaust (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).
19 Prosecutor v  Tadic (1995) at 57. See also, Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars : A  Moral Argument with 
Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 107.
20 Regina v  Finta, 818.
21 Christopher C. Joyner, 'Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War 
Criminals to Accountability', Law and Contemporary Problems 59, no. 4 (1996), 171.
22 Eugene Kontorovich, 'The Piracy Analogy: Modem Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation', 
Harvard International Law Journal 45, no. 1 (2004).
23 ibid, 205. For e.g. o f explicit endorsements o f this analogy see Diane F. Orentlicher, 'Settiling 
Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations o f a Prior Regime', Yale Law Journal 100 
(1991), 2557-2557 See also, 1 Law Reports o f Trials o f War Criminals 35, 42 (1947) (Brit. Mil. Ct. 
Almelo), cited in Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modem Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow 
Foundation', 195. This reasoning has been followed, e.g., by the American Courts In re Extradition of 
Demjanjuk (1985). Filartiga v  Pena-Irala, arguably the most famous case in which the U.S. claimed
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advantage o f this approach, Kontorovich suggests, is that by arguing that the 
heinousness of the crime explains the power to punish international offences on 
universality grounds, advocates of the piracy analogy put their opponents in the 
position of having to either question the heinousness of, for example, systematic 
torture, or concede that it should be treated like piracy.24 One may well feel discouraged 
from trying to prove the premise wrong.
Kontorovich argues powerfully against this explanation. He correctly suggests that 
its heinousness could not have been the reason why piracy was considered an 
international offence in the first place. When similar acts were perpetrated by 
privateers, i.e. state-licensed pirates, they were repatriated rather than subjected to 
universal criminal jurisdiction.25 Moreover, acts of piracy were never really considered 
particularly heinous. Piracy ultimately amounted to a very troublesome variety of 
robbery.26 And although the locus where it was committed made it hard to prosecute, 
this was certainly not enough to put its heinousness on a par with offences such state- 
sponsored rape or the poisoning o f water supplies.27
Once it is stripped from the piracy analogy, this argument seems to lose whatever it 
was that explained precisely why extraterritorial bodies would have the power to punish 
O. There is no evident connection between the heinousness o f a particular crime and 
the scope of a state’s power to punish O. And yet, it is precisely this connection that 
the theory needs to establish. Accordingly, this argument simply rests on a non sequitur.
extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts o f torture is not relevant for our purposes here, as it deals with civil 
jurisdiction, and therefore not with the U.S.’s power to punish O.
24 Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modem Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation', 208.
25 ibid, 21 Off.
26 See United States v  Palmer, cited in ibid, 225.
27 Both already mentioned by Vattel, Law of Nations, book III, § 145,157. Conversely, it might have been 
precisely because piracy was not as heinous as murder or rape that states were willing to accept 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over it: “[ujniversal jurisdiction over murder would usurp this deeply felt 
responsibility and thus antagonize the nation with traditional jurisdiction.” Kontorovich, 'The Piracy 
Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation', 229 citing United States v  Furlong. In this 
case, the Court argued: “Robbery on the seas is considered an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of  
all nations ... Not so with the crime of murder. It is an offence too abhorrent to the feelings o f man, to 
have it made it necessary that it also should have been brought within this universal jurisdiction.” (at 
196-7).
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3. International offences as ‘crimes against humanity*
Arguably, the most elaborate arguments for international offences have been developed 
within, what I call here, the paradigm of ‘crimes against humanity’ (hereinafter CAH).28 
This paradigm is not necessarily focused on the legal category of crimes against 
humanity, as distinct from war crimes, genocide, or crimes against peace (aggression). 
Rather, it often implies the particular view, traceable perhaps to The Hague 
Convention’s Martens Clause, that international crimes harm or violate humanity 
itself.29 This purportedly explains why any state or an international tribunal would be 
entided to punish their perpetrators. Interestingly, it was in the context of CAH that 
scholars and tribunals have been pressed to distinguish municipal from international 
offences.30 War crimes, by contrast, entered the constellation o f international offences 
largely uncontested.31 In fact, the first criterion used to internationalize CAH was 
precisely the ‘war nexus’. That is, CAH were cognizable by an extraterritorial authority 
only when committed “before or during the war” and “in execution o f or in connection 
with” war crimes or crimes against peace. In any event, CAH have now established 
themselves as a category of international offences in their own right and, some would 
argue, they could eventually become synonymous with them.32
The CAH paradigm revolves around the notion that CAH are group crimes in the 
sense that they are either committed by certain groups or against them. These
28 I refer here to the writings o f Anupam Chander, 'Globalization and Distrust', Yak Law Journal 114 
(2005); Adil Ahmed Haque, 'Group Violence and Group Vengeance: Toward a Retributivist Theory of 
International Criminal Law', Buffalo Criminal Law Renew 9 (2005); Luban, 'A Theory o f Crimes against 
Humanity'; May, Crimes against Humanity, Vernon, What Is Crime against Humanity?' 283. Here, I will 
mainly concentrate on the last two.
29 Preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention (II). See also Prosecutor v Erdemovic, §28 (29 November 1996).
30 Phillis Hwang, 'Defining Crimes against Humanity in the Rome Statute o f the International Criminal 
Court', Fordham International Law Journal 22 (1999); Beth Van Schaack, The Definition o f  Crimes against 
Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 37 (1999).
31 This has been considered one o f the most underrated legacies o f the Nuremberg trials. And rightly so 
because, at the time, there was no clear rule o f international law that treated war crimes (and for that 
matter crimes against peace) as international offences subject to universal jurisdiction. To this, one may 
add the fact that the Allied power could have used other jurisdictional bases to try war the Germans for 
war crimes and aggression. On this see Sponsler, 'The Universality Principle o f Jurisdiction and the 
Threatened Trials o f American Airmen'.
32 William J. Fenrick, 'Should Crimes against Humanity Replace War Crimes?' Columbia journal of 
Transnational Law 37 (1998-1999). For the view that war crimes are more appropriate as synonyms o f  
international offences see Simpson, Law, War and Crime.
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arguments usually rely also on the fact that they entail some egregious form of 
wrongfulness. I will argue that the different arguments under this account fail on two 
relevant grounds. First, they ultimately fail to identify a convincing rationale for making 
CAH cognizable by some extraterritorial authority. Secondly, when they do provide or 
point towards some answer to this question, this answer collapses the distinction 
between domestic and international offences by advocating extraterritorial prosecutions 
for both.
A first line of argument relies on the proposition that CAH are international 
offences because they are perpetrated by governments or govemment-like 
organizations against groups under their control. There are several versions of this 
argument. For the sake o f clarity of exposition, I shall divide them here into three: i) the 
conceptual claim that PS has the power to punish O on the grounds that TS has 
forfeited its immunity against PS doing so; ii) the normative argument that PS’s power 
to punish O is based on the interests of individuals in TS; and iii) the argument that this 
power is based on the individual interest of every single person on earth.
Let us first examine the claim that when security forces or state officials in TS 
perpetrate CAH against part of TS’s own population, TS forfeits its immunity against 
other parties interfering in its internal affairs by, in particular, punishing O.33 This claim 
is intuitively plausible. Why should such a state retain an immunity against this type of 
interference? The problem with this argument is that it fails to explain why TS has 
forfeited its immunity against a certain extraterritorial body, in particular, holding the 
power to punish O. It is harder to provide a satisfactory answer to this question than it 
might initially appear.
I will illustrate this by reference to an interpersonal example. While O attempts to 
kill V by shooting at her, O would arguably lack a right against third parties intervening 
to save V’s life (by killing O if necessary). This is often explained by arguing that O 
forfeited her right against being attacked. However, once the threat is over (e.g. O 
misses her final shot or, indeed, V is dead) a third party would need a different kind of
33 Luban, 'A Theory o f Crimes against Humanity', 109.
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justification to use force against O (for our purposes, by punishing her).34 This is 
precisely the kind of argument that justifications for legal punishment provide and the 
question I claim this argument begs. In other words, the argument being considered 
can only explain why TS forfeited its claim-right against a third party intervening on 
humanitarian grounds to stop the perpetration of CAH on its territory or, similarly, 
why PS is at liberty to do so. But this does not account for TS’s loss o f its immunity 
against foreign bodies punishing O, let alone for PS’s power to  do so. Unless, perhaps, this 
power is grounded on the need to incapacitate O. It is unlikely, however, that defenders 
o f this argument would be willing to endorse incapacitation as a general justification for 
the legal punishment. Moreover, this position has a further difficulty. If  this were the 
case, then Israel, France and Italy would not have had the power to try Eichmann, 
Barbie and Pnebcke, respectively, since when they were apprehended they hardly 
constituted a threat to anyone.
The second version o f this argument purports to explain PS’s extraterritorial power 
to punish O by reference to the interests of individuals in TS generally. The claim is 
that when CAH are perpetrated by a state or state-like entity, this is likely to affect 
other people in TS besides V. As a result, the international community “would have a 
legitimate basis for intervention so as to protect the larger community also likely to be 
harmed by the plan.”35 This argument is open to the criticism sketched in the previous 
paragraphs that the actual physical protection afforded to potential victims, either by 
way of deterring or incapacitating offenders, cannot withstand scrutiny as a justification 
for TS’s power to punish O. It also has a further troublesome implication. Tying the 
power to punish O so tightly to the protection of potential victims would lead to the 
unacceptable consequence that if the government o f TS succeeds in completely 
exterminating a minority that lives on its territory, i.e. if it succeeds in eliminating 
potential victims, then no authority (neither domestic nor extraterritorial) would have 
the power to punish O.
34 On this see Chapter 1, section 3.1 above.
35 May, Crimes against Humanity, 88. Emphasis added.
128
Thirdly, international crimes have been explained by recourse to the interests of 
every individual on earth. On the one hand, it is argued that CAH harm humanity in 
the sense that they are both crimes against our shared humanness and against humanity 
understood as mankind. The aspect of our humanness that is affected by CAH is our 
character as political animals.36 Human beings, the argument goes, are political rather 
than social animals (e.g. ants) in the sense that we need some form of artificial coercive 
organization.37 The problem is that politics can go horribly wrong and end up in the 
most atrocious crimes. Accordingly, “because we cannot live without politics, we exist 
under the permanent threat that ... the indispensable institutions of organized political 
life will destroy us.”38 CAH so defined pose a ‘universal’ threat that every individual 
human being (mankind) has an interest in repressing. Thus, the interest that justifies 
making them into international offences is the “interest in expunging [them] from the 
repertoire of politics ... [; because] in a world where crimes against humanity proceed 
unchecked, each of us could become the object of murder or [persecution].”39
I am sympathetic to the general claim that individuals both within TS and outside it 
(in PS, etc.) have an interest in O being punished for perpetrating an international 
offence. I disagree, however, with the particular interest on which this account relies. 
Indeed, it seems to rest on the proposition that every human being has an interest in 
CAH being punished irrespectively of where they were perpetrated, simply because 
anyone could be a victim o f these offences. We are all hostages of some political 
organization, and politics can potentially always go horribly wrong. Thus, the argument 
goes, any state and not just TS should have the power to punish O for this type of 
offence.40 However, we may readily object, we also live inevitably next to each other,
36 Luban, 'A Theory of Crimes against Humanity', 110.
37 ibid, 113.
38 ibid, 90-91. This is explicitly similar to Richard Vernon’s explanation o f CAH as an “inversion o f the 
jurisdictional resources o f the state” (Vernon, What Is Crime against Humanity?' 242).Vemon’s 
argument largely overlaps with many o f the consideration on which Luban’s argument is based. To this 
extent, I shall not explicidy deal with it here.
39 Luban, 'A Theory of Crimes against Humanity', 138.
40 As a matter o f fact, Luban argues for vigilante jurisdiction. However, he qualifies his claim by 
suggesting that it might be dangerous to allow private individuals to go punishing perpetrators o f  crimes 
against humanity. Only institutions which respect the natural justice duty (which essentially entails the
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and every human being could also be a victim of murder, assault, theft, etc. Moreover, 
the chances of being a victim of any of these municipal offences are, in a significant 
majority of states, far greater than those o f being a victim of CAH. Thus, despite 
providing a rationale for conferring upon PS an extraterritorial power to punish O, in 
so far as this argument is grounded on the individual interest that each human being 
holds in not being herself the victim o f a criminal offence, it collapses the distinction 
between international and municipal offences by advocating extraterritorial 
prosecutions for both.
The reader might find this response unfair. Clearly there is a significant disanalogy 
between offences committed by states or state-like organizations and those committed 
by individuals acting alone: while TS can prevent/punish domestic offences being 
perpetrated, who would be able to stop/punish TS’s officials from /for perpetrating 
CAH against its subjects? Though I readily admit that this disanalogy holds, I dispute 
its purported implications. If  the problem is that while some agent (TS) can prevent a 
single murder, no one can prevent CAH, the solution seems to be to grant some 
extraterritorial body the right to do so. However, and as explained above, the right to 
stop atrocities occurring in TS involves only a liberty to intervene on humanitarian 
grounds, i.e. a first order incident, not (or not yet) a power to punish those responsible 
for them. Ultimately, this power seems to rely on the claim that every human being has 
an interest in deterring potential perpetrators of CAH. This is the only way in which the 
criminal law may try to “expunge these acts from the repertoire o f politics.”41 
Nevertheless, this shows precisely why the alleged implications of the disanalogy put 
forward disappear. To repeat, although deterrence can explain extraterritorial 
prosecutions in the case of CAH, I have argued that it collapses the distinction between 
domestic and international offences by advocating extraterritorial prosecutions for 
both.
safeguards of due process of law) should have the power to exercise this right every individual holds. I 
think he conflates two different things. On this see section 1 in Chapter 5 below.
41 See text to fn 43 above.
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On the other hand, a different consideration that purportedly explains why CAH 
are international offences is that they are committed against individuals on grounds of 
their membership to a group or population. One version of this argument, for example, 
justifies extraterritorial prosecutions by reference to the fact that “all women share an 
interest in ensuring that women are not killed solely for being women, and all Jews 
share an interest in ensuring that Jews are not killed solely because they are Jews”.42 
However, few people would argue, e.g., that all ‘hate crimes’ should be turned into 
international offences.43 The fact that V is assaulted because of being Jewish, or black, 
or Latino, in a quiet alley in Hamburg hardly entails, nor should it, that Germany lacks 
its immunity against some extraterritorial authority holding the power to punish O. 
Moreover, to repeat, this argument would have unacceptable implications if TS is 
threatening to exterminate a minority which only exists in TS.
Admittedly, this argument could be stated in more general terms. In Luban’s 
words, “in a world where crimes against humanity proceed unchecked, each of us could 
become the object of murder or [persecution] solely on the basis o f group affiliation we 
are powerless to change.”44 Similarly, May argues that “[h]umanity is implicated, and in 
a sense victimized, when the sufferer merely stands in for larger segments of the 
population who are not treated according to individual differences..., but only 
according to group characteristics.”45 This is because this type o f offence is 
individuality-denying. The underlying rationale behind these claims seems to be that 
these are crimes that could happen to people for reasons that are beyond their control. 
As such, it might seem plausible enough; we may all have an interest in not being 
victims of crimes for reasons we cannot change. Nevertheless, I think this claim misses 
whatever it is that we find compelling about the original statement. If V were assaulted 
because she is tall, or short, or pretty, this would hardly constitute a sufficient reason 
for triggering the extraterritorial prosecution of her attacker. Conversely, this argument
42 Luban, 'A Theory of Crimes against Humanity', 138.
43 Furthermore, this argument implies that racially etc. motivated crimes are more serious than crimes 
with other motivations, or even motiveless crimes, and this is not easy to argue.
44 Luban, 'A Theory o f Crimes against Humanity1, 138.
45 May, Crimes against Humanity, 85-86.
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seems unable to accommodate a situation in which she is attacked for belonging to a 
particular political party, or professing a certain religion, etc. (things she would 
eventually be able to change). Rather, it seems that what is doing the justificatory work 
here is the fact that V is a member o f a vulnerable group or persecuted minority, rather 
than the fact that she is being targeted for reasons she cannot change. Put differently, it 
is the fact that she is Jewish, or black, Muslim or Albanian (in a world where these 
groups are persecuted) not the fact that she cannot change what she is, that matters.
May could reply that the individuality-denying element of CAH is not a sufficient 
condition for extraterritorial prosecutions. His account also requires that TS deprives 
its subjects of physical security or subsistence, or that it is unable or unwilling to 
protect them from harms to their security or subsistence, i.e., that it violates what he 
calls the ‘security principle’.46 However, I fail to see why a policy o f ethnic cleansing 
directed against members of a specific minority should be an international offence, and 
one of mass random killings should not. May might respond by arguing that his 
account can deal plausibly with the latter too. The individuality-denying element is not a 
necessary feature of international offences either. Thus, the random killings policy might 
be considered an international offence on grounds o f the group-based character of the 
perpetrator, rather than that of the victim.47 May’s argument is not easily defeated. 
However, I want to argue that, ultimately, it is philosophically unsatisfying because it 
fails to provide an explicit rationale for subjecting certain offences to extraterritorial 
prosecutions.
If we look a bit closer, this group-based argument seems to get its moral pull from 
the fact that it relies on the vulnerability of certain groups, or better, perhaps, on the 
vulnerability of certain individuals as members of these groups. Although pointing in
46 ibid, 68. May relies on a particular division o f labour here which needs elaboration. He contends that 
the violation o f the ‘security principle’ explains why TS lacks an immunity against PS interfering (by 
punishing O), while the fact that CAH are committed against groups (or by them) (the ‘international 
harm principle’) explains why O herself lacks an immunity against being punished. I find this problematic. 
Indeed, why would one want to put such a high threshold to justify before O the harm involved in 
punishment when we usually accept that O would be liable to being punished for domestic offences? 
Rather, the crucial question seems to be not why would O be liable to being punished but why would O 
be liable to being punished by PS?
47 Which also entails a violation o f the international harm principle.
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the right direction, I believe this consideration still falls short of explaining why these 
features entail that some extraterritorial authority should hold the power to punish O. 
It fails to explain what is the interest that members o f a persecuted minority have that 
would warrant conferring upon PS the power to punish O without collapsing the 
distinction between domestic and international offences. In other words, May’s account 
also begs the crucial question. It provides at best a fairly accurate rule of thumb as to 
what kind of acts are, or should be, international offences, but it fails to provide an 
explanation of why this is so.
4. A ‘jurisdictional’ theory of international crimes
In the previous sections, I have argued that most accounts of international offences 
cannot really explain what distinguishes them from domestic crimes in terms of 
allowing for some form of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Admittedly, they highlight 
several considerations which point in the right direction: the fact that international 
offences are committed by states or state-like entities, or perpetrated in places where 
law enforcement is particularly weak, or involve the most heinous acts committed 
against a vulnerable group of people. However, they all fail to connect the fundamental 
consideration(s) on which they rest, with a plausible explanation o f why a particular 
state holds the power to punish O for a particular offence.
In this thesis I have argued that TS’s power to punish O is justified by the interest 
o f individuals in TS in there being a system of criminal law in force. I now contend that 
there are certain criminal rules that cannot be in force in TS unless at least some 
extraterritorial authority holds a concurrent power to punish O. These rules provide a 
foundation for international crimes. Let me illustrate this by reference to a particular 
crime against humanity: acts of widespread and systematic torture perpetrated in TS.48 
Plausibly, whenever systematic or widespread acts of torture are perpetrated in TS, it 
will necessarily be the case that TS is either responsible for perpetrating, instigating or
48 See article 7.1 o f the ICC Statute. I leave aside for the time being the requirements o f them being “an 
attack directed against any civilian population” and the “knowledge o f the attack” (ibid) and any further 
qualification stemming from art. 7.2.
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allowing them, or simply unable to do anything about them. As a result, the fact that TS 
itself holds the power to punish this kind of act cannot really contribute to the sense of 
dignity and security of individuals in TS. As Geras puts it, “states and governments are 
themselves ... the very source of the calamities we are talking about ...; [thus, they] 
cannot be relied upon as the guarantors ... of last resort.”49
Take for example the last Argentinean dictatorship (1976-1983). As is well 
documented, the military had significant leeway to kidnap individuals, torture them, and 
in most cases make them disappear.50 Should a military squad knock on their door, 
there was no recourse to the police, no hope of being rescued by the authorities, 
nothing except the sheer use o f force in self-defence. The reason for this is that these 
squads were not, in any meaningful sense, bound by a criminal prohibition against doing 
what they were, in fact, ordered to do as a matter o f policy. In this context, individuals 
in Argentina could not meaningfully believe that the criminal rule against being 
kidnapped, tortured and killed by these public officials was in force. These criminal 
prohibitions could not contribute to their sense of dignity and security.
However, would not individuals in TS have a conflicting interest? In the general 
Introduction to this thesis I argued that individuals in TS have an interest that is 
sufficiently important to confer upon TS a prima facie immunity against extraterritorial 
authorities dictating or enforcing criminal laws on its territory. I argue now that it 
follows from the stated consideration that in the outlined circumstances TS would lack 
an immunity against extraterritorial bodies punishing O. But first a conceptual point is 
in order. To claim that TS lacks this immunity means that at least some extraterritorial 
authority would hold the power to punish O.51 For present purposes, I shall use these 
two propositions interchangeably. Having clarified that, let us now turn to the 
purported normative implication. I suggest that TS normally holds a prima facie
49 Norman Geras, The Contract of Mutual Indifference: Political Philosophy after the Holocaust (London: Verso, 
1998), 4.
50 For two good accounts see Jaime E. Malamud-Goti, Game without E n d : State Terror and the Politics of 
Justice (Norman: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1996) and Iain Guest, Behind the Disappearances : 
Argentina's Dirty War against Human Rights and the United Nations (Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania 
Press, 1990).
51 On this see section 3 in the general Introduction to this thesis above.
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immunity against PS punishing O for an offence she committed on its (TS’s) territory. 
This immunity is ultimately explained by the interest of individuals in TS in foreign 
bodies not dictating criminal rules binding on them. This is, in part, because this is what 
it means for TS to be a self-governed entity. This immunity, however, is not absolute; it 
is limited both by the interests of non-members, and by the fundamental interests of 
the members of TS. I suggest that individuals in TS have a fundamental interest in there 
being a criminal rule in force in TS against widespread and systematic acts of torture, 
murder, and the like. Moreover, this interest is not only incompatible with TS holding 
an immunity against PS punishing O, but it also overrides the interest that explains that 
immunity.
To wit, the interest of, e.g., the Germans in 1939 in a foreign body not punishing 
O for acts of genocide on German soil is not sufficiendy important to warrant 
conferring upon Germany an immunity against a foreign body punishing O. This is 
because the interest of, for instance, the German Jews and other prosecuted minorities 
in such a criminal rule being in force in Germany is more important than the interest of 
their Aryan co-nationals in being left alone. If nothing else, I suppose that the German 
Aryans would be able to lead a minimally flourishing life even without a right 
preventing foreign authorities from dictating criminal rules binding in Germany against 
widespread and systematic murder, whereas members o f persecuted minorities would 
find it much harder to live a decent life in a state in which their rights not to be killed, 
tortured, etc. are not protected by the criminal law system.
Let me clarify further my position in three relevant respects. First, I am not 
suggesting that international offences are exclusively crimes committed by states. 
Rather, I readily admit that certain non-state actors can also commit this type of 
offences. In fact, in contemporary warfare most of these crimes are committed by 
irregular forces.52 In certain areas in Colombia, for example, guerrilla or paramilitary 
groups hold de facto a significant portion of the powers which are often associated with
52 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars : Organised Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 2007).
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the state. They function as police officers, judges, administrative authorities, and they 
even collect “taxes”. Now, they also perpetrate a significant number of offences such as 
kidnapping and murdering political and military opponents and sympathisers, etc.53 As 
in the Argentine situation above, I suggest that individuals living in the 2ones controlled 
by these guerrilla groups will not consider, either, that there is a criminal rule against 
being kidnapped or killed by these groups that is in force (binding upon them). That is, 
at least when such acts are performed as a matter o f policy. The fact that the 
Colombian state provides a criminal rule against members of these groups performing 
such acts does not contribute in any meaningful way to the sense o f dignity and security 
o f individuals living in these areas. As a result, I suggest, individuals living in those 
territories have a fundamental interest in these rules being in force that overrides their 
interest in TS holding an immunity against a foreign body punishing O for these 
offences.54
The second relevant point of clarification is that not every wrong committed on TS 
on a widespread or systematic scale would entail that TS lacks an immunity against an 
extraterritorial authority punishing O. In short, systematic and widespread traffic 
violations or bicycle theft perpetrated on TS do not amount, under the scheme I 
advocate, to international offences.55 The reason for this is, arguably, that the interest of 
individuals in TS in being a self-governed state is more important than their interest in 
traffic regulations being binding on particular groups o f individuals. I have argued that 
the interest o f individuals in TS in it being a self-governed authority is limited by the 
interests of individuals outside TS, and by the fundamental interests o f the individuals
53 On the situation in Colombia and how the state has been unable to deal with these groups even by 
using drastic emergency penality means see Manuel A. Iturralde, "Punishment and Authoritarian 
Liberalism: The Politics of Emergency Criminal Justice in Colombia (1984-2006)" (PhD Thesis, London 
School o f Economics, 2007).
54 Admittedly, someone may ask, however, whether it is really the case that the fact that some 
extraterritorial body would have the power to punish O would contribute to the rule against, e.g., 
systematic torture being in force in TS. This issue will be tackled with some more detail in the following 
chapter.
55 This was, in fact, the case in Argentina during  the dictatorship, and even before that. Many state 
officials and unofficial armed groups linked, often, to Trade Unions or other official bodies, 
characteristically could violate most o f the traffic regulations. I shall come back to this issue in section 6 
below.
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in TS.56 I now suggest that individuals in TS do not have a fundamental interest in these 
traffic regulations being in force that is sufficiendy important to override their general 
interest in being left alone. Only violations o f fundamental rights such as the right not 
to be tortured, killed, raped, etc. would. In cases of far milder crimes, I suspect their 
interest in dealing themselves with these issues prevails. This, then, clarifies the role that 
moral egregiousness or enormity plays in defining international offences. It would be, 
of course, hard to decide where to draw the line. Yet, the purpose o f this chapter is 
only to explain why certain standard offences warrant conferring upon some 
extraterritorial authority the power to punish O, while others do not.
Comparing these values against each other might lead to further difficulties. It may 
be objected, for instance, that there might be some communities within a nation state 
who may have fewer qualms than most about foreign powers interfering. E.g. Welsh 
nationalists might resent English rule so much that they would prefer to have a foreign 
power dealing with traffic offences. Or what if ethnic minorities are disproportionately 
targeted for traffic violations? Would they not have an interest in a foreign power 
prosecuting these offences? I reject the purported normative implication underlying 
both these objections. Even if the Welsh would rather have any state but England 
prosecuting traffic violations on Welsh territory, I seriously doubt that they would have 
a sufficiendy important interest to warrant conferring upon, e.g., Japan the power to 
prosecute and punish traffic violations. This is because the interest that justifies holding 
the power to punish O is that in having a system of criminal rules and, regardless of 
what their will is on this matter, these traffic rules are in force in Wales. Indeed, it is 
most unlikely that Japan claiming jurisdiction over traffic violations in Wales would 
suffice for these rules to be in force. Because Japan has no de facto territorial authority 
nor any police force there, it would be unlikely that these rules would have any teeth at 
all. Similarly, the fact that an ethnic minority is disproportionately targeted does not 
warrant giving an extraterritorial authority the power to punish O for an offence such 
as theft. In short, even if the black population is being disproportionately targeted in
56 See section 4 o f the general Introduction to this thesis.
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the US, it is unlikely that they can claim a right to be tried before a Spanish or 
Norwegian court. All they could claim is that the US courts should lack the power to 
punish them. Ultimately, these objections only undermine, if anything, TS’s authority to 
punish O; they hardly provide a good reason for an extraterritorial body being justified 
in doing so.57
Third, and relatedly, not just anyone can carry out an international offence. Take 
genocide for example. In the vast majority of cases, when genocide is carried out in TS, 
TS would be responsible for perpetrating, instigating or allowing it, or simply unable to 
do anything about it. Therefore, if a criminal rule against genocide is to be in force on 
TS, TS must lack an immunity against PS punishing O for participating in this 
genocide. Genocide, then, should generally be considered an international offence. 
However, this might not always be the case. An instance of genocide might be 
perpetrated by an individual acting alone. David Luban illustrates this with the strange 
case of Abba Kovner, a poet and a survivor o f the Shoah, who in 1945 attempted to 
poison the Hamburg water supply. Kovner claimed -it is reported- that his ultimate 
goal was to kill six million Germans.58 An implication of the theory developed here is 
that this act does not qualify as an international offence. And this would be the case 
even if Kovner had succeeded. In short, the German criminal law prohibiting this kind 
of behaviour does not require other states holding the power to punish O for it to be in 
force. But then, why consider this example? The reason is that it illustrates well what 
does the justificatory work in the explanation I advocate. There are specific territorial 
considerations that impinge upon the reasons for making certain wrongs an 
international offence. This also shows that the heinousness of the crime does not seem 
to provide a sufficient reason as to why PS should hold the power to punish O for this 
offence.
It is now clear that the crucial feature of international offences is explained neither 
simply by the moral enormity of these acts, nor by the locus o f their commission. Nor
57 On this type o f objections, see Chapter 5 below.
58 Luban, 'A Theory of Crimes against Humanity1, citing Tom Segev, The Seventh Million: The Israelis and 
the Holocaust (1993), 14-16.
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does it come down to the fiction that they harm or violate humanity itself. Rather, the 
reason as to why they are international rather than municipal offences relies on the 
interest that normally explains S’s power to punish O. With this fact he three significant 
advantages of the explanation offered here. First, it suggests that the justification for 
meting out legal punishment for both domestic and international offences rests on very 
similar considerations. Secondly, it explains why TS lacks an immunity against PS 
punishing O, and not simply a claim-right against PS intervening militarily to stop the 
crimes (humanitarian intervention). And finally, it does not collapse the distinction 
between international and domestic offences.
The next step is to see whether this explanation can also accommodate war crimes. 
Let us take the crime of ‘intentionally directing an attack against a civilian population as 
such’ committed as part of a plan or policy (hereinafter ‘attacking civilians’).59 Again, 
my argument is that a criminal rule against this war crime cannot really be in force 
unless the parties to an armed conflict lack an immunity against some extraterritorial 
body punishing O for attacking civilians. This claim, however, needs further argument. 
Unlike the case of crimes against humanity committed within TS, these crimes typically 
involve two different states which could both claim the power to punish O. As a result, 
their both holding criminal jurisdiction over such offences might suffice for the 
prohibition against attacking civilians being in force. Let us call them Attacking State 
(AS) and Defending State (DS) and assume that O is a pilot of the AS air force 
attacking civilians in DS. Arguably, the fact that AS holds the normative power to 
punish O for intentionally attacking civilians would not suffice for this criminal rule 
being in force. Again, it is highly unlikely that AS would prosecute its own pilots for an 
act it ordered, or allowed them to perform. But even if some prosecutions were to take 
place, they would hardly suffice for individuals in DS to consider that the pilots, or 
more importantly perhaps, AS’s high ranking officials are bound by such a rule.
However, one may wonder, would not DS — and no other state — holding the 
power to punish O for these offences provide individuals in DS with the relevant sense
59 Arts. 8.1 and 8.2.(b)(i) o f the Rome Statute.
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of dignity and security that this criminal rule being in force is normally able to provide? 
And if this is the case, would individuals in DS not have an interest in DS deciding itself 
when O violated this rule, thus holding a prima fade immunity against third-party states 
doing so? I suggest that this is not the case. The reason for this is, in short, that 
although DS can deter this kind of attack, it cannot provide its civilian population with 
the specific sense of dignity and security that a criminal law being in force provides. 
Indeed, DS can deter O or AS high rank officials by means of retaliation or military 
reprisals. It can also deploy some of its troops exclusively for the purposes of 
protecting its civilian population. However, it is highly implausible that individuals in 
DS or external observers will consider D S’s criminal prohibition binding on AS’s 
personnel on the basis of DS’s power to punish them. As a result, individuals in DS will 
not have a valid reason to consider their dignity and sense o f security protected by such 
a rule o f criminal law being in force.
From the opposite side’s perspective, I suggest that individuals in AS also lack an 
interest in AS (and DS) holding an immunity against third parties punishing O. O n the 
one hand, they might have an interest in AS conducting warfare in accordance with 
international humanitarian law, if only to avoid being victims of reprisals and 
retaliation. For this purpose, it will certainly help that AS’s high ranking officials and its 
soldiers consider themselves bound by, at least, the laws on war crimes. And on the 
other hand, individuals in AS usually benefit also from the legal prohibition of war 
crimes being in force, i.e., being binding upon DS; and this can only obtain, I 
suggested, if some third (extraterritorial) party holds the power to punish O for war 
crimes. Thus, both individuals in AS and in DS share an interest in neither AS nor DS 
holding an immunity against some third party punishing O for war crimes. Moreover, 
this explanation can easily account for the fact that under existing international law war 
crimes cannot be committed by servicemen against their own military, something which 
neither of the previous theories would be able to explain.60
60 See Pli^ Dutch Special Court of Cassation, and Motosuke, Temporary Court Martial o f the 
Netherlands East Indies, at Amboina. Both in Cassese, International Criminal Law, 48.
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5. Do we need a theory of international crimes?
Altman and Wellman have argued against the project of defining certain categories of 
“super crimes” which would provide a compelling justification for overriding state 
sovereignty and would ground “international criminal jurisdiction over moral wrongs 
that do not cross borders”.61 They call this project the ‘received view* and propose a 
different way of thinking about international criminal law. In particular, they take issue 
with the ‘heinousness’ requirement that the received view attaches to international 
offences, and suggest that extraterritorial prosecutions should potentially apply also to 
ordinary or municipal crimes. The central tenet of their position is that international 
prosecutions should be warranted in a failed state when an “accumulation of separate 
criminal acts [are being] committed by individuals operating solo.”62 From this it 
purportedly follows that the concept of an international offence has no part to play in a 
theory o f international criminal law.
By contrast, Altman and Wellman provide an explanation o f when and why it is 
justified to “pierce state sovereignty” that mirrors the justification for humanitarian 
intervention. They put forward certain conditions under which a state loses its right 
against suffering military intervention by an external authority. The threshold is 
established at the point where states are unwilling or unable to prevent systematic or 
widespread violations of individual rights.63 It follows that either widespread or 
systematic violations of basic rights would suffice, by themselves, to interfere in TS’s 
internal affairs by punishing O. This, they argue, is the sole criterion necessary to justify 
extraterritorial prosecutions.
However, I suggest that it pays to look more closely at what is doing the 
justificatory work in their argument. If it is the “widespread or systematic” character of 
offences, then it should be irrelevant whether TS has become a failed state. Thus, if 
bicycle theft, or credit card fraud were perpetrated on a widespread or systematic basis,
61 Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman, 'A Defense o f International Criminal Law', Ethics 
115, no. 1 (2004), 43.
62 ibid, 49.
63 ibid, 48.
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then their argument commits them to the claim that those responsible for these 
offences would become liable to extraterritorial prosecutions. This, however, is far less 
appealing than their initial picture. And this arguably is precisely because bicycle theft 
and credit card fraud are not heinous or grave enough crimes. I suspect that the moral 
pull their argument has comes from the fact that TS has become a failed state, not from 
the fact that some offence is committed on its territory on a widespread or systematic 
basis.
But how convincing is this consideration as an explanation o f extraterritorial 
prosecutions? Admittedly, PS should hold the power to punish O for a municipal 
offence perpetrated on the territory of a failed state (TS) if it militarily occupies TS. 
However, there are three difficulties with this line o f argument. First, I doubt that 
widespread fraud in TS would warrant giving PS the liberty to occupy militarily TS. 
Secondly, if PS becomes an occupying power then its criminal jurisdiction becomes 
based on the territoriality principle, not on universality grounds as Wellman and Altman 
contend. And finally, if PS becomes an occupying power on TS then it would hold the 
power to punish O regardless of whether the relevant offence was committed on a 
widespread or systematic scale. That is, it would also be entided to punish any single 
murder or robbery committed there.
Finally, I wonder how convincing is their explanation for the proposition that 
international prosecutions would be justified against any widespread or systematic 
municipal offences committed on the territory of TS. They suggest that, just as the right 
to interfere with an abusive parent is explained by the interest of the child, PS’s power 
to punish O is explained by the interest of individuals in TS. Thus, the crucial question 
is what interest o f individuals in TS justifies PS holding, in particular, the power to 
punish O. Altman and Wellman fail to provide an explicit answer to this question. 
What would be analogous to interfering with an abusive parent, they suggest, would be 
to intervene on humanitarian grounds on the territory of TS to stop the commission of 
the offences. However, and without addressing this sensitive issue, it seems utterly 
unconvincing to suggest that PS holds a right to intervene in TS on grounds of
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systematic fraud, or widespread tax evasion. Moreover, the main problem with this 
argument is that while humanitarian intervention is purely prospective in nature, 
punishment is applied retrospectively. In other words, while the right to intervene is 
grounded on widespread or systematic offences currently being perpetrated on TS, or a 
substantial threat thereof, punishment could come about after these violations have 
stopped. Thus, this argument would not be able to explain why PS holds an 
extraterritorial power to punish O when the widespread or systematic offences have 
ceased. But what is worse, I suppose, neither would TS. In short, this justification has 
the unacceptable implication of making the power o f any state to punish O conditional 
on these offences still being perpetrated at the time.
To conclude, then, I argue that their view o f the scope o f international criminal law 
is ultimately unconvincing. And that the reason for this is, in part, that they reject the 
claim that the gravity of the crime has some role to play in the justification for 
extraterritorial prosecutions. I am sympathetic to their underlying claim that the 
heinousness o f a particular offence should not be taken at face value as a sufficient 
reason for recognmng an extraterritorial body having the power to punish O. They are 
right in that, at least, it should be explained what role this particular consideration plays 
in a general theory of international criminal law. Nevertheless, this should not be 
mistaken with the claim that the heinousness o f the offence has no role at all to play in 
the argument for extraterritorial prosecutions. Their mistake is that they believe that the 
“received view” cannot but rely on the unpersuasive argument that international crimes 
are simply those which are so morally egregious as to harm humanity itself.64 In this 
chapter I have clarified both what is the normative consideration that explains why 
certain offences warrant conferring upon some extraterritorial authority the power to 
punish O, and what is the justificatory work that the gravity or heinousness of these 
offences does. I submit that this suffices to account for the need of a concept of 
international crimes in a general theory of international criminal law.
64 ibid, 50.
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6. Terrorism as an International Crime
Before closing this chapter let me examine the implications of the theory of 
international offences I advocate for a particularly controversial case: terrorism. After 
9/11, terrorism has jumped to the forefront of debates concerning international crimes. 
Before we go on to examine whether this category of offences should be made into 
international crimes, two caveats are in order. First, several authors have pointed out 
relevant parallels between the pirate and the terrorist as simply outlaws.65 Gerry 
Simpson argues that under the current prevailing narrative, the terrorist is the new 
pirate.66 For many, this means “that participating in an act o f terrorism questions, and 
in some cases forfeits, an individual’s right to have rights.”67 Thus, the pirate-terrorist is 
often situated outside the law: he is neither an enemy combatant, nor a criminal. He 
floats in some sort of legal black hole, as it seems to be the case with prisoners being 
held in Guantanamo Bay.68 In this chapter, however, I will focus on their treatment as 
criminal suspects, with the relevant rights and safeguards that all criminal suspects 
should enjoy.
Secondly, I shall not tackle here the complicated questions o f what exacdy 
terrorism is, why it is wrong, or whether it might be permissible under certain
65 M. Reisman, 'In Defence o f Public Order', American Journal of International haw 95, no. 4 (2001).
66 Simpson, haw, War and Crime, 159. In the words o f Frey and Morris, it is sometimes argued that “[t]he 
terrorist differs from the criminal or gangster, who seeks wealth, power, status through illicit means; for 
the latter’s activity in some sense depends on civil society. By contrast, terrorist, through their relatively 
indiscriminate targeting o f civilians, expliddy reject familiar political categories and the limitations on 
violence they embody” (in R. G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris, Violence, Terrorism, and Justice 
(Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 13).
67 O ’Keefe in Michael P. O'Keefe and C. A. J. Coady, Terrorism and Justice: Moral Argument in a Threatened 
World (Carlton South, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2002), 107 citing the overview in James M. 
Poland, Understanding Terrorism : Groups, Strategies, and Responses (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 
1988), 5-7. The same was once argued about pirates (see Kontorovich, 'The Piracy Analogy: Modem 
Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation', citing the classical treatment by De Vattel, and Vaughan 
Lowe, "Clear and Present Danger': Responses to Terrorism', International and Comparative Taw Quarterly 54 
(2005)).
68 See Johan (Lord) Steyn, 'Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole', International and Comparative haw 
Quarterly 53 (2004).
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circumstances.69 These questions are extremely controversial both as a matter of theory 
and as a matter of legal practice. There is arguably no standard definition of terrorism 
as a discrete offence under international law.70 International treaty law seems to provide 
only a piecemeal approach, criminalizing certain specific forms of terrorist activities, 
such as hijacking of aircraft, taking hostages, unlawful acts against the safety of 
maritime navigation, the financing of terrorism, and so on.71 Some of them are even 
criminalized as war crimes or crimes against humanity.72 For clarity’s sake, I shall use 
what McMahan refers to as the “orthodox definition”, i.e., politically or ideologically 
motivated violence that is directed against civilians or non-combatants.73 The issue at 
stake is only whether TS lacks an immunity against some extraterritorial authority 
holding the power to punish O for a terrorist attack committed in TS.
The standard view on this question seems to be that there are some forms of 
terrorism which belong in the category o f municipal offences, as defined here. For 
example, Article 3 of the UN Convention on terrorist bombing provides that “this 
Convention shall not apply where the offence is committed within a single State, the 
alleged offender and the victims are nationals of that State, the alleged offender is 
found in the territory of that State and no other State has a basis ... to exercise 
jurisdiction”.74 By contrast, other terrorist acts would amount to international crimes as, 
for example, when they “transcend national boundaries”, “are carried out with the 
support, the toleration, or the acquiescence o f the State where the terrorist organization
69 On this see, generally, Frey and Morris, Violence, Terrorism, and Justice; Ted Honderich, Terrorism for 
Humanity : Inquiries in Political Philosophy (London; Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2003); O'Keefe and Coady, 
Terrorism and Justice : Moral Argument in a Threatened World; McMahan, 'The Ethics o f Killing in War'; 
David Rodin, 'Terrorism without Intention', Ethics 114 (2004); Samuel Scheffler, 'Is Terrorism Morally 
Distinctive', The Journal of Political Philosophy 14, no. 1 (2006); Jeremy Waldron, Terrorism and the Uses o f  
Terror', Journal of Ethics 8 (2004).
70 For a dissenting view on this, see Cassese, International Criminal Taw, 120-125, and some literature in 
footnote 126.
71 See the Conventions on the safety of civil aviation (the Tokyo Convention o f 1963 and the Montreal 
Convention o f 1971), the New York Convention against the taking o f hostages (1972), and the UN  
Convention for the suppression o f the financing o f terrorism (1999), among others.
72 See, e.g., article 4(2)(d) of the Second Additional Protocol o f  1977 to the Geneva Conventions.
73 McMahan, 'The Ethics o f Killing in War', 729. For criticism o f this view, see Scheffler, 'Is Terrorism 
Morally Distinctive', 2.
74 There are some qualifications to this principle which are not entirely relevant for our purposes here. 
For a similar provision see Art. 3 o f the Convention for the suppression o f the financing o f terrorism.
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is located or o f a foreign State”, they “concern (...) the whole international 
community”, or “are very serious or large-scale”.75 In the following paragraphs I will 
defend and further clarify this rough distinction. I will also add certain caveats. For this 
purpose I shall distinguish, perhaps a bit schematically, between internal and cross- 
border terrorism on the one hand, and between state or state sponsored terrorism and 
terrorist acts performed by non-state actors (without the acquiescence or support of a 
state) on the other.
The principles that should govern a state’s criminal jurisdiction over internal 
terrorist acts by non-state organizations are quite straightforward. According to the 
general argument advocated here, TS should hold an exclusive power to punish O for a 
terrorist act performed on its territory. Put boldly, the struggle with terrorist 
organization ETA should be left for the Spanish (and eventually the French) to deal 
with. And them alone. Individuals in Spain lack an interest in the UK, China, etc. 
holding the power to punish a Basque separatist for an attack carried out in Madrid. 
They have an interest in Spain dealing with ETA. And the reason for this is precisely 
that some extraterritorial authority unilaterally claiming the power to punish O would 
not contribute in any meaningful way to the sense of dignity and security they enjoy as 
a result o f their (the Spanish) criminal rule against these acts being in force. Neither 
would it contribute, I may add, to the sense of dignity and security that individuals 
enjoy in China, the UK, etc. as a result o f their criminal prohibition of terrorism being in 
force. Thus, following the court in Republic of Bolivia v Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance, 
this means that “[w]holly domestic terrorism ... needs no international action but can 
be left to local laws to deal with like any other criminal conduct.”76
Nevertheless, this arguably holds only in so far the terrorist attacks do not become 
widespread or systematic. If this obtains, it will be again because TS is in collusion with 
the terrorists, unwilling or simply unable to do anything about their acts. I would then 
submit, with Mark Drumbl, that these offences should move from domestic or,
75 Cassese, International Criminal Law, 129.
76 at 6.
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eventually, transnational criminal law to international criminal law proper.77 Indeed, in 
such a context the interest of individuals in TS in this rule being in force would 
override their interest in handling these cases by themselves. But this conclusion should 
have been expected. Widespread or systematic acts of terrorism are in no meaningful 
sense different from widespread or systematic acts of torture, murders, attacks on 
civilians, etc.
I also submit that internal state terrorism, i.e. terrorist actions pursued as a matter 
of policy by TS officials in TS, should qualify as an international offence in the 
jurisdictional sense I advocate here.78 This is, again, because individuals in TS have a 
fundamental interest in the criminal rules prohibiting enforced disappearances, torture, 
rape, and murder being in force and no prohibition of such acts could ever be in force, 
i.e. binding on TS’s officials, unless some foreign authority holds the normative power 
to punish O extraterritorially.
Some people might want to argue that once state terrorism is over in TS, because 
o f regime change or otherwise, TS should “recover” its immunity against foreign 
bodies punishing O for acts of terrorism performed by TS as a matter of policy. I 
disagree. I would argue that individuals in post-Pinochet Chile have a fundamental 
interest in there being a criminal rule prohibiting state terrorist acts in force in Chile, 
and that this criminal rule can be in force in Chile only if some foreign body holds a 
concurrent power to punish O extraterritorially. The force of the objection, however, 
lies in the question regarding how much this would contribute to the sense of dignity 
and security of individuals in Chile today, since these acts are not taking place any 
longer. This is a hard empirical question to answer. The damage that state terrorism can 
cause to a society is very difficult to measure. The sense of vulnerability and lack of
77 Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Im w , 212, note 221.
78 For a philosophical account o f state terrorism, see Igor Primoratz’s ‘State Terrorism’, in O'Keefe and 
Coady, Terrorism and Justice: Moral Argument in a Threatened World, and Jonathan Glover’s ‘State Terrorism’ 
in Frey and Morris, Violence, Terrorism, and Justice and Scheffler, 'Is Terrorism Morally Distinctive', 11-15.
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confidence in the rule o f law might be persistent for vast numbers of individuals.79 This 
translates into fear towards public authorities, a feeling of helplessness and lack of 
rights, the inhibition of certain kinds of cooperative social relations, and so on.80 
Although criminal prosecutions will certainly not suffice to undo the effects of state 
terrorism, I suggest that they would certainly contribute to the feeling that the criminal 
rule prohibiting this conduct is again in force, and with this, bring individuals new 
confidence in their status as right bearers, whether the Chilean state likes it or not. 
Moreover, this power to punish O cannot depend on the fact that Chileans, themselves, 
feel at risk of being kidnapped, tortured and killed by state officials. Otherwise, even 
the Chilean state would lack the power to punish crimes performed by the Pinochet 
regime. Put differently, this issue points not to the question o f whether extraterritorial 
prosecutions should be conducted over Chilean state tortures, but to the question of 
whether any authority should hold the power to punish something that happened 25 
years ago. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, this question, which closely 
relates to the issue o f whether statutes of limitations apply to international offences, is 
beyond the scope of the present enquiry.
Cross-border terrorism, by contrast, would normally be considered an international 
offence.81 However, I suggest that this view is unwarranted. The jurisdictional rules 
applicable to domestic offences seem to suffice to bring about the benefits on which 
the power to punish offenders generally rests. Indeed, under this framework the US 
would hold the power to punish everyone involved in the attacks of 9/11 (on grounds 
o f territoriality and/or protection). And so would Afghanistan. Thus, if Russia obtained 
custody over Bin Laden and tried him for this offence, the US and Afghanistan might 
consider this an intrusion in their domestic affairs, and rightly so. Similarly, the UK,
79 For a powerful illustration, see Ariel Dorfman, Death and the Maiden (London : Nick Hem, 1995), 
where Paulina, who was systematically tortured and raped by the Pinochet’s regime, reencounters the 
doctor in charge o f overseeing her torture by sheer chance.
80 See Waldron, Terrorism and the Uses o f Terror' and Scheffler, 'Is Terrorism Morally Distinctive', 13.
81 This opinion has been shared by prominent international lawyers and officials such as Kofi Annan, 
Mary Robinson, Robert Badinter, Alain Pellet and Geoffrey Robertson (cited in Antonio Cassese, 
'Terrorism Is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories o f International Law', European Journal of 
International Law 12, no. 5 (2001), 994). For a careful defence o f this claim see Mark A. Drumbl, 'Judging 
the 11 September Terrorist Attack', Human Lights Quarterly 24 (2002), 323, discussed below.
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Spain, and other countries where A1 Qaida cells are functioning would hold the power 
to punish their members on the basis of the territoriality or protective principles. This 
way of distributing the power to punish acts of international terrorism is not only 
intuitively appealing. It is also consistent with the justification for punishment 
advocated here. To wit, individuals in the US would have good reasons to believe that 
its criminal prohibition of this kind o f acts is in force irrespective of Russia holding a 
concurrent power to punish O. Accordingly, they have an interest in the US's criminal 
rules applying on its territory exclusively, and this interest is sufficiently important to 
warrant giving the US an immunity against Russia doing so. Moreover, individuals in 
Russia have no interest in Russia holding a power to punish O for the 9/11 attacks that 
is sufficiently important to trump that immunity. Their criminal prohibition of terrorist 
attacks does not require that in order to be in force. Again this argument holds only in 
so far these offences, both by non-state actors or state-sponsored, are not carried out in 
TS on a widespread or systematic basis.
But many commentators would probably object to this conclusion. Mark Drumbl, 
for instance, suggests that international terrorism “is not a matter to be left to domestic 
criminal law”, but rather it is “in the interest of all humanity to prosecute”.82 The main 
reason for this is that leaving this to TS “may not be a particularly effective way to build 
a widespread, deep-rooted social norm that condemns terrorism in the places where 
disaffected individuals may be inspired to join terrorist movements.”83 On the one 
hand, he suggests that westem-style trials would do little to deter potential terrorists 
since they may have little legitimacy to affect social norms or behaviour patterns in 
societies where terrorism emerges.84 On the other hand, prosecuting al-Qaeda members 
in domestic courts trivializes the evil o f the attack.85 Thus, he concludes, international 
terrorists should be brought to account before an international court.
82 Drumbl, 'Judging the 11 September Terrorist Attack', 323 and 338, respectively.
83 ibid, 324.
84 ibid, 348, emphasis added.
85 ibid, 342.
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I am unpersuaded that these arguments warrant the purported conclusion, namely, 
that an extraterritorial authority should hold the power to punish O to the exclusion of 
any domestic court. Let me take them in turn. First, it is difficult to argue that a trial in 
a domestic court would trivialize the evil o f the offence. The trials of Barbie and 
Eichmann, for example, seem to have had significant symbolic power. In a similar vein, 
people do not seem to consider it necessary to try very serious domestic offences, such 
as multiple murder or rape, before international courts. Secondly, the goal of deterring 
potential terrorists would not lead, as Drumbl seems to believe, to extricating the 
power to punish O from domestic authorities. Afghanistan and the US holding the 
power to punish A1 Qaeda militants might have some deterrent effect. Even if this 
would not maximize that effect, I am unpersuaded that this consideration suffices as an 
argument against them holding that power. Moreover, maximizing that effect would 
probably lead to summary executions rather than international trials.86 Finally and 
perhaps most significandy, Drumbl seems to undermine the central tenet of his 
argument himself. In effect, he argues that “[h]owever foreign [Pashtuns’] customary 
set of laws may seem to many Westerners..., in order for terrorism to be viewed by 
Pashtuns as a repugnant social norm to be stamped out, it will be (sic) have to be 
constructed as deviant and repugnant conduct throughout all elements of Pashtun 
society.”87 Thus, Drumbl wants to have his cake and eat it. He wants to have a court 
formed essentially by judges of the same community (political, ethnic or otherwise) 
from where the alleged perpetrators come from, which would apply the set o f local 
rules recognized by that community, and he wants to call this an international court. 
Finally, DrumbL wants this court to perform a trial that will satisfy both Western 
standards and the Pashtun society. I am afraid this is not something that would be 
easily achieved.
To sum up, creating the conditions that would make terrorism a form of 
unacceptable, criminal behaviour in the relevant communities where members o f these
86 As for example executing terrorists driving in Yemen. On this, see Lowe, "Clear and Present Danger1: 
Responses to Terrorism' and Chapter 2 above.
87 Drumbl, 'Judging the 11 September Terrorist Attack', 349.
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organizations are usually recruited should certainly guide the policy towards terrorism. 
However, this neither leads to the claim that only an international court should hold the 
power to punish O, nor does it mean that this aim excludes the interests of other 
relevant stakeholders. In short, I argue that although the U.S. population may have an 
interest in, for example, the Afghan local authorities prosecuting and punishing 
members of terrorist organizations plotting attacks abroad, or recruiting volunteers, 
they also have an interest in their respective criminal laws against terrorist attacks being 
in force. Thus, I argue that cross-border terrorism, state-sponsored or otherwise, 
should not be categorized as an international offence in the sense advocated here, 
unless it becomes widespread or systematic.88
7. Conclusion
This chapter relies on three propositions. First, what is in need o f normative elucidation 
about international crimes is their particular jurisdictional regime, i.e., the fact that some 
extraterritorial authority holds the power to punish O. Secondly, that in order to 
provide a convincing explanation for this normative fact we need to look at the reasons 
why authorities (states and international tribunals) hold the power to punish an 
offender in the first place. And third, that the reason why states hold the power to 
punish offences is that this contributes to the sense of dignity and security of 
individuals living there.
On this basis, I argued that international crimes are simply those offences for 
which a criminal rule cannot be in force on the territory of TS unless at least some 
extraterritorial authority holds a concurrent power to punish O. This is because 
whenever, for example, crimes against humanity are committed on the territory o f TS, 
that state must either be responsible for perpetrating, instigating or allowing them, or 
simply unable to do anything about them. As a result, the fact that TS itself criminalizes 
this kind of act cannot really contribute to the sense of dignity and security of 
individuals in TS. Put differently, the interest of individuals in TS in its criminal
88 An interesting hard case might be the first and second Intifada against Israel.
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prohibition being in force requires that TS lacks an immunity against some 
extraterritorial court punishing O.
I further clarified this position in two respects. First, I argued that although non­
state actors can also carry out international offences when they hold de facto a significant 
portion of the powers which are often associated with the state over a certain territory, 
enormous crimes by individuals acting alone would not normally qualify as international 
crimes (even if they amount to genocide). Secondly, not every wrong committed in TS 
on a widespread or systematic scale would warrant conferring upon an extraterritorial 
authority the power to punish O. International offences need to reach some threshold 
o f gravity. I defended this view against the objection that the heinousness often 
attached to international offences should not play any role in the justification of 
extraterritorial or international prosecutions.
The last section of this chapter examines whether terrorism should qualify as an 
international crime. I argued that instances of purely domestic acts of terrorism should 
not be made into international offences, unless they are perpetrated on a sufficiendy 
widespread or systematic basis. By contrast, I suggested that acts of state terrorism 
should warrant conferring upon an extraterritorial authority the power to punish their 
perpetrators. Finally, I argued that the jurisdictional rules applicable to domestic 
offences suffice to deal with acts of cross-border international terrorism, such as the 
9/11 attacks.
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4
Extraterritorial jurisdiction for international offences
‘There are also those who think that an act of cruelty committed, for 
example, at Constantinople may be punished at Paris for [the] 
abstracted reason that he who offends humanity should have enemies in 
all mankind . . . as if  judges were to be the knights errant of human 
nature in general, rather than guardians of particular conventions 
between men. ’n
‘To pursue the outlaw and knock him on the head as though he were 
a wild beast is the right and duty of every law-abiding man.
1. Introduction
In this chapter I shall provide a philosophical argument for universal criminal 
jurisdiction (henceforth UJ). I shall contend that both individual states and a particular 
international tribunal, the International Criminal Court (hereinafter the ICC) should 
have the normative power to punish O for international crimes regardless o f where the 
offence was committed, or of the nationality of both offender and victim.3 The 
literature on universal jurisdiction is vast, even unmanageable. However, many 
specialists complain about its ‘under-theorization’.4 Universal jurisdiction is arguably the 
most difficult case for a theory of punishment like my own, which is based mainly on 
territorial considerations. This is because it not only entails conferring criminal 
jurisdiction in the absence of any link or nexus between the prosecuting body and the
1 Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub. Co., 1986).
2 Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Eaw (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1898 [1911]), 569-579, cited in Cowles, 'Universality o f Jurisdiction over War Crimes'.
3 I do not distinguish here conceptually between universal jurisdiction, commonly exercised by states, 
and international jurisdiction, normally claimed by international or internationalized tribunals. On this 
see section 2 below.
4 Leila Nadya Sadat, 'Redefining Universal Jurisdiction', New England Eaw Review 35, no. 2 (2001) and 
Anthony Sammons, 'The "Under-Theorization" O f Universal Jurisdiction: Implications for Legitimacy 
on Trials o f War Criminals by National Courts', Berkeley journal of International Eaw 21 (2003). See also 
Theodor Meron, 'International Criminalization o f Internal Atrocities', The American journal of International 
Eaw 89, no. 3 (1995), 563.
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crime. In addition, and crucially, it entails providing an argument that accounts for every 
state and a particular court created by some of them holding the power to punish O 
extraterritorially. These are the specific normative issues that the argument I shall 
develop here will concentrate upon. Accordingly, I shall leave aside other sources of 
difficulties that affect both territorial and extraterritorial authorities alike such as, for 
instance, whether criminal trials are an appropriate response to mass atrocities in 
general.5
The structure of the chapter is relatively straightforward. In section 2 ,1 shall argue 
that the justification for legal punishment advocated in this thesis endorses the 
proposition that every state should hold a power to punish international offences that is 
universal in scope.6 Moreover, I shall argue that the normative account I offer in this 
thesis is better suited than any alternative account available in the literature to explain 
not only the peculiar normative features o f UJ, but also to reconcile this explanation 
with a more comprehensive account o f extraterritorial punishment. Section 3 examines 
the case for the International Criminal Court holding UJ. I will take issue with the 
standard arguments that purportedly account for the scope of its power to punish O 
and argue they are theoretically flawed. I will also suggest that under a more plausible 
normative account the jurisdiction held by the ICC as a matter of law is unduly 
restricted at the bar of justice. Finally, section 4 will handle a handful of objections 
raised against this ‘pure’ form of extraterritorial punishment. I will conclude that 
although some of these objections do raise significant obstacles to the principle of 
universal jurisdiction, none of them is capable of rebutting the case I made in the first 
two sections.
To the reader, I suspect, this way of organizing my argument might seem strange. 
Indeed, in the previous chapter I argued that international crimes are those for which at
5 This distinction has rarely been acknowledged in the literature. See, e.g., Meron, 'International 
Criminalization o f Internal Atrocities'; Osiel, Why Prosecute? Critics o f Punishment for Mass Atrocity'; 
Tallgren, 'The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law'; and Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and 
International Imw.
6 Provided it satisfies the conditions to claim, itself, legitimate authority. These conditions are set in 
Chapter 5 below.
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least some extraterritorial authority should have the power to punish O. Would it not be 
natural to examine the case of a global criminal court holding this kind o f power first? 
The case for individual states holding UJ would seem harder, and better left till last. 
The problem with this approach, however, is that the ICC is not a global criminal 
court. Rather it is a treaty body created in virtue of an agreement between a certain 
number of states. As a matter o f law, treaties can only create rights and obligations for 
their parties.7 As a matter of fact, three of the biggest powers in the international 
community (the U.S., China and Russia) not only are not parties to this treaty but 
perceive the ICC as a threat. By contrast, these states (and many others) are arguably 
not, at least in principle, against individual states holding UJ over international crimes. 
Thus, it is far from clear that the argument I provided in Chapter 3 would lead to the 
ICC  holding UJ to try O for an international crime. Rather, and according to the 
leading explanation available in the literature, the scope of the ICC’s criminal 
jurisdiction is to some extent dependent on the jurisdictional scope of its state-parties.
The same two clarificatory remarks I made in Chapter 2 hold here. First, I am 
concerned only with the power to punish O, not with the liberty or claim-right to obtain 
custody over her extraterritorially. This entails assuming also throughout this chapter 
that either the defendant (O) is present on the territory of the state that claims 
jurisdiction over her at the point when it wants to exercise its power, or the court which 
claims a right to try her has to request her extradition. And secondly, I will only 
examine here the grounds on which individual states or the ICC can claim jurisdiction to 
punish O. This is not the same as the particular conditions that each concrete 
institution should meet in order to claim, itself this normative power. An argument for 
this purpose will be provided in Chapter 5 below.
7 See, e.g., article 26 o f the Vienna Convention o f the Law o f Treaties; see, also, Brownlie, Principles of 
Public International Law, 592.
2. The case for states* universal criminal jurisdiction
In this section I shall argue that under current non-ideal conditions individual states 
ought to be granted UJ over international crimes. This is a normative claim and it is the 
main claim I will defend here. But first, a conceptual point is in order. I understand UJ 
as the power of some entity (in this case PS) to punish O irrespective of where she 
perpetrated her offence and of the nationality of both O and V. Moreover, a crucial 
feature of the regime of UJ is that every state can claim this power.
2.1 A conceptual point
Ian Brownlie famously warns against conflating the proposition that every state holds a 
power to punish crimes under international law with the principle of universality. 
Universality, he claims, is only about individual states holding the power to punish 
certain crimes under their domestic law, for which international law recognizes every 
state’s criminal jurisdiction.8 Anne-Marie Slaughter clarifies his position as follows: 
“ [t]he principle o f universality... is a procedural device by which international law grants 
all states jurisdiction to punish specified acts that are independently crimes under [their] 
national law.”9 Piracy is allegedly the paradigmatic example because, they contend, it 
has traditionally been defined and prosecuted under domestic law.
This distinction seems to challenge the framework defended here. However, I 
suggest it does nothing of the kind. Rather it is useful as it forces us to distinguish 
between conceptual and normative philosophical issues and these, in turn, from issues 
regarding specific institutional arrangements. But let us deal with things one at a time. I 
must first explain what we mean by UJ. This is a conceptual issue. I suggested that UJ 
consists in PS holding an extraterritorial power to punish O irrespective o f where she 
had committed the offence or her nationality or that o f V. This definition is 
uncontroversial enough and is, in fact, consistent with Brownlie’s position.
8 ibid, 303.
9 Anne-Marie Slaughter, T)efining the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts’, in Stephen 
Macedo, Universal Jurisdiction : National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes under International Law 
(Philadelphia, Pa.: University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 169, 319, quoting Brownlie.
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As a separate question we will need to determine whether certain crimes, such as 
those covered in my previous chapter, warrant conferring upon states UJ to punish O. 
We can examine this issue both as a matter of normative argument or as a matter of 
international law. Brownlie and Slaughter’s claim is that UJ refers to offences provided 
for under domestic criminal law as a matter of law. Accordingly, if we consider this as a 
technical statement about a particular set of institutional arrangements regarding UJ, 
this position (whether it is right or wrong) is irrelevant for our purposes here. My 
objective is, rather, to explain why certain offences should warrant UJ. And this is a 
philosophical issue o f a normative kind.
If, by contrast, we are to consider their statement as a philosophical claim about what 
moral powers states have at the bar of justice, they are both conflating the conceptual 
question I have identified with the normative one, and begging the latter. By advocating 
such a restrictive conceptual definition of UJ they rule out a normative possibility as a 
matter of definition. Yet, they do not provide any normative argument as to why UJ applies 
only to crimes provided under PS’s domestic criminal laws. I do not suggest that their 
claim is subject to this kind of criticism. But it follows from this that their objection 
does not really undermine the conceptual framework advocated here which states that 
UJ applies to international crimes.
The same criticism can be made against Bassiouni’s exact opposite proposition that 
universal jurisdiction should not be conflated with the universal reach of extraterritorial 
national jurisdiction.10 The concept o f universal jurisdiction he advocates, which is 
contained in Principle 1 o f the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, is that of 
“criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard o f where the 
crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the 
nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such 
jurisdiction”.11 I am obviously very sympathetic to this definition. However, I believe 
Bassiouni is also smuggling a normative point into a conceptual one. In other words,
10 Bassiouni, The History o f Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in International Law’, in ibid, 42.
11 ibid. Emphasis added.
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whether universal jurisdiction is based solely on the nature of the crime is a normative 
claim for which he needs to argue, not part of its definition.
To repeat, then, universal criminal jurisdiction is, for present purposes, the power 
o f an authority to punish O for an offence committed extraterritorially, irrespective of 
where she perpetrated her offence and of the nationality of both O and V. This concept 
of UJ applies equally to individual states and to international criminal tribunals. This 
statement does not mean though, or not yet, that the powers that each of these hold are 
normatively grounded on the same considerations. So far I commit myself to the 
former view, not to the latter.12
2.2 An argument for states having UJ over international crimes
As a matter of public international law, it may be argued that UJ is probably, but not 
unambiguously part o f customary international law.13 Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and 
Buerghenthal’s joint separate opinion in the Arrest Warrant case is arguably one o f the 
most authoritative statements on this. They argued that “[tjhere are certain indications
12 Similarly see Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction : International and Municipal Legal Perspectives. We should not 
conflate the question asked in this chapter with that regarding the distinction between the narrow notion 
o f universal jurisdiction, which entails that only the state where the accused is in custody may try her 
(called forum deprehensionis), and a broad notion also called absolute or pure universality, which entails that 
S can prosecute O even if  she is not at the time in the forum state. This distinction should neither be 
treated as a conceptual question, but as a normative one. What is at issue is not what is the meaning o f  
universal jurisdiction, but rather what is the scope o f states’ power to punish O, or the conditions under 
which PS is in a position to exercise this power. The relevance o f this consideration will be examined in 
Chapter 5 below.
13 Bassiouni argues that it cannot be inferred solely from existing state practice and opinio juris that 
universal jurisdiction is part o f customary international law, but he contends that the cumulative effect 
o f state practice, opinio juris, general principles of law and opinion by publicists does in fact suffice to 
make it into a rule o f CIL (Bassiouni, 'Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical 
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice1, 148-149). Cassese on his part considers that UJ is warranted 
for certain offences under CIL (Cassese, International Criminal Law, 293-295). Higgins, starts her section 
on this matter by stating that “International law permits the exercise of jurisdiction in respect o f certain 
offences against the international community.” (Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process : International Law 
and How We Use It (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 56). Finally, the authors in Oppenheim’s 
International Law recognize that “[tjhere are now very few writers who deny absolutely the right o f a 
state to punish aliens for crimes committed abroad.” However, that statement refer both to universal 
jurisdiction and also to certain cases in which jurisdiction is justified on the basis o f the protective 
principle (Oppenheim et al., Oppenbeim's International Law /  Vol. 1, Peace, 467, and 469 on international 
offences). Cryer concludes that the “level o f support is sufficient to suggest that the customary case for 
universal jurisdiction over core crimes can be made” (Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes, 93).
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that a universal criminal jurisdiction for certain international crimes is clearly not 
regarded as unlawful.”14 In any case, UJ seems to be largely uncontroversial with 
respect to certain offences such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
even if there is also agreement that it is only very seldom exercised by states.15
For our purposes, however, this basis of jurisdiction needs to be defended on very 
different grounds. I have suggested that the extraterritorial scope of PS’s power to 
punish O is dependent on the justification for PS holding that power in the first place. 
In Chapter 1 ,1 argued that the normative power to punish O is based on the collective 
interest o f individuals in PS in having a system of criminal laws in force. This is because 
having a set of rules prohibiting murder, rape, etc. in force contributes to their sense of 
dignity and security. In Chapter 2, however, I argued that this justification is, in 
principle, against the extraterritorial application o f domestic criminal rules, except on 
grounds of protection (that is, except when PS’s power to punish O is based on the 
interest o f individuals in PS in having there a system o f criminal laws in force 
extraterritorially). The reason for this is threefold. First, individuals in TS have an 
interest in TS being a self-governed entity that is sufficiently important to warrant 
conferring upon TS a prima facie immunity against extraterritorial authorities punishing 
offences committed on its territory. Secondly, individuals in TS lack an interest in PS 
holding such a power because PS’s domestic criminal laws cannot be in force on the 
territory o f TS. Finally, I argued that individuals in PS lack an interest in PS punishing 
offences committed on TS.
However, as we saw in Chapter 3, there are certain criminal rules which cannot be 
in force in TS unless at least some extraterritorial authority holds a concurrent power to 
punish O. The reason for this is that whenever one of these crimes is perpetrated in TS, 
it will be necessarily the case that TS is either responsible for perpetrating, instigating or
14 See paragraphs 45-46. It must be noted, though, that o f the judges who addressed this matter in the 
Arrest Warrant case, four were against the existence of UJ and five explicidy in favour. There is some 
degree o f expectation regarding what would be the ICJ’s decision in the Certain Criminal Proceedings in 
France (Republic of the Congo v  France) case.
15 See Slaughter, T)efining the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts’, in Macedo, Universal 
Jurisdiction, 170.
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allowing it, or simply unable to do anything about it. As a result, the fact that TS 
criminalizes this kind of acts cannot really contribute to the sense o f dignity and 
security of individuals in TS. I have called these offences international crimes. I now 
want to argue that, as a matter of normative argument, every single state should have the 
extraterritorial power to punish O for her offence on TS irrespective of the nationality 
o f O and V.
Take widespread or systematic torture. The first limb of my argument was made in 
my previous chapter. I argued there that TS lacks a prima facie immunity against 
extraterritorial authorities punishing O for an international crime committed on its 
territory. This is because individuals in TS have a fundamental interest in there being a 
criminal rule in force in TS against widespread and systematic acts of torture. This 
interest is not only incompatible with TS holding an immunity against PS punishing O, 
but it also overrides the interest that explains that immunity. This explanation, however, 
does not yet amount to an argument for UJ. What I need to explain in particular is why 
every state would hold the power to punish O.
I have already identified what the relevant interest is that, I argue, explains PS’s 
power to punish O. It remains for me to argue here who the holder of this interest is in 
these particular cases, and what the implications o f this are for establishing who the 
holder of the relevant power to punish O must be. In short, I suggest that there are 
many people in different parts of the world who share a collective interest in there 
being a system of criminal rules prohibiting, inter alia, acts o f widespread or systematic 
torture. This is hardly controversial. Furthermore, I claim that their interest is 
sufficiently important to warrant conferring upon every state the power to punish 
perpetrators of this crime against humanity extraterritorially. But let us go one step at a 
time.
This interest is shared, in the first place, by many individuals in TS. If such a crime 
is perpetrated on its territory, they would have an interest in the perpetrators being 
punished for their offence, and by an extraterritorial authority explicidy authorized to 
do so. That is, individuals in whose state international crimes are being perpetrated
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have a fundamental interest in the criminal rules that provide for these offences being 
in force. But so would, I suggest, individuals in other states in which similar 
international crimes are being perpetrated. The fact that O is punished, for her offence 
in TS, by an authority expressly authorized by the international legal system would not 
only ground the belief in that such a criminal rule is in force in TS. It would similarly be 
able to ground the belief that this rule is in force also in TS2, where these crimes are 
also being perpetrated. This explains the usual claim that whether or not Pinochet was 
punished for widespread or systematic torture committed in Chile is not merely a 
matter that affect the interests of the Chileans. The Chileans may have, admittedly, 
many reasons for claiming priority to try and punish Pinochet. Yet, whether or not he 
was punished affected the interests o f other people around the world. In particular, I 
suggest it affected their interest in the existence o f this international legal rule being 
expressed and communicated by assessing his compliance with it.
Finally, I submit that this argument also accounts for conferring the power to 
punish O upon states in which individuals are not particularly uneasy about them 
becoming victims of widespread or systematic torture such as, for example Switzerland. 
Admittedly, the Swiss will generally not be too concerned about becoming victims of 
these international crimes; but my argument nowhere requires such a demanding 
threshold. First, as long as there are certain individuals in Switzerland, such as refugees, 
who will benefit from there being a rule against widespread or systematic torture in 
force, this would suffice to confer upon Switzerland UJ over these offences. Several 
criminal prohibitions protect only a portion of any state’s population or protect people 
differendy. It might be plausibly argued that the legal prohibition o f rape protects 
women and men differendy. This does not necessarily mean that women’s interest in 
there being a rule against rape in force does not suffice to confer upon S the power to 
punish O.
But even if there are no refugees or members of any minority who will clearly 
benefit from such a rule being in force, this would not be fatal to my argument. And 
this is because, as argued above, Switzerland’s power to punish O does not need to rely
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solely on the interest of the Swiss. It can also be grounded on the interest o f individuals 
in TS, TS2, TS3, etc. This joint interest, by itself, might be all things considered 
sufficiendy important to warrant conferring upon every state (including Switzerland) a 
power to punish O that is extraterritorial in scope. Admittedly, this position suggests 
that PS’s power may be grounded exclusively on the interest o f people outside PS. Yet, 
there is nothing in the account of rights I defend here that precludes assigning B a right 
on the basis of an interest explicidy held by C.16 An example at the interpersonal level 
would clarify this point. B would normally be at liberty to stop C when she is trying to 
escape with D ’s purse. B’s liberty in this example is arguably based, exclusively, on the 
interests of D. Moreover, D ’s interest warrants conferring not only B this liberty, but 
arguably everyone who is in a position to stop C (namely, F, G, H, etc.). The same 
could be argued about PS’s power to punish O.
It could be argued, of course, that this need not be the case in the international 
society. In short, individuals in Chile might take issue with Spain prosecuting Pinochet. 
They would probably feel even more strongly about this if it were Bolivia, or Argentina 
doing so. There are two lines of reply to this objection. First, that this objection does 
not really address the issue at stake in this chapter. That is, it does not really claim that 
individuals in Chile and in several other states lack an interest in there being a rule 
against widespread or systematic torture in force. It does not even argue that the 
interest that Chileans might have in Pinochet not being punished would override the 
former interest in that rule being in force. Rather, it points to the question of whether a 
particular country should be put under a disability to punish Pinochet. This is an issue that 
has to do with PS’s authority (or standing), not with the specific interests that justify 
conferring upon it the power to punish O. In the following chapter I will argue that the 
question of PS’s authority has little to do with the extraterritorial scope of PS’s power.
Moreover, if Argentina were to prosecute Pinochet for a crime committed on its 
own territory against a Chilean national (such as the assassination of General Prats and 
his wife in Buenos Aires in 1974), individuals in Chile would probably take issue with it
16 See section 3 o f the general Introduction to this thesis.
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too. And yet, the fact that individuals in TS take issue with PS punishing O is generally 
not a sufficient reason to hold PS under a disability to punish O. As the example of the 
murder o f General Prats shows, Argentina’s power to punish O rests on considerations 
which are independent from the opinion of Chilean nationals. Similarly, I claim here 
that the power to punish Pinochet is not grounded exclusively on the interest of 
Chileans. As long as this suggestion is sound, I do not see why their taking issue with PS 
punishing Pinochet would be of crucial normative relevance.
There is an obvious qualification to the general position advocated thus far. It 
might be that under certain circumstances, as for instance in the case of an incumbent 
head of state, or head of government, the interests of individuals in TS are sufficiendy 
important to confer upon O a prima facie immunity against PS’s power to punish O. It 
might well be, also, that their interest would outweigh the interest o f individuals in TS, 
TS2, etc. in O being punished. I seriously doubt that. Yet this illustrates well how 
strong the interest-based theoretical framework I advocate is. On the one hand, it can 
accommodate the concern raised by biased states by referring to the conditions that PS 
should satisfy in order to have the authority to punish O. And secondly, it shows 
exacdy where the difficulty lies in this type of cases. Namely, it depends on carefully 
examining the interest that explains PS’s power versus the interest that explains O ’s 
immunity. Sorting out this question is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, 
showing the way in which this could be done should dispel any anxiety that the initial 
objection might still generate.
To conclude, the world lacks a centralized governmental institution that can 
provide a system of criminal justice that is in force extraterritorially on TS, TS2, PS, etc. 
In this context, I suggest that the collective interest of these individuals in a rule against 
widespread or systematic torture being in force on the territory of TS, TS2, etc. 
warrants conferring upon every state the power to punish O. This is required, at least, if 
these criminal rules are to provide any meaningful sense of dignity and security to them. 
In the absence o f a centralized mechanism of distribution of criminal competence for
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this kind o f offences, UJ provides us with the closest we can get to these rules having 
any real sense of bindingness.17
2.3 Competing arguments for UJ
My claim here is not just that I can provide a convincing account of states’ power to 
punish international crimes on universality grounds. I suggest that the argument 
developed here fares much better as a normative explanation of UJ and 
extraterritoriality in general than alternative ones available in the literature. Several of 
these arguments hardly resist careful philosophical scrutiny. Among the arguments 
most often relied upon are the claims that extraterritorial punishment is justified as a 
means to enhance peace,18 to fight against impunity by closing the gap in law 
enforcement19 thus eliminating safe heavens by giving perpetrators of atrocities no 
place to hide.20 Some o f these arguments are clearly question begging. To say that the 
justification for punishing O is to fight impunity is tautological. It is precisely why it is 
important to fight impunity that this argument needs to explain. Retributivists have 
been traditionally concerned with this problem. By contrast, other considerations in this 
list point towards deterrence. Ultimately it is the fact that eliminating safe heavens 
would (allegedly) provide individuals with greater incentives to refrain from committing 
this kind of offence that would be doing the normative work. I will briefly address 
these two kinds of justification below.
But first, let me consider the argument that purportedly explains PS’s power to 
punish O by reference to the enhancement of peace. There are, in short, at least two 
fundamental problems with this argument. The first is that it provides only a contingent 
justification for PS’s power to punish O.21 In situations in which criminal trials will not
17 On this see section 4.3 below.
18 See, e.g., Preamble of SC Resolution 827 by which the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia was created.
19 Princeton Principles, 24.
20 Bruce Broomhall, Towards the Development o f an Effective System o f Universal Jurisdiction for 
Crimes under International Law', New England I m w  Review 35 (2000-2001), 406; Kenneth Roth, 'The Case 
for Universal Jurisdiction', Foreign Affairs 80, no. 5 (2001), 153.
21 On the problem with contingent justifications for legal punishment see Chapter 1 above.
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enhance peace, for example because peace has already been secured, advocates of this 
justification would have to argue against carrying them out. Secondly, even if we expect 
the criminal law to have a deterrent effect, it does not follow that it would deter the 
continuation of ongoing hostilities per se. International criminal law essentially prohibits 
certain forms of warfare, but it does not necessarily criminalize the use of military force 
per se. Thus, even if its premise were right, this argument fails to lead to its purported 
conclusion.
In an article entided ‘The “Under-Theorization” of Universal Jurisdiction’, 
Anthony Sammons provides a more elaborate account of UJ. 22 He suggests that the 
justification for UJ is not merely a question of explaining S’ power to punish O. Indeed, 
“ [m]any commentators and jurists incorrecdy seek to divorce the assertion of universal 
jurisdiction from the principles of state sovereignty.”23 He provides an account o f UJ 
tailored specifically to address this difficulty. On his view, UJ is mainly an interference 
with another state’s domestic jurisdiction which must, therefore, be explained by 
reference to the principle of state sovereignty. Sammons sees sovereignty as largely 
analogous to private property: states have a bundle of rights over their territory, 
including the rights to political autonomy, non-interference and territorial integrity24 
Among these rights, sovereignty includes the right to pass criminal laws, prosecute and 
punish offenders.25
This analogy, he claims, is also useful to understand that sovereignty is not 
unlimited, but rather presupposes a certain level of respect for neighbours and their 
equivalent rights within their own territories. It is a feature of his account that 
sovereignty can be transferred to other states or to the international community. This is 
how, for example, the Allied powers exercised some form of sovereignty over German 
territory after WW2, including the right to prosecute and punish certain criminal
22 Sammons, 'The "Under-Theorization" O f Universal Jurisdiction: Implications for Legitimacy on 
Trials o f War Criminals by National Courts'.
23 ibid, 127.
24 ibid, 117.
25 ibid, 124.
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offences. Thus, his account of UJ relies on explaining how it is that TS’s sovereignty is 
transferred, at least in part, to the international community.26
Sammons argues that the main reason why states have the right to make certain 
criminal rules subject to universal jurisdiction has to do with the fact that TS has 
become terra nullius.11 This was the case with pirates, who acted beyond the reach of any 
single state’s jurisdiction. Alternatively, this may be the result of the breakdown of the 
criminal law system or its lack of capacity to prosecute a particular type of crimes or 
group of perpetrators. As an example he cites the case of Rwanda which, after the 
events of 1994, appealed to the Security Council to create an international tribunal 
because its government felt it did not have the capacity to deal with them itself.28 Thus, 
he contends that any state that derogates from certain essential norms such as the 
prohibition of genocide, torture, etc. transfers a portion of its sovereignty to the 
international community as a whole.29
Sammons’ account is complex and points to a relevant gap in the literature on UJ. I 
suspect that an important source of its appeal rests on the fact that it allegedly explains 
why UJ should be regarded as a subsidiary mechanism for certain types of very serious 
offences. Moreover, unlike other accounts Sammons explicitly addresses the challenges 
raised by the principle of sovereignty. I wonder whether he can consistently maintain 
this subsidiary character and whether his sovereignty-based explanation suffices to 
justify PS holding a power to punish O that is universal in scope. But first, an analytic 
point is in order. I find Sammons’ explanation of the transference of a portion of TS’s 
sovereignty to the international community unconvincing. To start with, we need to 
distinguish cases in which TS authorises PS to exercise its criminal jurisdiction on its 
territory from those in which extraterritorial punishment is exercised against TS’s will. 
In Chapter 2 above, I argued that the justification for TS’s power to punish O also 
entails TS holding a normative power to authorize a specific extraterritorial body to
26 ibid, 125.
27 ibid, 128.
28 ibid, 131.
29 ibid, 137.
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punish her.30 But this is hardly a justification for UJ. UJ, rather, entails PS punishing O 
for acts committed in TS irrespective of the authorization of TS, and usually against its 
will. Thus, the fact that TS becomes terra nullius can only explain why TS forfeits its 
immunity against PS refraining from punishing O for an offence she perpetrated on TS, 
but not yet why PS, itself holds a power to do so. This point is not just a matter of 
analytic rigour. It has normative implications.
I suggest that the fact that TS became terra nullius does not suffice as a justification 
for UJ to punish O. Let me explain. When X forfeits a right o f hers, she can forfeit her 
right in rem, i.e. against the world at large, or in personam, namely, against certain 
individuals or bodies.31 According to the general understanding about the rules that 
apply on terra nullius, TS would forfeit her immunity only in personam. As discussed in 
section 3 of Chapter 2 above, under the standard conception of terra nullius, it is not the 
case that every state has the power to punish O. Only the state o f nationality o f the 
offender or that o f the victim would be empowered to do so. Although I disagreed with 
this position, this is immaterial for present purposes.32 The point is that even under the 
standard account regarding the laws applicable on terra nullius, not all states 
automatically earn a power to punish offences committed there on universality 
grounds. They need to be able to point to an interest that justifies their holding the 
power to do so in particular.33 In the final analysis, Sammons makes a mistake which is 
the mirror image of the one he identifies in the literature. That is, he discusses universal 
jurisdiction only with regard to the issue of sovereignty, failing to grasp that he needs, 
crucially, an argument that accounts for specific states holding the power to punish O.
Finally, I submit that Sammons’ scheme commits him to more than he would 
willingly admit. In short, his argument does not seem to be limited, necessarily, to the 
most serious offences such as genocide, crimes against humanity, aggression, slavery,
30 This arguably explains why the Allies exercised jurisdiction in Germany after WW2 (at least over 
domestic offences). To wit, it was because Germany in its capitulation had explicidy authorized them to 
do so. A similar case could be made, to some extent, with the case o f Rwanda he cites.
31 On this distinction see the general Introduction to this thesis.
32 I suggested that PS does not have the power to punish O on terra nullius if it is not on grounds of 
protection.
33 On this see also Hirst, Jurisdiction and the Am bit of the Criminal haw, 217.
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etc.34 The nature of these offences and the identity of their perpetrators would 
function, in his account, as a sort of threshold below which intervention by way of 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction would be unwarranted. Nevertheless, his argument 
does not lead to this conclusion. The reason for this is that this is not what TS 
becoming terra nullius would entail. It might well be that whenever systematic rape, 
torture or even genocide are perpetrated on the territory of TS, this country becomes 
something similar to an empty island, or Antarctica in terms of its government lacking 
an immunity against extraterritorial states having criminal jurisdiction over it. Yet, when 
a certain territory becomes terra nullius, it lacks not only an immunity against foreign 
bodies punishing a genocide that occurred there, but also an immunity against PS 
punishing domestic offences perpetrated there, such as robberies, assaults, etc.35 In sum, 
the notion of terra nullius on which his argument rests, can explain neither PS’s power to 
punish O nor can it limit UJ to international crimes.
I have suggested throughout this thesis that the extraterritorial scope of PS’s power 
to punish O is dependent upon the reasons that justify PS holding that power in the 
first place. Allow me to bypass here deterrence as a general justification for UJ. Most of 
the difficulties I have with deterrence have been aired in previous chapters. Most 
relevandy, I have argued: i) that it would advocate summary executions rather than 
criminal trials, and ii) that it would entail the prosecuting state having universal criminal 
jurisdiction for both international and domestic offences.36 This last objection also 
holds for standard accounts of retributivism with the possible exception of D uffs 
communitarian justification for legal punishment. To his general account I now turn.
When he put forward his theory of punishment, D uff was arguably concerned with 
the problems created neither by international criminal law nor by extraterritoriality. 
Only recendy has he addressed these issues in some detail.37 Thus, I will concentrate 
first on his general argument for punishment and, subsequendy, I will examine his
34 Sammons, 'The "Under-Theohzation" O f Universal Jurisdiction: Implications for Legitimacy on 
Trials o f War Criminals by National Courts', 132.
35 See Chapter 2, section 3 above.
36 See Chapters 1 and 2 above, respectively.
37 Duff, "Criminal Responsibility, Municipal and International".
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account specifically tailored to the issue at hand. In Chapter 2 above, I argued that 
D uffs general argument faced some difficulties with regards to the power to punish 
domestic offences committed abroad. I now want to claim that the main shortcoming 
of his general justification for legal punishment is in the area of international crimes. 
Duff sees punishment as a secular penance whose main purpose is to communicate 
censure to moral agents (O). He is therefore concerned with being able to reach the 
offender’s moral conscience. One of the conditions for this punishment to reach O ’s 
moral conscience is that PS needs to have the moral standing to censure her for that 
conduct. For this to obtain PS should, first, have the appropriate relationship to O, or 
to her action in question. This implies that there is a political community on behalf of 
which punishment is imposed. Secondly, PS must not have lost that standing as a result 
o f some (wrongful) previous dealing with O. It is only the first condition that matters 
for us here.38
As suggested in Chapter 2 above, the answer to this question depends crucially on 
what constitutes for D uff a political community in the relevant sense. If  he makes the 
requirements too thin (i.e., mutual recognition and protection of basic human rights) 
then he would have to admit that almost every state would have the moral standing to 
censure O and as a result he would end up advocating UJ for both domestic and 
international offences. By contrast, if he uses a thick notion of political community, he 
seems committed to rejecting UJ altogether. No community other than that to which O 
belongs would be able to communicate with O in the relevant sense.39 The question of 
what suffices for a group of people to be a political community in D uff s terms is one 
o f the most controversial aspects of his account.40 For us, what matters is that, 
depending on what constitutes a political community, his initial approach seems 
doomed to advocate either UJ for any type of offence, or preclude UJ completely.
38 For a fuller explanation o f D uffs position, see Chapter 2, section 6 above. This second condition will 
be examined in Chapter 5 below.
39 This creates, I have suggested in Chapter 2.6, other issues concerning offences committed by 
foreigners on the territory o f TS.
40 Most recendy, von Hirsch and Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles, Chapter 7.
His more recent approach to this issue may solve this initial inadequacy.41 As 
explained in Chapter 2, Duff elaborates on the idea of moral standing by resorting to a 
relational notion of criminal responsibility. He argues that “O is responsible for her 
offence as a citizen to S”.42 This approach, he concedes, would be incompatible with UJ. 
Thus, he needs to explain how it is that this reasoning does not apply to other offences 
such as genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. Or, better, why it is that O 
would be responsible for such offences simply as a moral agent and to the whole of humanity. 
He leaves aside the issue of “genuinely international wrongs” and concentrates only on 
cases in which the wrong is committed within a particular state and against its 
members.43 For present purposes, I shall follow his line of argument although I am not 
persuaded that the case of UJ for war crimes or aggression is as straightforward as he 
presents it.
Duff contends that both on principled and pragmatic grounds TS, the political 
community to which O belongs, has the power (standing) to bring O to account for an 
international offence she perpetrated in TS.44 This, as it stands, is broadly non- 
controversial. Rather, we want to see how it is that he extends this power (standing) to 
PS. First, he claims that “if the wrong is serious and persistent enough, and if the 
[territorial] state radically fails in its duty to prosecute and punish such wrongdoing, it 
may become in principle legitimate for others ... to intervene, and may become 
practicable for them to do so”.451 take it from D uffs argument that the seriousness of
41 A caveat is in order. D uff in his paper only considers the case o f an international tribunal, not o f  
individual states. His explanation for this is that individual states exercise UJ as a way o f ‘filling the gap’ 
left by the absence o f an effective international criminal court (Duff, "Criminal Responsibility, Municipal 
and International"). I will not take issue with this position. Most arguments for UJ usually explain the 
power to punish O on universality grounds by claiming that it belongs to the international community as 
a whole, and then explain why it is that states are entitled to act, individually, on behalf o f that 
community.
42 See Chapter 2 above.
43 Duff, "Criminal Responsibility, Municipal and International," 18.
44 I have argued above that his explanation for the extension o f this ‘standing’ to the state on whose 
territory the offence was committed is unconvincing. See Chapter 2 above.
45 Duff, "Criminal Responsibility, Municipal and International," 18. On this see also Altman and 
Wellman, 'A Defense o f International Criminal Law'; May, Crimes against Humanity.
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the offence and its persistence are both necessary and sufficient conditions for an 
extraterritorial state to intervene legitimately.
This, however, hardly constitutes an explanation for PS’s power to punish O on 
universality grounds. In effect, this argument seems to get its moral pull from the fact 
that it is both legitimate and practicable for states to stop or prevent these wrongs. But, as 
I have repeatedly argued throughout this thesis, the power to punish O does not follow 
from the liberty to defend V. Indeed, if based on the liberty to protect individuals in 
TS, this ‘right to intervene’ would be contingent on the serious wrongs still being 
committed (persisting) at the time of the intervention. This means that there would be 
no extraterritorial punishment for these wrongs when they have already ceased. This 
seems artificial. Moreover, this explanation sits very uncomfortably with D uffs own 
justification for the power to punish O, namely, providing the conditions for a secular 
penance.
Ultimately, Duff needs to explain why it is every state’s business to punish O for, 
say, an act of genocide she carried out on TS. He presents two possible answers to this 
question. First, PS would act on behalf of the political community in TS.46 Although he 
is not too clear about how convincing he himself finds this claim, this line o f argument 
seems unpromising. In effect, he does not explain why it is that PS has the standing (in 
his terms) to act on behalf of the political community in TS. And this is problematic for 
his account. If an extraterritorial state could simply act on behalf of the political 
community in TS, this would completely undermine the necessary relationship he so 
carefully tries to build between O and TS, and on which TS’s own standing is based. 
Thus, this answer can be readily rejected. His second answer relies on the following 
proposition: PS should have “jurisdiction over (and only over) those crimes whose 
perpetrators must answer not to this or that particular political community, but to 
humanity itself’.47 Admittedly, this proposition makes his relational account of criminal
46 Duff, "Criminal Responsibility, Municipal and International," 20.
47 ibid, 21.
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responsibility compatible with UJ for certain offences. However, it is worth examining 
this argument more closely.
D uff rejects any suggestion that these offences harm or victimize humanity “as a 
whole”.48 This position, he rightly contends, is too artificial. An individual living in 
Mexico would not be harmed or victimized himself'm any meaningful way by a genocide 
committed in Korea. By contrast, his account relies on the following analogy: in the 
same way we say that crimes are public wrongs, i.e., that they are kinds o f wrongs that 
properly concern the political community as a whole, certain offences such as crimes 
against humanity are wrongs that properly concern the whole humanity as such 49 But this 
analogy begs the fundamental questions. First, it assumes that the reasons why a single 
homicide is the exclusive business of the political community to which O and V belong 
are clear enough. Furthermore, it assumes that these reasons similarly explain (by 
analogy) why an act o f genocide is not the exclusive business o f that political 
community but, rather, the business of humanity as a whole.
I am not persuaded that D uff can explain the former issue convincingly. In 
Chapter 2 I argued that D uffs citizenship-based explanation cannot account 
convincingly for TS’s power to punish foreigners who perpetrate an offence on its 
territory. Yet, the latter proposition seems even more mysterious. If  we are to consider 
an act of genocide the business o f humanity as a whole, a further explanation is 
warranted. D uff claims that these wrongs are everyone’s business “simply in virtue of 
our shared humanity with their victims (and with their perpetrators)”.50 Yet, if we 
accept that we all belong to “that broadest of human communities”51, then I wonder 
what is precisely the normative work that belonging to a community — whatever that 
community may be — does in his explanation. Put differendy, even if we accept that we 
share our human condition, the question subsists of how that makes it every state’s 
business to punish O for an act of genocide but not for a single homicide, or rape
48 ibid, 21-22.
49 ibid, 22; emphasis added.
50 ibid, 22.
51 ibid, 21.
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/committed extraterritorially. This, Duff does not explain. And it is, I suspect, precisely 
what he needs to explain.
To sum up, the problem ultimately rests with the fact that D uff treats the question 
o f PS’s ‘standing’ as being separate from the question regarding the reason why 
punishment is visited upon O.52 His relational notion o f criminal responsibility has no 
evident connection with the question of what particular interest warrants giving PS the 
power to punish O and, crucially, whose interest this is. I suggest this latter issue is 
what does the justificatory work all along. Take an example of his I already cited above: 
university X has itself the power to sanction one of its lecturers (L) for neglecting her 
classes because the members o f X have an interest in the classes being up to the 
required standard that is sufficientiy important to warrant conferring upon X  
disciplinary powers over JL. By contrast, university Y lacks the power also to sanction L 
because the interest that its own members have in lectures being up to a given standard 
is not important enough to warrant Y  the power to sanction L. This same reasoning 
applies also to states and their criminal laws. Thus, I suggest these are the questions we 
need to answer to provide a theory of UJ; contra Duff, whether the notion of 
responsibility, criminal or otherwise, is necessarily relational does not seem to do any 
normative work.53
3. The jurisdiction of the ICC
It is time to examine the ICC’s jurisdictional scope. In order to take up this task, 
however, two caveats are in order. First, as I have argued in the general Introduction to 
this thesis, my aim is to examine the moral justification for the rights of existing 
institutions and their scope, not about devising or clarifying the rules that should 
govern a different, ideal institutional arrangement. Secondly, the ICC is not a global 
criminal court. Rather, it is a treaty body that was created as a result o f an agreement
52 Interestingly he explicitly admits that “it bears directly on [it]”, (ibid, 14).
53 On S’s ‘moral standing’ see section 4 in Chapter 5 below.
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between a certain number of states.54 As the international law on treaties makes it clear, 
treaties create rights and obligations only vis-a-vis their parties.
Under the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction over O if either the state on 
whose territory the offence was committed or the state o f which the offender is a 
national are a party to the Statute, or if either o f the two explicidy accepts its 
jurisdiction in a particular case.55 Moreover, the ICC can have jurisdiction over an 
offence irrespective of where it was committed or of the nationality of both O and V if 
it is referred to the Prosecutor by the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter.56 Finally, jurisdiction of the ICC over an offence is ‘complementary’ to 
domestic criminal jurisdiction.57 This means that the ICC’s jurisdiction will be triggered 
only if “the [s]tate which has jurisdiction over it ... is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution”.58 As it stands, the jurisdiction of the ICC 
may seem unduly restricted. In effect, its power to punish O has a narrower 
extraterritorial scope than that of individual states.59
The leading strategy to explain the jurisdictional scope of the ICC relies on the idea 
that “[jjurisdiction is given to the ICC by a delegation o f traditional Westphalian 
jurisdiction by the member states”.60 According to this view, which I shall term the 
‘delegation argument’, the ICC is not a state and therefore has no ‘interests’ o f its
54 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter the Rome Statute or ICC Statute).
55 Article 12 ICC Statute.
56 Article 13 ICC Statute. Under the same provisions, the Security Council can also prevent the ICC 
from investigating or prosecuting an offence temporarily. Article 16 ICC Statute.
57 Preamble and article 1 to the ICC Statute.
58 For different scenarios see Article 17.1.(a), (b) and (c) o f the ICC Statute.
59 Yet, some o f the offences included in the Rome Statute, arguably, do not warrant universal 
jurisdiction for individual states under international law. On this, Madeline Morris, 'High Crimes and 
Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States', Law and Contemporary Problems 64, no. 1 (2001). For a 
conflicting view see Michael P. Scharf, 'The ICC's Jurisdiction over Nationals o f Non-Party States: A 
Critique o f the U.S. Position', Law and Contemporary Problems 64, no. 1 (2001), 79-80.
60 Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation', 200. See also 
Diane F. Orentlicher, ‘The Future o f Universal Jurisdiction in the New Architecture o f Transnational 
Justice’ in Macedo, Universal Jurisdiction, 217; Diane F. Orentlicher, 'Politics by Other Means: The Law of 
the International Criminal Court', Cornell International Law Journal 32 (1999); Scharf, 'The ICC's 
Jurisdiction over Nationals o f Non-Party States: A Critique o f the U.S. Position'. Accepting this 
framework but arguing that the delegation argument cannot legally ground the provisions on jurisdiction 
contained in article 12 o f the Rome Statute, Morris, 'High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and 
Non-Party States'.
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own.61 What justifies its power to punish O is the consent o f states which authorized it to 
exercise jurisdiction over certain offences when committed on their territory or by one 
o f their nationals. In this section I shall argue that this framework is inadequate to 
explain both the jurisdiction the ICC actually has as a matter o f law, and the jurisdiction 
it ought to have as a matter of normative argument.
But before examining this issue, I need to consider an objection famously put 
forward by the U.S. government and defended by some prominent officials and 
academics.62 They suggest that scope of the ICC’s power to punish O, as it stands, is 
illegitimately broad. More precisely, they argue that the ICC lacks the power to punish 
nationals o f non-party states even if their offence is committed on the territory of a 
state party, or a state which consented to the jurisdiction of the court on an ad hoc basis. 
This is mainly a legal claim. But the argument on which it is grounded is in part a 
normative one. The legal argument has already been addressed in the relevant 
literature.631 shall concentrate here on its normative force.
The claim is that the ICC’s jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states is 
incompatible with the theory of delegation of powers. In short, states can delegate to an 
international tribunal neither their universal nor their territorial power to punish O. 
Madeleine Morris presents the most elaborate version of this argument. She first argues 
that because there are significant differences between national courts and an 
international tribunal, we cannot assume from the fact that UJ can be exercised by the 
former, that it can automatically be delegated to the latter.64 Her problem with this 
delegation is that the ICC Statute purports to bind non-party states.65 Some scholars 
flady reject this claim. The ICC Statute, they suggest, does not impose any obligation
61 Moms, 'High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States', 49.
62 See ibid and David Scheffer, 'Opening Address at the Universal Jurisdiction Conference at the New  
England School of Law', New England Law Review 35, no. 2 (2001). For a political statement o f this 
position, see William K. Lietzau, 'International Criminal Law after Rome: Concerns from a U.S. Military 
Perspective', Law and Contemporary Problems 64, no. 1 (2001).
63 Orentlicher, 'Politics by Other Means: The Law o f the International Criminal Court', and Scharf, 'The 
ICC's Jurisdiction over Nationals o f Non-Party States: A Critique o f the U.S. Position'.
64 Morris, 'High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States', 29 and ss.
65 ibid, 14.
175
upon non-party states; it only binds individuals.66 The problem with this rebuttal, 
Morris suggests, is that the ICC would not simply assess the individual culpability of a 
particular defendant; it quite often would have to adjudicate on the lawfulness of 
official acts of states.67
This, in itself, does not suffice as an argument for her position. She needs to 
explain why it is that states cannot delegate that power they hold to the ICC. To explain 
this, Morris draws on principles related to the legal institution of assignments. In a 
nutshell, her argument is that as a matter of principle PS can delegate to the ICC a right 
it has against TS if and only if this does not prejudice TS’s position.68 And in fact, she 
suggests that delegating the power to punish nationals of non-party state to an 
international tribunal would prejudice the position of non-party states. This assertion is 
based on three claims. First, the ICC, unlike an individual state, can only provide “a 
diminished availability o f compromise outcomes in interstate disputes”. Secondly, its 
verdicts would have a higher political impact on the state of which O is a national than 
those reached by a national court. And finally, its decisions would have a much greater 
role in shaping the law, and would provide for impediments to the diplomatic 
protection of nationals.69 Therefore, she concludes, states lack the power to delegate to 
the ICC their territorial or universal jurisdiction over non-party states’ nationals.70
Michael Scharf has responded to this argument by claiming that states simply lack 
the right (an immunity) against the ICC (or other states) deciding on the lawfulness of 
acts committed by their officials extraterritorially.71 He does not provide any 
explanation for why this is so. But this proposition is on the right track. For TS to hold 
an immunity against the ICC punishing one of its nationals, individuals in TS would
66 Orentlicher, 'Politics by Other Means: The Law o f the International Criminal Court', 490; Scharf, 'The 
ICC's Jurisdiction over Nationals o f Non-Party States: A Critique o f the U.S. Position', 75.
67 Morris, 'High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States', 14.
68 ibid, 51.
69 Morris, 'High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States', 45.
70 Analytically, the argument should be that non-party states have an immunity against states parties to the 
ICC delegating their power. The relevance of this analytical point will become clear in the next 
paragraphs.
71 Scharf, 'The ICC's Jurisdiction over Nationals o f Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position', 
75.
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have to have an interest sufficiently important to warrant putting the ICC  under a 
disability to do so. In this thesis I have argued that quite the opposite is true. 
Individuals in TS would normally have a collective interest in a system of international 
criminal rules being in force. But even if they lacked such an interest (because, arguendo, 
it would not contribute to their sense of dignity and security), I have suggested that 
individuals in other states (TS2, etc.) have a significant interest in these rules being in 
force. For these rules to be binding also upon TS’s state officials, it is necessary that 
extraterritorial authorities have the power to punish those who violate them. And this 
certainly covers the ICC.
In other words, the reasons why Morris holds that TS’s position would be 
prejudiced by the ICC having jurisdiction over acts committed by its nationals may well 
be reasons for which individuals in TS, and crucially, in TS2, TS3, etc. would have an 
interest in prioritizing the ICC  exercising its criminal jurisdiction over individual states. 
To wit, the ICC would not try to find a negotiated outcome; it generally decides on O ’s 
culpability or lack thereof. It would not accept diplomatic protection of nationals and it 
would probably have a bigger impact on S’s domestic politics and on the development 
of international criminal law. These considerations seem to provide individuals with 
stronger reasons to believe that international criminal laws are in force than the 
imposition of legal punishment by PS.
Someone may argue that my answer begs the relevant question. Would not 
individuals in non-state party S, which is involved in an air campaign against a terrorist 
group in S2, have an interest in the actions of S being immune from the jurisdiction of 
the ICC? For example, if they want their national security enhanced, would they not 
want their government officials to act free from the threat of being prosecuted by the 
ICC? The obvious response to this question is that the interest individuals in S may 
have in their collective security is not sufficiendy important to confer on S the liberty to 
perpetrate war crimes while doing so. In fairness, defenders of this immunity against 
the ICC do not advocate that S should be able to do anything it considers that fits its 
own interests in order to pursue their goals; rather, their contention is that
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extraterritorial authorities and in particular the ICC should not have the power to 
decide whether the chosen course of action was lawful or not.72
The problem with this approach is that it considers these two as separate, unrelated 
questions. Yet, they are nothing of the kind. If officials of state S are to be considered 
bound in any meaningful sense by the rules of international criminal law, it is not 
enough that S alone holds the power to prosecute and punish them. Rather, if these 
rules are to be in force at all, some extraterritorial body would need to have jurisdiction 
over them. As Morris suggests the ICC would be in a privileged position to claim this 
power. Put differendy, one cannot consistendy argue at the same time that S’s 
personnel should be bound by the rules of international criminal law and that S should 
have an immunity against the ICC exercising jurisdiction over acts o f its nationals. It is 
simply not true that S can validly claim an immunity against the ICC punishing its 
nationals for an international offence perpetrated on the territory of a state party. 
Therefore, it follows that states can validly delegate their territorial jurisdiction (and 
their universal jurisdiction) to the ICC.
Having dealt with this objection, I will take issue with the whole ‘delegation’ 
framework. Admittedly, this approach would seem generally compatible with the 
normative claims made so far in this thesis. In Chapter 2 I argued that the interest 
individuals in TS have in there being a system of criminal laws in force in TS warrants 
conferring upon TS the normative power to authorize an extraterritorial body to punish 
O for an offence she committed there. This would include authorizing not only foreign 
states, but also regional and international tribunals. Earlier in this chapter, I argued that 
individual states hold a normative power to punish O for an international crime that is 
universal in scope. As with their territorial jurisdiction, states would then hold the 
normative power to authorise the ICC to exercise universal jurisdiction for international 
offences on their behalf.
This delegation framework would successfully explain most aspects of the 
jurisdictional scope the ICC has as a matter of law. States would be able to delegate
72 Madeline Morris, 'High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States', 53.
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their territorial criminal jurisdiction to the ICC, and they would also be entided to 
delegate their universal jurisdiction. Furthermore, because it is their powers they are 
delegating, they have the power to authorize the ICC to exercise them under certain 
conditions. This would explain the ICC having UJ only upon the condition of the UN 
Security Council referring the case to the Prosecutor, and would also be able to account 
for the principle of complementarity. There is, however, an exception to this general 
compatibility. Defenders of the delegation theory would have difficulty explaining the 
jurisdiction over nationals of states parties for offences committed on the territory of 
non-party states (nationality principle). If my argument in Chapter 2 holds water, a 
consistent account would have to admit that states lack the power to delegate the 
power to punish a national of theirs for offences she committed outside their territory. 
To this extent, the rule provided in article 12 (b) of the Rome Statute would be 
unwarranted.
Nevertheless, the problems with this normative framework as an explanation for 
the scope of the ICC’s power to punish O cut deeper. I suggest that it is based on an 
unconvincing version of the domestic analogy. To wit, the delegation argument 
identifies wrongly those whose interest ultimately explains the ICC’s power to punish
O. Take the power of the ICC to punish O for an international crime perpetrated on a 
non-party state by a national of a non-party state. For the delegation argument to do 
any justificatory work, the power held by the ICC would have to rely on the power held 
individually by the state parties. Let me illustrate this. In Chapter 2 I argued that TS 
could delegate to PS the power to punish O for an offence she perpetrated in TS. That 
delegation was needed to empower PS because the reason for conferring upon TS the 
power to punish O does not itself warrant conferring upon PS the power to do so. 
Individuals in PS lack an interest in PS punishing O for an offence she committed in 
TS, and the interest of individuals in TS in having a system of criminal rules in force 
does not, per se, warrant conferring upon PS the power to do so. Delegation, then, is 
crucial for PS holding the normative power to punish O in this scenario.
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However, this does not obtain in the case of the ICC. Rather, the collective interest 
(held by individuals in different parts o f the world) that justifies each individual state 
holding UJ also warrants conferring a power to punish O upon the ICC. Put differently, 
the delegation argument seems to rely heavily on the claim that, unlike states, the ICC 
has no interests of its own.73 Therefore, its criminal jurisdiction is dependent upon 
states delegating their powers to it. As we saw, however, the power of a state to punish 
an offence committed on its territory is grounded on a specific collective interest of 
individuals in that state. It is not grounded on an interest of the state itself. States do not 
have interests o f their own.74 We talk about the interests of the UK or of Sri Lanka only 
as a shortcut to refer to the interests (usually of a collective nature) of individuals in the 
UK and Sri Lanka respectively. It is ultimately individuals’ interests (taken singly or 
collectively) that have moral worth. Thus, both the power o f individual states and the 
power of the ICC to punish O must be explained by reference to the interests o f these 
individuals. By resting on an unconvincing use of the domestic analogy, the delegation 
argument simply obscures this important insight.
By contrast, in section 2.2 above I argued that individuals in TS1, TS2, PS1, etc. 
have a collective interest in there being a legal system in force prohibiting genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, etc. For this to obtain, I suggested, it is necessary 
that states have UJ over these crimes. Thus, it is the collective interest of these 
individuals that warrant conferring upon every individual state the power to punish O 
irrespective of where she perpetrated her offence or the nationality of both O and V. 
This same collective interest warrants conferring UJ upon the ICC.
This alternative explanation is less controversial than it may initially seem. For 
example, despite being an advocate of the ‘delegation argument’, Scharf explicitly 
recognizes that “the drafters [at the Rome Diplomatic Conference] did not view the 
consent of the state ... as necessary ... to confer jurisdiction on the court. Rather, they 
adopted the consent regime as a limit to the exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction
73 See text corresponding to footnote 61 above.
74 On this, see section 4 o f the general Introduction to this thesis.
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as a politically expedient concession to the sovereignty of states in order to garner 
broad support.”75 I do not mean to suggest that this concession was not politically 
necessary to establish the ICC. Rather, my claim is that the delegation argument does 
no normative work in the justification for the scope of the ICC’s power to punish O. But 
not only this, if the jurisdiction of the ICC is grounded on the collective interest of 
individuals worldwide in there being a system of international criminal laws in force, 
then there are reasons to critici2e the scope of this jurisdiction for not being broad 
enough. That is, if we take into consideration the interests o f individuals worldwide and 
we admit that millions of individuals living in different parts of the globe have an 
interest in there being a criminal law system that prohibits, inter alia, genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity in force, then it must follow that the ICC should 
have the normative power to punish O whether or not the UN Security Council refers 
the situation.
4. Objections to UJ
I have argued that both individual states and the ICC should have UJ over international 
crimes. In this last section I shall tackle some objections raised against this position. 
The literature on this issue is vast, making any treatment at best partial. I shall respond 
here only to a handful of challenges. Before doing so, however, a caveat is in order. 
Many of the objections raised against it suffer from one or more of the following flaws. 
First, sometimes purely contingent objections are presented in the guise of general 
arguments.76 Take the often flagged ltu quoque’ or ‘clean hands’ objection. Kissinger 
complains that Spain — which holds one of the broadest stances on UJ — was itself 
tainted by transgressions committed during its Civil War and under Franco’s regime 
and has done very litde about it.77 Thus, how would it have the power to punish abroad
75 Scharf, 'The ICC's Jurisdiction over Nationals o f Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position', 
77 citing Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, 'The Rome Conference on an International Criminal 
Court: The Negotiating Process', American Journal of International Law 93, no. 2 (1999).
76 Against contingent justifications for punishment see Chapter 2, above.
77 Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls o f Universal Jurisdiction', Foreign Affairs 80, no. 4 (2001), 91. This 
might be about to change with Baltasar Garzon’s new investigation on these crimes. See,
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what it has failed to punish at home? This might or might not be a strong argument. 
However, it misses the point; for it does not undermine UJ per se, but rather it is only an 
argument against Spain itself holding that right.78
Secondly, some arguments claim to undermine UJ while, in fact, they only advocate 
certain limitations upon its exercise. The reason for this is that they concern the 
conditions that any particular body should meet in order to hold the power to punish O 
(i.e., the authority to do so), with the interest that accounts for a particular body 
holding that power. Take for example the issue of trials in absentia. All that a complaint 
against trials in absentia can do is suggest that the presence of the accused is a condition 
that every trial should meet in order for PS to hold a normative power to punish O on 
universality grounds. But showing that PS holding that power has certain normative 
limits (stemming, inter alia, from individuals’ right to due process) does nothing to show 
that PS lacks that normative power.79
Most significantly, perhaps, several arguments raised against UJ are ultimately 
objections against any state punishing O — including TS. In other words, they fail to 
address the core aspect of UJ, namely, its extraterritoriality.80 Take again the issue of 
trials in absentia. Whether a judicial authority ought to hold the power to punish O in 
absentia does not or not clearly depend on whether O committed the offence on its 
territory or not. To sum up, then, whenever an objection is liable to one or more of 
these flaws, it simply fails to undermine the case for UJ made here.
h t tp : / /w w . elpais.com/articulo/espana/Gar2on/investigara/represion/ franquista/abrira /  fosa/Lorca/ 
elpepuesp/20081016elpepunac_6/Tes (last accessed, 10 January 2008).
78 This challenge will be examined in more detailed in Chapter 5, section 5, below.
79 This charge will be addressed in section 6 o f Chapter 5 below. Similarly, see the charges raised in 
George P. Fletcher, 'Against Universal Jurisdiction', Journal of International Criminal Justice 1 (2003); 
Madeline Morris, 'Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks', New England haw 
Review 35, no. 2 (2001), 352-354 and Alfred P. Rubin, 'The International Criminal Court: Possibilities for 
Prosecutorial Abuse', Caw and Contemporary Problems 64 (2001), respectively. Most o f the concerns 
expressed therein, and their normative implications will be addressed in Chapter 5 below.
80 Admittedly, UJ entails also a lack of nationality link between, both O and V, and PS. However, 
because I have argued that both the nationality o f O and V should have no relevance as to whether PS 
should have the power to punish O, I portrait here UJ under the light o f pure extraterritoriality.
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4.1 UJ criminalizes political decision-making
In a polemical paper, Henry Kissinger complains that UJ means submitting 
international politics to criminal procedures. Heads of state and senior public officials, 
he suggests, should not be equated with pirates, hijackers and other similar oudaws.81 
Let us appraise Kissinger’s claim. I do not think his argument implies that there is 
something fundamentally disanalogous between heads of states and hijackers that 
warrants that only the latter should be subject to the criminal law. In effect, if a head of 
state is uncontroversially liable for ordering the murder of his wife, why would he not 
be liable for ordering a genocide? Rather, I believe this argument points to the 
complicated debate regarding the relationship between criminal liability and politically 
motivated behaviour. In effect, the distinction between crime and politics is a tough 
one, and one that is beyond the scope of this thesis.82 Far from trying to untangle the 
intricacies o f this issue here I shall point out, rather, that this objection has a logical 
flaw.
Indeed, the issue it raises is whether a particular instance of conduct (e.g., 
systematic torture of alleged terrorists) should be criminalized or, by contrast, 
considered merely a political decision. As pointed out in other parts o f this thesis, I 
cannot address here issues of criminalization in any depth. My point here is that 
questions about criminalization of particular conduct should not be conflated with the 
question of who should have the power to punish O for them. Kissinger conflates these 
two separate questions and reasons through a non-sequitur. From a premise that 
ultimately objects to torture being criminalized simpliciter when ordered by certain state 
officials, he concludes that an extraterritorial authority (PS) should lack the power to 
punish torturers on grounds of UJ. However, if his premise is convincing it must follow 
that neither TS nor the state that employs O should have the power to punish O for 
these acts. I am not sure that that Kissinger is really committed to the view that, for 
example, the US under Barack Obama would lack the power to punish acts o f torture
81 Kissinger, 'The Pitfalls o f Universal Jurisdiction', 87.
82 For a brief discussion o f some o f the issues that arise from this discussion see Stanley Cohen, 'Crime 
and Politics: Spot the Difference', The British Journal of Sociology 47, no. 1 (1996), 1.
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committed by its own troops in Abu Graib. But even if  he were, his is not an argument 
against PS exercising universal jurisdiction over O.
4.2 UJ risks becoming a tool against political adversaries
Another common ground for concern stems from the possibility of states using 
criminal trials as foreign policy tools to prosecute adversaries or advance their national 
interests.83 In Kissinger’s words “[t]he Pinochet precedent, if literally applied, would 
permit the two sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict, or those in any other passionate 
international controversy, to project their battles into the various national courts by 
pursuing adversaries with extradition requests.”84 This, some add, would be particularly 
problematic due to the lack of judicial independence in many countries.85
This argument has significant normative pull but I suggest it is ultimately 
unconvincing. First, this objection is liable to the flaw of contingency, i.e., it takes issue 
with certain states (i.e., political adversaries) exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
O, not every state. Moreover, it is not always the case, and I am unpersuaded about 
how plausible this is in international relations, that states have tried to take international 
political conflicts to their own domestic criminal courts. Criminal trials are slow, cosdy, 
burdensome and arguably unsatisfying in the context of heated political disputes. 
Negotiations, reprisals, and ultimately war have proven far more popular. Thus, I 
suggest the risk is overstated.
Secondly, this objection also fails to address extraterritorial punishment per se. In 
short, it would undermine both TS and PS exercising their criminal jurisdiction against 
a political adversary. That is, it would also undermine Syria’s power to punish offences 
committed by Israeli soldiers in Syria. Ultimately this is because, again, this charge 
affects not the interest on which the justification for punishing O rests, but the 
conditions that any given body should allegedly satisfy in order to hold the power to do
83 Morris, 'Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks', 354.
84 Kissinger, 'The Pitfalls o f Universal Jurisdiction', 92.
85 Morris, 'Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks', 353.
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so (its authority). As I will argue in my next chapter, this issue is unrelated to the 
extraterritorial scope of S’s power to punish O.
4.3 UJ is just an expensive taste for elites
Arguably, the most damaging objection to extraterritorial punishment on grounds of 
universality is the supposedly negligible effect it has on the lives of the very individuals 
whose interests seem to ground this power. In David Luban’s words, “the enterprise of 
occasionally putting perpetrators on trial —even leaders like Milosevic and Kambanda— 
seems more like a publicity stunt than a commitment to humanitarian legal values”.86 
This objection implies that, as a matter of fact, it is unrealistic to believe that a system 
of international criminal rules will ever provide individuals with any real benefit. No 
such system can succeed unless states are willing to yield some of their most treasured 
attributes. As Alfred Rubin puts it, most people argue that the U.S. are not willing to 
have alleged misdeeds o f its military and civil leaders defined by people with no interest 
in the turmoil an arraignment would cause in the American political system. But would 
any state be willing to do so?87 This does not only apply to state officials; “when people 
are willing to die for a cause, send their children to die for it, and pay for the effort in 
supplies and other ways, the notion that international supervision will limit atrocities is 
unrealistic in the absence of the full panoply of world government.”88
If this objection is viewed in terms of the capacity of extraterritorial punishment to 
deter future offences then I have expressed my sympathy for this claim in Chapter 1 
above.89 Yet, the putative strength of a system of international criminal laws as a 
deterrent of atrocities is not a matter that should concern us, for deterrence plays 
virtually no part in the justification I advocate. This objection does challenge the view I 
have defended here, though. It claims that international criminal laws cannot contribute
86 Luban, 'A Theory of Crimes against Humanity', 130.
87 Rubin, 'The International Criminal Court: Possibilities for Prosecutorial Abuse', 164.
88 ibid, 157.
89 In fact, despite the fact that there are no empirical studies to prove this claim the literature seems 
confident in that its deterrent effects are negligible. See, e.g., Sloane, 'The Expressive Capacity of 
International Punishment', 71-75; Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, 169-173; and 
Tallgren, 'The Sensibility and Sense o f International Criminal Law', 569-579.
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to the dignity and security of individuals worldwide in any meaningful sense. This 
would be very damaging for my position. In Chapter 2 I argued that because PS 
holding a power to punish O for a robbery she committed on TS can contribute neither 
to the sense of dignity and security of individuals in PS or TS, PS lacks that power.90 
Similarly, if this objection is sound I must reject the claim that both individual states 
and the ICC should have UJ.
To respond to this, I would suggest that conferring upon PS the power to punish 
O extraterritorially is capable of contributing to the sense of dignity and security that 
international criminal rules provide individuals worldwide and that, for this to obtain, 
both individual states and the ICC must have UJ. This might seem unwarranted today. 
But let me clarify exactly what the position I defend is. I have argued in this chapter 
that if a system of international criminal law is in force, it would contribute to the sense 
o f dignity and security o f millions of individuals worldwide, including those on the 
territory of TS. The claim that not many people on earth currently feel any extra sense 
o f dignity or security stemming from international criminal rules being in force does 
not undermine my argument entirely.
First, we should not take this proposition at face value. There seems to be some 
empirical evidence that in practice the fact that an extraterritorial authority claims 
jurisdiction to punish O can have a non-negligible impact on the ground. The 
likelihood of accountability, albeit extraterritorial, seems capable o f having some 
effects. When Colombia threatened the guerrilla and the drug-trafficking cartels with 
extradition to the US to face charges there, this generated a bloody wave of terrorist 
attacks, kidnappings, etc., designed to make the Colombian Government step back. For 
those belonging to such organizations it made a huge difference whether they would be 
in prison in Colombia or abroad.91 But also it might make a difference for those being 
targeted by these groups. There have been some indications that the opening o f an 
investigation by the International Criminal Court has changed things on the ground
90 See Chapter 2 above, sections 3 and 4.
91 As one may imagine, their privileges (which in some cases amounted direcdy to escaping from prison) 
would have been rather different.
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both vis-a-vis those responsible for international offences and the vulnerable, targeted 
minorities in Sudan and DRC.92 Finally, there might be some clear exceptions to this 
general objection such as the situation of prisoners o f war in certain armed conflicts. 
Albeit circumstantially, this shows that the empirical assumption on which this 
objection rests is far less certain than its advocates admit.
Moreover, it is not even clear that if this objection were empirically accurate today 
it would lead to rejecting UJ. The fact that individuals do not have a sense o f being 
right bearers and that the criminal law protects their rights might not be so much a 
consequence of the impossibility of this system doing anything meaningful for them, but 
rather a result of it not being in force yet. International criminal law is arguably still in its 
infancy, and few people will deny that it has a long way to go before becoming 
established as an institution in both international and domestic life.
The objector, however, may push the point further by suggesting that international 
criminal law will never be able to provide the benefits that domestic criminal law 
systems create for individuals. I will have to concede that much. PS would usually have 
difficulties in investigating or obtaining custody over O. Moreover, TS will often refuse 
to collaborate with these investigations by, among other things, not disclosing 
information, refusing access to witnesses, facilities, and victims, not extraditing 
defendants, etc. It would be poindess to reason on different assumptions. Nevertheless, 
this does not mean that a system of international criminal law can achieve nothing. 
Even if the level of convictions would be low, as is admittedly the case in every domestic 
criminal law system, and even if it faces difficulties and limitations, many individuals 
would benefit from a system of international criminal laws coming of age. Indeed, such 
a system of criminal law would provide them with some sense o f being right bearers 
and that these rights are protected by criminal laws. Moreover, this is a feeling of 
security that many domestic systems o f criminal law will not be able to provide.
92 See, e.g., Suliman Baldo, The Impact of the ICC in the Sudan and DRC  (http://www.peace-justice- 
conference.info/documents.asp 2007 [last accessed, 10 January 2008]) and the Report o f the 
International Center for Transitional Justice in id.
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Thus, my conclusion on this issue is rather thin. I suggest that we have good 
reasons to recognize the ICC and individual states having the power to punish O on 
universality grounds as this would contribute to the sense o f dignity and security of 
many individuals in many different parts of the world. This is not in fact such a 
controversial stance to take. In an otherwise rather pessimistic paper about the benefits 
that international criminal laws can provide, Sloane suggests that “[o]ver time, 
punishment by [extraterritorial] criminal tribunals can shape as well as express social 
norms”.93 And he adds, “the international sentencing process can reinforce and 
vindicate those norms even if it cannot, alone, realistically be expected to deter or fulfil 
retributive aspirations held by each affected local constituency”.94 This arguably 
suggests that the argument advocated here is perhaps the best suited for this task.
5. Conclusion
This chapter closes the section of this thesis on international criminal law. Ini chapters 3 
and 4 I have presented an argument to the effect that both individual states and the 
ICC should have, at the bar of justice, the power to punish O for an international crime 
irrespective of where it was perpetrated, and o f the nationality o f either O or V. 
Chapter 3 argues that an international crime is simply one whose prohibition cannot be 
in force on the territory of TS unless at least some extraterritorial body has the power 
to punish O. In Chapter 4 I have argued that the interest of individuals in TS, TS2, 
TS3, PS, etc, i.e., o f every individual in a situation of vulnerability vis-a-vis this kind of 
crimes, warrants conferring upon every state and the ICC UJ to punish O. Finally, I 
have defended this proposition against the claims that UJ simply criminalizes political 
decision-making, that it risks becoming a tool against political adversaries, and that it is 
simply an expensive taste for elites o f no consequence to the individuals who should 
benefit from it.
93 Sloane, 'The Expressive Capacity o f International Punishment', 85. He refers only to “international” 
tribunals, but I think it is more accurate to include domestic ones acting on universal jurisdiction too. 
Drumbl reluctandy seems to admit that this is a function that extraterritorial punishment can perform 
rather well, even in mass atrocity situations (Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, 176).
94 Sloane, The Expressive Capacity o f International Punishment', 85.
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5
Legitimate Authority and Extraterritorial Punishment
1. Legitimate Authority and the Right to Punish
The question in this thesis so far has been when a particular body is justified in meting 
out legal punishment extraterritorially to an offender. Chapters 2 and 4 explained, 
respectively, how the interest-based justification for the power to punish O advocated 
here accounts for different extraterritorial bodies (PS and the ICC) being justified in 
punishing O for domestic and international offences. However, as I argued in the 
general Introduction to this thesis, identifying an interest that is sufficiendy important 
to confer upon S this normative power does not suffice as a complete explanation for 
the allocation of such power. S would normally have to fulfil certain conditions such as, 
quite plausibly, not decide on a defendant’s (D) culpability on the basis o f confessions 
extracted by torture.1 In other words, it is not enough for S to have the power to 
punish O, that someone’s interest would be served by the conferral o f that power; S 
must also have the authority to do so. In the general Introduction I illustrated this point 
by way of a simple example. A needs prescribed drug D to fight some illness of hers 
and B knows about this illness and knows that drug D would be appropriate. I 
suggested that although B would be justified in prescribing D to A, she would not have 
the normative power to do so. This is not, or so I claim, because A lacks the relevant 
interest in getting the drug or B lacks the relevant interest in selling it to her, but rather 
because B lacks the authority to prescribe it. The same can be argued in respect of PS. In 
order for it to claim the power to punish D, it must satisfy certain conditions. This 
chapter provides a philosophical account of these conditions.
1 Although along the thesis I have been using O as an alleged offender (i.e., an offender found guilty by 
a body with the relevant authority), in this chapter I use the notion o f a defendant The reason for this 
is, in short, that it captures better the fact that D  has not been convicted yet.
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Although this is obviously an important question for any theory of criminal justice, 
it may seem of particular importance for a theory o f extraterritorial criminal law. This is 
because defendants, victims, and third parties characteristically tend to question the 
authority of the court deciding the case. In effect, the authority of the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and Tokyo was objected to on the basis that it was 
nothing more than victor’s justice and that the Allies had also committed war crimes 
during the war (tu quoque). Similarly, in the case against Pinochet, Spain’s standing was 
questioned on the grounds that it had failed to prosecute the crimes of the Franco era. I 
will call this the issue of ‘clean hands’. Italy and France have often been criticized for 
trying offenders in absentia. Certain trials, such as Saddam Hussein’s, bear the charge of 
being show trials or ‘trials by ambush’. And, finally, sometimes offenders are brought 
before the Court after being abducted abroad (e.g. Eichmann). I shall examine each of 
these claims here and assess their normative force and implications.
This chapter is intended to do two things. First, it will complete my general theory 
of extraterritorial punishment by explaining when a particular body (S, PS, the ICC or 
one of their organs) satisfies the minimum requirements to hold, itself, the power to 
punish D. I will argue that this question is ultimately about whether S can claim the 
authority to do so. Moreover, in order to substantiate this claim I believe it is worth 
referring to what is arguably one of the most elaborate philosophical accounts of 
authority available in the literature: Raz’s service conception. In sections 2, 3 and 4 I 
will provide a general account of the authority of criminal courts.
Secondly, this account o f authority will show that none of the challenges often 
raised specifically against extraterritorial bodies punishing D has anything to do with 
the extraterritoriality o f the prosecution. Rather, they rely on different considerations 
which affect both territorial and extraterritorial bodies alike. This is crucial for my 
purposes because it shows, against what it is commonly believed, that the issue of the 
extraterritorial scope o f S’s power to punish is entirely separate from the specific 
considerations on which S’s authority is based. As I have suggested in previous chapters, 
the extraterritorial scope of S’s power to punish D rests on the reasons that justify S
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meting legal punishment to D, to wit, on the interest on the basis of which this power 
is explained, and on whose interest it ultimately is. In sections 5 and 6 below, I will 
examine some of the most relevant challenges against extraterritorial prosecutions. But 
before going into any of this a caveat is in order.
We must not conflate the question of what conditions S should satisfy in order to 
have, itself, the authority to punish D, with the justification for the need to confer upon 
some authority the power to punish D. While the former question has to do with what 
gives S authority over a particular issue, the latter justifies the need for having some 
sort o f centralized authority to deal with it in the first place. These questions are 
analytically independent from each other. Indeed, regardless o f whether we consider 
that we need a centralized authority or that we should allow individuals to decide 
themselves on whether D should be punished, we might still require that they both 
satisfy certain conditions in order to exercise that prerogative legitimately.
Admittedly, few would argue that we would be better off if each individual, rather 
than the state, held the power to punish D for an offence. Yet it is worth clarifying why 
this is so. The obvious objection to vigilante jurisdiction is the risk of potential abuse.2 
However, that risk would be significantly tamed by imposing strict conditions for the 
exercise of that power. We may require that trials remain public, that provision for 
defence counsel be adequate, that stringent rules o f evidence be adhered to, that 
sentencing guidelines be provided, etc. These limitations are perfectly compatible with 
conferring upon any interested party the power to punish D. Quite possibly vigilante 
jurisdiction will still be resisted on the grounds that “it is unreasonable for Men to be 
Judges in their own Cases”.3 Yet, this does not argue in favour o f having a centralized 
authority but rather suggests that V  should not be allowed to try D herself. Moreover,
2 See, e.g., Luban, ‘A Theory o f Crimes against Humanity’, 106, who in fact does conflate these two 
questions. See also Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Second Treatise, §13, 275 and J. Gardner, ‘Crime: 
in Proportion and in Perspective’ at Andrew Ashworth and Martin Wasik, Fundamentals of Sentencing 
Theory: Essays in Honour of Andrew von Hirsch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
3 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, § 13,275.
as Locke suggested, “if he that judges, judges amiss in his own, or any other Case, he is 
answerable for it to the rest o f Mankind”, i.e., he is liable to punishment himself.4
By contrast, I suggest that the main reason why we should have a centralized 
authority is the need for coordination and cost-reduction. I cannot offer here a full 
defence o f this claim. Rather, I shall simply suggest that it would be too onerous on 
individuals to have to carry themselves the costs of investigating, trying, and executing 
the sentence.5 This position will play an important role in the explanation o f some of 
the issues I will address below, so it is worth keeping this background claim in mind.
2. The service conception of authority and the power to punish
“A. command is when a man saith do this or do not do this je t 
without expecting any other reason than the mil of him that 
said it.>>6
Joseph Raz’s influential service conception o f authority may help us explain and justify 
what conditions any given body should meet in order to hold legitimate authority to 
decide whether D should be punished. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide 
an adequate defence o f this well-known position.7 However, I suggest that Raz’s highly 
influential conception is clearly the best suited to account for the legitimate authority of 
courts in the context of adjudication of criminal cases, both territorial and 
extraterritorial. First, it readily distinguishes between the reasons that underlie the basis 
of Acs authority and those which account for the scope of its power. While the whole 
o f this thesis has been concerned with the latter issue, this chapter deals only with the 
former. Secondly, and as I will argue below, it links A’s authority to it having an 
epistemic advantage; thereby, it captures the fundamental insight that we normally
4 ibid, § 13, 276.
5 It must be noted that this argument is independent of my particular justification for the right to punish 
and, thus, it would be compatible with other justifications, such as deterrence, retributivism, etc.
6 Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 25.
7 For a good introduction to the issue of authority and a good example o f the relevance o f Raz’s version 
of the service conception in current debates see S.J. Shapiro, ‘Authority’ in Scott Shapiro and Jules L. 
Coleman, The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Taw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002).
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accept the authority of courts because they are in a much better position than any of us 
to decide a particular case, and this is due to their better knowledge o f the facts and the 
applicable law. This is under most accounts a central aspect of the criminal process. 
Finally, the argument provided in this chapter does not need to rely on the service 
conception as an argument to explain all instances of authority, political or otherwise. 
By narrowing its application to the authority of courts I simply bypass one o f the main 
sources of resistance with which the service conception has met, i.e., its lack o f interest 
in democratic procedures.8
The issue o f authority presents us with both a normative and a theoretical 
question.9 The normative question is, ultimately, on what grounds can we justify 
subjecting one’s judgment to that of another person, in our case by allowing her to 
decide whether D should be punished (and how much). The theoretical one is about 
the implications of recognriing A. as an authority on a given matter, i.e., how the 
existence of an authoritative decision affects the reasoning or decision-making of 
others.10 The service conception rests on three central theses, the first two o f which 
provide an answer to the normative or moral question, and the third, to the theoretical 
one. The Normal Justification Thesis (hereinafter NJT) argues that the normal reason 
why a person ought to subject his will to that o f another person is that he “is likely 
better to [conform] with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged 
authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as 
authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow reasons 
which apply to him direcdy.”11 This normative claim has a limit built into it. Thus, the 
Dependence Thesis states that in order for directives to be authoritative, they “should 
be based on reasons which already independendy apply to the subjects of the directives
8 See, e.g., Thomas Chtistiano, The Authority o f Democracy', The Journal of Political Philosophy 12, no. 3 
(2004) and Shapiro, ‘Authority’, 431-439. Ultimately I assume that the other considerations on which 
authority is often said to rest, e.g., consent, identification, etc., are not suitable to the issue at stake here.
9 Joseph Raz, 'The Problem o f Authority', Minnesota Taw Review 90 (2006).
10 Joseph Raz, 'Authority and Justification', Philosophy and Public Affairs 14, no. 1 (1985), 3.
11 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 53; Raz, 'The Problem of Authority', 1014.
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and are relevant to their action in the circumstances covered by the directive”.12 Finally, 
the Pre-emption Thesis (hereinafter PT) provides an answer to the theoretical question 
identified above; it maintains that “the fact that an authority requires performance of an 
action is a reason for its performance which is not to be added to all other relevant 
reasons when assessing what to do, but should exclude and take the place of some of 
them”.13 As I shall explain below, the answers to the moral and the theoretical 
questions are deeply interconnected.
But let us start from the beginning. The service conception rests on a particular 
understanding of practical reason.14 It suggests that in any given circumstances 
individuals ought to act on reasons that apply objectively to them. Regardless of 
whether I am driving, playing chess, or adjudicating in a criminal case the reasons I may 
have for not speeding, avoid loosing my rook, or convicting D only if she is proven 
guilty beyond reasonable doubt apply to me independendy of my will, or my perception 
o f these reasons. With this in mind, it is only natural that the normal reason why a 
person ought to subject his will to that of another person is that he is likely better to 
conform with reasons which apply to him if he accepts the directives issued by that 
authority than if he tries to follow these reasons direcdy (NJT). Thus, when playing 
chess one would be better off listening to Kasparov’s advice than trying to figure out 
the right move by oneself. And this is arguably why we recogni2e Kasparov as an 
authority in chess. Accordingly, the service conception suggests that the normal 
function of legitimate authority is to mediate between people and right reasons that
12 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 47 and Ethics in the Public Domain, 214. This is not the only limitation that 
applies to the service conception. Authorities are also limited by the kind of acts they can or cannot 
regulate (Raz, 'Authority and Justification', 14). Moreover, in his latest restatement o f  the service 
conception, Raz places a significant emphasis in what he calls the Independence Condition, i.e., that 
“the matters regarding which the [NJT] is met are such that with respect to them it is better to conform 
to reason than to decide for oneself, unaided by authority” (Raz, The Problem o f Authority', 1014). I 
work on the assumption that empowering an authority to decide whether D  should be punished or not 
(and if she is, how much) poses “no threat to the authenticity o f  one’s life, or to one’s ability to lead a 
self-reliant and self-fulfilling life” (Raz, 'The Problem o f Authority', 1016) and that, as a result, it satisfies 
the Independence Condition.
13 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 46.
14 Again, I cannot defend this approach here. For critical remarks see Heidi M. Hurd, Moral Combat 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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apply objectively (and independently of the authoritative directives) to them, and 
enhance their conformity with these reasons. Authority is ultimately grounded on 
epistemic advantage.15 This dissolves one o f the traditional concerns with accepting an 
authority; authorities are not an arbitrary denial of one’s capacity for rational action, but 
rather a device through which one can achieve more effectively one’s capacity for 
rational action.16 In Raz’s words, “the primary value o f our general ability to act by our 
own judgment derives from the concern to conform to reasons, and that concern can 
be met in a variety of ways.”17
It has been often objected, however, that the NJT provides only a prudential 
reason for accepting someone’s authority, and does not yet explain why we are bound 
to do so. The standard example goes: even if as patients we would comply better with 
reasons that apply to us by following the doctor’s advice than by relying on our own 
judgment, this does not entail per se that we are under a duty to follow her advice (or 
that the doctor has authority over us).18 This proposition, however, is only partially 
correct. For while it is true that doctors lack authority to oblige patients to follow 
certain medical treatment, they do have authority to prescribe them certain medications. 
Admittedly, the NJT cannot explain this difference of treatment. In both situations we 
would comply better with the reasons that objectively apply to us by following the 
doctor’s advice than by following reason directly. But why should we rely on the NJT 
to explain this difference? I suggest that it is a mistake to suppose that the service 
conception relies on it to explain the bindingness o f an authority’s decisions. On the 
contrary, Raz has argued that we are under a duty to accept an authoritative directive 
“where a substantial good is at stake, a good that we have moral reasons to secure for
15 Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, 214.
16 Raz, 'The Problem of Authority', 1018.
17 ibid, 1017.
18 Kenneth Einar Himma, 'Just 'Cause You're Smarter Than Me Doesn't Give You a Right to Tell Me 
What to Do: Legitimate Authority and the Normal Justification Thesis', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27, 
no. 1 (2007), 124.
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ourselves and for others but that can in the circumstances be best secured by yielding 
to a coordinating authority.”19
It seems, then, that the objection misunderstands the normative work that the NJT 
does within the service conception. The NJT explains only why we recognize, doctors 
as the relevant authority to prescribe certain drugs, or engineers as authorities regarding 
whether we can build certain buildings, or certain courts o f law as authorities 
empowered to adjudicate on matters of criminal liability. The bindingness of their 
decisions, by contrast, depends on other considerations, which are contained in Raz’s 
answer but which it pays to explicate further. In short, the service conception relies on 
two further positive arguments to explain the bindingness of an authority’s decision: first, 
that there are things we have an interest in, an interest which is important enough to 
warrant the protection of a right; and secondly, that the best way to serve this interest is 
to empower an authority. It is only when these two conditions and the NJT are satisfied 
that we have a moral case for considering the decisions of A binding.
Before moving on to the theoretical question identified at the outset, that is, what 
the implications of recognizing A  as an authority on a given matter are, two further 
points are in order. First, under the service conception, for a certain body to hold 
legitimate authority it must have some de facto authority. Admittedly, “in most cases the 
normal justification cannot be established unless the putative authority enjoys some 
measure o f recognition and exercises power over its subjects.”20 The main reason for 
this is that if A ’s authority relies on the fact that it is capable o f solving certain 
coordination problems and of providing a particular good, it must have some degree of 
recognition by its peers and obedience from those subject to it. A powerless authority 
simply cannot secure the relevant good at stake, be that a system of criminal laws, the 
reasonable regulation of certain pharmaceutical products, or whatever. Moreover, this 
helps to explain why states are natural candidates to claim the authority to punish D 
and it provides a sensible evaluative threshold for extraterritorial authorities, such as
19 Raz, 'The Problem o f Authority', 1016. See, similarly, Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 100.
20 Raz, 'Authority and Justification', 21; Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 56.
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governments in exile or international tribunals, and for domestic non-state institutions 
such as tribal authorities, belligerent movements, etc.21 In the remainder of this chapter 
I shall assume that the relevant body satisfies that requirement.
Secondly, A ’s authority is limited by the kind of reasons on which she may or may 
not rely in making a decision. To repeat: directives must be based on reasons which 
already independendy apply to the subjects of the directives and are relevant to their 
action in the circumstances covered by the directive in order to be binding 
(Dependence Thesis). This is a moral thesis on how authorities must use their powers. 
It follows from it that in order for a decision reached by a given state S (or one of its 
organs) on whether D should be punished or not to be authoritative, it must be based 
on the reasons that apply to individuals whose interest explains conferring upon this 
particular body the power to punish D. In simple terms, I have argued that individuals 
in S have an interest in punishing those who violate S’s criminal rules.22 As a result, this 
requirement rules out decisions reached primarily for other reasons, such as political 
expedience, economic interest o f a certain kind, vindictiveness, hate, etc.23 This explains 
why a verdict reached through bribing or threatening the jurors can claim no 
authoritative force even if it is accurate.
As suggested above, the answer to the theoretical question identified at the outset, 
namely, what are the implications of saying that S has legitimate authority to try D, rests 
with the Pre-emption Thesis (PT). That is, “the fact that an authority requires 
performance of an action is a reason for its performance which is not to be added to all 
other relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should exclude and take the 
place of some o f them”.24 Thus, Raz argues that authoritative decisions work as
21 I am happy to accept that, in certain circumstances, a body different from the state would be able to 
hold the power to punish D  at least if, e.g., it is authorized by the state, like the Gacaca in Rwanda, or if  
the body acts de facto as the state. However, I submit that we should accept its authority to punish D  
only as long as A satisfies the relevant conditions outlined below. Gacaca proceedings seem 
unpromising in this sense.
22 This does not mean they are, as a matter o f fact, guilty. For a detailed explanation o f this proposition 
see Chapter 1 above.
23 See, e.g., Duff, Ansmringfor Crime, 186 and cases cited in fn 143 and 144.
24 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 46 This is arguably one o f the most controversial aspects o f Raz’s service 
conception. For a review on some of the criticisms, see Shapiro, ‘Authority’, 411-413.
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second-order reasons that pre-empt the subject from relying on the first-order, 
background reasons that apply to her independendy. The reason for excluding other 
background reasons is that an authority cannot succeed in improving our conformity 
with reason and solving coordination problems if it does not pre-empt our background 
reasons, i.e., if individuals have to rely on their own judgment o f the merits.25 I cannot 
offer here a proper defence of the PT nor even of Raz’s notion of exclusionary 
reasons 26 Rather, I shall only concentrate on its explanatory potential for the account 
of extraterritorial criminal justice defended here.
Briefly put, the PT explains the difference between saying that S is justified in 
punishing D (as per Chapters 3 to 5) and claiming that S has the authority to do so. The 
former proposition means that someone has an interest which is sufficiendy important 
to put D under a liability to having punishment inflicted upon her; the latter means that 
S’s decision on this matter should be treated as binding by others 27 This entails, first, 
that individuals in S must abide by the court’s decision. That is, for example, they are 
not supposed to go to the local Mob asking for justice after the state sentenced the 
defendants too lenientiy.28 And most relevandy for our purposes, it also follows that if 
S satisfies the requirements of the service conception, other states should consider that 
decision as authoritative, that is, they would lack a valid reason to reject it. A  contrario, 
this also entails that if a state fails to satisfy these conditions its decision cannot claim 
authoritative force.
We may be inclined at this point to distinguish between the authoritativeness of 
convictions and acquittals. Indeed, although a guilty verdict means that D was found 
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, acquittals do not establish innocence but rather that 
the guilty threshold was not reached. One could then suggest that acquittals should not
25 ibid, 47-48; Raz, 'The Problem of Authority', 1019.
26 On this see Raz, Practical Reason and Norms.
27 As I explained above, the former proposition is one of the conditions that must be satisfied in order 
to claim that S has legitimate authority to punish D.
28 Prudential reasons might also indicate likewise, as one may hear as a chilling reply: “Some day, and 
that day may never come, I will call upon you to do a service for me. Until that day accept this justice as 
a gift on my daughter's wedding day.” (Mario Puzo, The Godfather (New York: New American Library,
2002), 33).
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then carry the same authority as convictions, and therefore that they need not be 
considered binding, particularly by other states. Accordingly, the fact that D was 
acquitted in S should not entail that she cannot be tried again (and convicted) in S2. But 
this, I suggest, conflates two different things. The reason why we might consider S an 
authority (i.e., that she satisfies the NJT) is not what explains its decision pre-empting 
other authorities from deciding the case again. As suggested above, the PT is not 
grounded on S making a more accurate decision than S2, but rather on the need for 
coordination and cost-reduction. It would be deeply problematic for the purposes of 
the criminal law system to have conflicting decisions as to whether D is guilty. In 
particular, the fact that S’s courts have acquitted her would render S2’s conviction 
suspicious, at least if it was not grounded on new evidence. This would undermine the 
whole purpose o f punishing D, for it will not convey a clear message that the rule she 
allegedly violated is in force. I cannot examine here whether states should have the 
power to try D again on new evidence (for this purposes it is immaterial whether she is 
tried in a court in the same state or a different one). The majority o f states seem to have 
rules against this kind of proceedings called the safeguard against double jeopardy or ne 
bis in idem.29 To conclude, then, I submit that D ’s acquittal does carry as much authority 
as her conviction (in the restricted sense o f the PT), even if it arguably has an entirely 
different meaning.
3. The service conception and the legitimate authority of courts
It is now time to see whether the service conception can convincingly account for the 
institution at hand, i.e., criminal courts. As argued in Chapter 1 ,1 submit that having a 
criminal law system in force is a public good we have reasons to secure for ourselves 
and for others. That is, an interest in this system being in force sufficiently weighty to 
ground a normative power to punish D. I also suggested that the best way to comply 
with these background reasons is to empower an authority to investigate and try
29 An exception is the UK, which allows under quite strict conditions a new prosecution (see Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 ss. 75-81).
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criminal offences. This is mainly because of its greater coordination and cost reduction 
(i.e., its efficiency). This authority would normally be a territorial or extraterritorial one 
depending on whether the relevant offence is municipal or international.30 The bulk of 
this chapter is therefore concerned with identifying when such institutions (normally 
some kind of domestic or international court) satisfy the NJT, that is, when individuals 
are likely better to conform with reasons which (independently) apply to them by 
accepting its directives rather than by trying to follow these reasons directly.
Following Ashworth and Redmayne, a plausible answer to this question is that A. 
satisfies the NJT when it seeks “accurately to determine whether or not a person has 
committed a particular criminal offence and does so fairly.”31 In other words, the normal 
reason why individuals should recognize the authority of a given Court to decide a 
particular criminal case has to do with its greater knowledge o f the facts o f the case and 
the relevant law, and its careful consideration of the conflicting viewpoints on the 
matter. This response certainly has much intuitive appeal. However, there are at least 
three issues that need further elaboration.
First, although the accuracy requirement captures the epistemic advantage that 
courts normally offer, it raises the question as to why accuracy actually matters. 
According to the NJT an authority’s epistemic advantage must be connected to the 
reasons which independently apply to us and which it helps us conform better to. 
Ashworth and Redmayne’s answer to this question is therefore consistent with the 
rationale for legal punishment they endorse, to wit, retribution. If A ’s power to punish 
is based on the fact that D deserves to be punished, it is only natural that the criminal 
procedure is intended to determine, as accurately as possible, whether this is the case. I 
have criticized retributivism in previous chapters for being incompatible with the
30 To remind the reader, Chapter 2 argues that individuals in S have an interest that warrants conferring 
upon S the normative power to punish offences committed on its territory or against its sovereignty, 
security or important governmental functions even if committed abroad. Chapters 3 and 4 argue that 
both the ICC and PS (an extraterritorial state) hold the normative power to punish international 
offences regardless o f where they were perpetrated, and o f the nationality o f both the offender (O) and 
the victim.
31 Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 22.
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interest theory of rights, and for leading to unacceptable positions when faced with the 
issue of extraterritoriality.32 Yet, if I want to endorse accuracy as an element of the NJT, 
I would need to explain why it would be required also by the justification for legal 
punishment advocated here.
The basic proposition I have defended throughout this thesis is that ^4’s power to 
punish D is based on the interest of individuals in there being a rule against murder, 
robbery, systematic torture, etc. in force. For that criminal rule to be in force, those 
who violate it must be punished; they must be punished by an authority expressly 
authorized by the relevant legal system; and they must be punished because they violated 
this rule. Only when all these conditions are fulfilled would punishing D send the right 
message to individuals that the rule is in force.33 Accordingly, we need to make sure as 
far as possible to convict the right person. Punishing innocent people qua innocent will 
not do for the simple reason that it would ultimately undermine the credibility o f the 
criminal law system and, with it, the sense of dignity and security that it brings to 
individuals.34 This explains why accuracy is also required by the justification of legal 
punishment I advocate.
Secondly, we need to clarify what it means to try someone fairly and explain why 
this would also be required by the NJT. The former question is perhaps simpler to 
answer than the latter. Fairness in this context is normally connected with respect for 
certain rights. It is beyond the scope o f this thesis to provide a complete account of the 
rights that a fair criminal process must respect. My argument is about being able to 
account for the standard cases of fair or unfair trials; it is not meant to discern where 
exactly to draw the line between them. A good starting point, in any event, is to look at 
the different incidents that embody the right to a fair trial as provided for in the 
relevant International Human Rights instruments. Article 14 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights establishes that “everyone shall be entitled to a
32 See Chapters 1 and 2 above, respectively.
33 See Chapter 1 above.
34 I do admit, however, that a given decision might be authoritative even if  in a specific case D  is 
wrongly acquitted or wrongly convicted. On this, see section 3.1.4 in Chapter 1 above and below.
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fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established 
by law”; “shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty”; and shall be 
entided to several minimum guarantees, such as, “to be informed prompdy and in detail 
in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him”; 
“to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to 
communicate with counsel of his own choosing”; “to be tried without undue delay”; 
“to be tried in his presence”, “to have legal assistance assigned to him”; “to examine, or 
have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination 
of witnesses on his behalf’; “to have the free assistance o f an interpreter”; and “not to 
be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt”.35 There are certainly other 
rights that the criminal process should respect, which are not normally covered by the 
right to a fair trial as such. Among them, one could mention the right to privacy, to 
personal liberty, to freedom from torture, etc. In sum, I suggest that fairness in this 
context has to do with respect for some basic moral rights that individuals have in the 
context o f a criminal process broadly defined.36
Far more difficult is to explain why fairness is required by the NJT, i.e., why 
accuracy does not suffice. Is not the NJT based on the notion of epistemic advantage 
and is not the epistemic advantage linked to whether we have sufficient evidence that D 
is guilty o f wrongdoing? Ashworth and Redmayne suggest that accuracy and fairness 
are twin, concomitant aims. They even resist the idea that individual rights work as 
mere side-constraints in the pursuit o f truth. For them the criminal process “is not just 
a diagnostic procedure, o f which the sole purpose is to establish as accurately as 
possible ... what happened”; they insist that respect for rights be seen as an objective
35 See roughly similar provisions in article 8 o f the American Convention on Human Rights, article 6 o f  
the European Convention on Human Rights. See also complementary rights and provisions in the UN  
Convention on the Rights o f the Child and the Charter o f Fundamental Rights approved by the 
European Union in 2000.
36 Admittedly, some o f the particulars o f these rights would be jurisdictionally specific (e.g., the right to 
have legal advise when questioned in a police station). Yet, ultimately my argument rests on a more basic 
catalogue o f rights (e.g., the right to an adequate defence), whose different forms of institutionalization 
are immaterial for present purposes.
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to be attained while pursuing that end.37 However, this proposition fails to explain why a 
violation of the right to fair trial would undermine v 4 ’s authority to punish D, and it 
seems to take for granted that these two aims will not conflict.
There are two main positions in the literature regarding this specific issue. On the 
one hand, the separation thesis suggests that “each part of the criminal justice process 
should be considered independently”, that is, that if a wrong was committed during the 
investigation, the police officers who carried it out should themselves be punished, but 
this should have no bearing on the situation o f D.38 And on the other hand, the 
integrity thesis entails that a breach of, for instance, someone’s right not to be tortured 
during the criminal process would undermine VVs authority to punish D.39 Ashworth 
and Redmayne take sides with the integrity thesis and so do I.40 However, the difficulty 
lies in providing a convincing account for this position. A possible reason to endorse 
the integrity thesis is that fairness is a condition for accuracy. Accordingly, it has been 
argued that things such as coerced confessions are generally unreliable.41 Indeed, I 
suggest that this is the reason why most breaches o f the rules o f fair process undermine 
vVs authority. However, why should we not admit such a confession when it led to a 
very specific piece of incriminatory evidence that could not have been made up and 
which confirms D ’s culpability? Lack of reliability, thus, cannot take us far enough.
Ashworth and Redmayne advocate a stringent version of the integrity thesis which 
they call protective or remedial. Ultimately, they argue that the only way to give 
significant force to a person’s right not to be tortured is to exclude the evidence 
obtained in violation of this right, and that it is much more important to uphold this
37 Ashworth and Redmayne, The Criminal Process, 24 and 45 respectively, emphasis added.
38 As described by D uff et al., The Trial on Trial. Vol. 3, 226.
39 See, generally, ibid, Chapter 8 and A. Ashworth ‘Exploring the Integrity Principle in Evidence and 
Procedure’ in Peter Mir field and Roger N ov Smith, Essays for Colin Tapper (London: LexisNexis UK,
2003).
40 A note o f caution is in order here. This does not mean that under certain circumstances the state 
officials should not also be punished. It only means that their wrong is not entirely unrelated to S’s 
authority to punish D.
41 Interestingly, some ‘coerced’ interrogation techniques used at Guantanamo Bay were allegedly used by 
the Chinese during the Korean War to obtain confessions from American prisoners, most o f them false. 
See, S. Shane, ‘China Inspired Interrogations at Guantanamo’, New York Times, July 2 2008.
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right than to convict a guilty defendant in the immediate case.42 However, their position 
rests on slippery grounds. First, its premise is far from uncontroversial, since there are 
other ways o f upholding D ’s right which do not involve excluding illegally obtained but 
otherwise accurate pieces of evidence. Most notably, and as the separation thesis 
advocate would argue, S could punish those who violated that right and compensate D 
for the harm she suffered. Ashworth and Redmayne could still suggest that “the ideal 
remedy for breach of a right is normally (at least) restoration of the victim to the 
position he would have been in had the right not been violated”.43 However, this would 
still fail to explain the exclusion of evidence when it is the right of a third party that has 
been violated, or when D ’s rights were violated by a third party or state.44 Secondly, 
their position would face a significant challenge particularly in cases of trials for 
international crimes and when excluding this evidence would lead to D ’s acquittal. 
Unless one is dealing with extreme situations such as torture it might well not be 
apparent why symbolically upholding someone’s right to a fair trial would be more 
important than punishing D in instances such as the indictment of key political or 
military figures responsible for mass atrocities in ongoing conflicts 45
By contrast, I want to suggest that the reason why fairness matters is ultimately 
connected to the NJT in a more fundamental way. The NJT rests on the reasons that 
objectively apply to us, and those are for our purposes the reasons that justify 
punishing D. This thesis argues that S’s power to punish D is explained by the interest 
o f individuals in S in there being a system of criminal rules in force. For these rules to 
be in force, D has to be punished by an authority expressly a u th o re d  by that legal 
system, and because she violated these rules. That is, if the infliction o f punishment is to 
convey the message that the violated criminal rule is in force, it is vital that individuals
42 Ashworth and Redmayne, The Criminal Process, 330-331.
43 As put by D uff et al., The Trial on Trial. Vol. 3, 230, 235. My emphasis.
44 This is why D uff et al seek to complement this account, which they call integrity as integration, with 
the principle o f integrity as moral standing. In section 4 below I will discuss in some detail whether the 
notion o f moral standing should play a part in a defensible conception o f authority as applied to criminal 
courts.
45 This might well apply also in cases o f serial killers such as Harold Shipman, serial rapists, etc. See 
Adrian A. Zuckerman, 'Illegally-Obtained Evidence - Discretion as a Guardian o f Legitimacy', Current 
Legal Problems 40 (1987), 57.
in S see it as credibly meted out for that reason. Yet, if D is punished after her right to a 
fair trial is violated, this would raise doubts as to whether the reason that she is being 
punished is that she violated one of these rules. And this would be true, most likely, 
even if there was strong evidence that indicated that D is guilty. Fairness, I submit, is a 
necessary condition for credibility.
By credibility I do not mean here simple reliability as to whether D, as a matter of 
fact, committed the offence. Rather, my submission is that it is crucial that the court is 
credibly seen as convicting or acquitting D for the right reasons. Put differendy, the 
trial is a means of communication with the public at large (including D and V).46 Public 
confidence in S’s courts is therefore a necessary condition for the existence of a system 
of binding criminal laws. This confidence is not exclusively a product o f the factual 
accuracy or reliability of the verdict.47 Trials that are legitimately perceived as biased are 
problematic even if they convict the guilty or acquit the innocent. This explains why 
publicity and impartiality are widely endorsed conditions for any court’s authority even 
when they are not necessarily instrumental in reaching more accurate decisions. A 
secret trial is suspicious and therefore its verdict is unacceptable for the public even if it 
happens to be accurate. Similarly, the House of Lords’ decision in Pinochet I  was 
quashed not because of it being incorrect, not even because it was biased. As Lord 
Browne Wilkinson put it, “Senator Pinochet does not allege that Lord Hoffmann was 
in fact biased. The contention is that there was a real danger or reasonable 
apprehension or suspicion that Lord Hoffmann might have been biased, that is to say, 
it is alleged that there is an appearance of bias not actual bias.” This was considered 
sufficient to undermine the authoritativeness of the decision.
To sum up, I argue that S satisfies the NJT as an authority to punish D if and only 
if it both seeks to reach an accurate and reliable verdict and it does so fairly. It is
461.H. Dennis, 'Reconstructing the Law of Criminal Evidence', Current Legal Problems 42 (1989), 35.
47 D uff et al, The Trial on Trial. Vol. 3, 88. The Canadian Constitution provides: “Where ... a court 
concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms 
guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that ... the admission o f it 
in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute” (cited in Zuckerman, 
'Illegally-Obtained Evidence - Discretion as a Guardian o f Legitimacy', 60).
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therefore not true that according to a generally instrumental conception of the criminal 
process “the unreliability of the means by which [the decision] was arrived at, or the 
fortuitousness of its truth, gives us grounds to criticise those who arrived at it, but do 
not undermine its instrumental value”.48 Under the version of the service conception 
defended here it is also true that the justice of the outcome is not wholly independent 
of the justice of the procedures.
However, the service conception might be liable to the opposite charge. Namely, it 
may have to recognize the binding character o f a credible wrong conviction or a 
mistaken acquittal.49 The Dependence Thesis does not require that authoritative 
decisions correctly reflect the balance of reasons on which they depend. This proposition 
is a necessary implication of the conception of authority advocated here, and quite a 
salient one. Because the justification of legitimate authority relies on its capacity to sort 
out coordination problems, there is no point in having authorities unless their 
determinations are binding even if mistaken. This might seem hard to swallow. Yet the 
difficulty it causes should not be overstated.
First, clear mistakes would disqualify the authoritativeness o f S’s decision.50 This 
means that S2 would not be bound by S’s decision to punish D if it has clear and 
reliable information that D is innocent of the offence. Thus, under these circumstances 
S2 would be entitled not to extradite her to S. By the same token individuals in S itself 
and external observers would be able validly to object to that decision, and even, in 
some circumstances, to refuse to comply with it. Secondly, we can devise rules to help 
us minimize certain types of mistakes. For instance, states tend (and should) prefer to 
let a guilty person go free than punish an innocent one, and this explains why they 
require proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction, and not merely on the balance 
o f probabilities, given that in principle the latter standard would secure a greater degree 
o f accuracy. Finally, accepting the authoritativeness of a mistaken decision is far less 
controversial than one would initially think. When a court of law finds D guilty after a
48 D uff et al., The Trial on Trial. Vol. 3, 88.
49 Raz, 'Authority and Justification', 15.
50 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 62.
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fair process and on the basis of accurate and reliable information, we generally accept 
its decision as binding. And righdy so; we would rather have this occur than having 
everyone trying to make up their mind whether to comply with this decision.
It is worth pausing here for a second. There is a particular kind o f mistake that is 
accorded a different treatment. Raz suggests that the only mistakes that make an 
otherwise authoritative decision void are mistakes over jurisdiction. Yet, he does not 
give any reason why this should be so.51 I submit that the fact that mistakes over 
jurisdiction undermine s¥ s  authority to punish D has to do neither with it failing to 
meet the NJT nor the DT. Rather, the problem in such cases would be that A  has no 
reason to punish D which is sufficiently important to be protected by a right. As I 
explained in Chapter 3, the reason why a state PS lacks jurisdiction to punish D for a 
robbery she committed in TS (when it is not an offence against its sovereignty, national 
security, etc.) is that individuals in PS lack an interest which is important enough to 
merit the protection of a right. And this is, as explained above, a necessary element of 
the power to punish D. Accordingly, states which mistakenly assert jurisdiction over 
offences committed extraterritorially cannot validly effect a change in D ’s moral rights, 
let alone do so bindingly.
4. Authority as ‘moral standing*
There is a competing view that sees in S’s moral standing the main (though perhaps not 
the only) condition grounding legitimate authority to punish D. This position relies on 
a conceptual point, i.e., that a “complete account o f the legitimacy o f any authority 
must include an explanation of how the authority acquires the moral standing to hold 
others accountable, as well as an explanation of how it imposes genuine obligations.”52 
Crucially, A ’s moral standing to hold someone (D) accountable for a breach of its rules 
is explained by the relationship between A  and D. This is a plausible position to hold in 
several contexts. For instance, the objection goes, moral philosophers are not entided
51 ibid.
52 Scott Hershovitz, 'Accountability and Political Authority', 2008, 5 (manuscript cited with permission 
from the author).
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to discipline any child they happen to see committing a misdeed on the street, 
regardless of their satisfying the NJT; that power is generally grounded in the parent- 
child relationship. Competence does not warrant authority.53
In this light, the service conception would be unsatisfactory as an explanation of 
legitimate authority precisely because it is unable to provide a plausible account o f how 
S acquires the moral standing to hold D accountable. Indeed, Raz argues that “remedies 
for breaches of the law [such as damages for acts of defamation] ... can be morally 
justified even if applied to those who are not subject to the authority o f the government 
and its laws.” The “importance of the law in such matters is in creating a centre of 
power which makes it possible to enforce moral duties.”54 Thus, this objection claims, 
the service conception and the predominantly instrumental justification here advocated 
only explain why the state is competent to hold the tortfeasor to account, but it cannot 
explain why it has the standing to do so.
The damage this criticism does to the service conception is hardly as significant as 
its proponents suggest. Its initial appeal comes from the fact that it misrepresents the 
service conception and the normative work that the NJT does within it. The charge is 
that the NJT cannot explain why we are bound to obey a particular authority; in 
Hershovitz words, “[t]he normal justification thesis appears to tell us whether someone 
would make a good authority, not whether someone possesses it.”55 Hershovitz himself 
admits that satisfying the NJT is not enough to hold legitimate authority over someone 
under the service conception. However, he fails to grasp what explains S holding 
legitimate authority under it. He argues that what accounts for S possessing authority 
over D is that it has de facto authority.56 His more plausible charge against the service 
conception is then that the fact that S has de facto authority over D and that it satisfies 
the NJT does not entail that D is accountable to S. In effect, the fact that D is arrested 
in Chile and that the courts in Chile satisfy the NJT does not automatically entail that
53 ibid 13.
54 ibid.
55 ibid 18.
56 ibid 18-19.
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Chile has the normative power to punish her for theft. Chile would not have that 
power, for example, if D perpetrated this offence in Iran.
But this criticism is wholly misplaced. S satisfying the NJT and having de facto 
authority are simply necessary conditions for S to have authority over D on a given 
matter; they are not what explains the scope of its justified power. Rather, what 
explains this is the fact that individuals in S have an interest in a given individual in 
particular (D) being punished, sufficiendy important to warrant the protection o f a 
right. As Raz puts it, a central aspect of the service conception is that it separates 
between the issues of the authority of the state and the scope of its justified power.57 As 
I have argued in previous chapters, no particular relationship between S and D is 
needed in order for individuals in S to have an interest in D being punished. The moral 
standing theorist needs some sort of relationship between S and D because she fails to 
see that what explains S being justified in punishing D is also a necessary condition for 
S possessing the authority to do so. Namely, that individuals in S have an interest in D 
being punished which is sufficiendy important to warrant the protection of a right and 
reasons to empower an authority to do this job.
Antony Duff et al take the moral standing line o f argument further in a direction 
relevant for our enquiry. They provide a normative account of the criminal trial that 
“takes as its starting point the ordinary social practice whereby one person calls another 
to answer in the light of evidence of serious wrongdoing”.58 They illustrate their view 
by way of the following example:
I think you have been spreading gossip about me at work. I call you to answer. I 
outline the reasons that I think this, and if they are good reasons, it seems that
there is a legitimate demand that you answer This seems right even if you are
in fact innocent of spreading gossip about me.59
57 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 104.
58 D uff et al., The Trial on Trial. Vol. 3, 223.
59 ibid, 209.
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In order to call someone to answer and eventually hold her accountable for what she 
did, they argue, one needs to have the appropriate moral standing, i.e., the right to 
assess the moral nature of their conduct.60 What explains S’s moral standing in their 
view is the notion of citizenship. Citizenship, they suggest, involves a network of 
responsibilities, obligations and rights that structure relationships between citizens and 
between citizens and the polity.61 As a result o f these relationships, defendants have the 
responsibility to answer to the charge based on the fact that they are citizens of S.62 The 
criminal trial should then be “normatively understood as a process in and through 
which citizens are summoned to answer to their fellow citizens for their alleged public 
wrongs.”63
However, this is too quick. As Mike Redmayne has suggested, their example 
involves acquaintances, and the moral obligations between citizens may well be 
different. For instance, if someone on the street falsely accuses me of scratching her 
car, it is far from clear that as a matter of justice I am under a duty to answer to her, or 
that she has any right to call me to account.64 The crucial point is that no matter 
whether one takes D uff or Redmayne’s side, it certainly does not seem to make any 
difference whether the person calling me to answer is in fact a co-national, a tourist, or 
someone calling on the phone from the other side of the globe who has never set a 
foot on S.
The more interesting proposition is that we must appeal to the fact that D is a 
citizen of S to explain why it is S and not some other state, which might be similarly 
well-suited to the task (or even better suited), that has the standing to punish D.65 This 
statement shows precisely where my disagreement with this position lies. Indeed, 
making S’s authority over D dependent on whether she is a citizen o f S creates far more
60 ibid, 155-156.
61 ibid, 140.
62 ibid.
63 ibid, 165. Moreover, this is also consistent with D uffs own justification for legal punishment in that 
for punishment to reach D ’s moral conscience it is necessary that A  has the appropriate moral standing 
to censure her for her wrong. On a broader analysis o f this theory see Chapters 2 and 3 above.
64 ibid.
65 This claim is also made by Hershovitz, 'Accountability and Political Authority', 21.
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problems than it actually solves. First, this position sits very uncomfortably with the 
core intuition that foreign visitors are bound by S’s criminal laws while on its territory. 
Though Duff et al explicidy state that S’s right to call into account applies to them, they 
fail to give any reason as to why this would be the case.66 Moreover, and as explained in 
Chapter 2 above, their position would not be able to explain some standard cases of 
criminal jurisdiction. For instance, it would fail to explain why Scotland had the power 
to punish anyone (i.e., anyone who is not a Scottish national) for the Lockerbie 
incident, or why Uruguay would have the power to punish offences committed by 
foreigners in France against its sovereignty, security or important governmental 
functions. After all, there seems to be no significant relationship between D and these 
states. Finally, by requiring this kind of relationship between S and D, they would have 
trouble explaining why states have extraterritorial jurisdiction to try international 
offences committed abroad on grounds o f universality unless, o f course, the relevant 
relationship is rendered so thin that it would be hard to see what normative work it is 
actually doing.67
To sum up, then, my claim is not that S should lack a certain moral standing in 
order legitimately to claim the authority to punish. Rather, my position is that this 
moral standing does not rely on any special relationship between D and S, and in 
particular, not on the relationship of citizenship. This completes my general account of 
authority. In the following sections, I will test it against some common arguments often 
(though not exclusively) raised against the authority of extraterritorial courts. My task is 
to show that even when successful, these charges are not directed against the 
extraterritoriality of the court.
5. Show trials, ‘Clean Hands’, and the problem of Victor’s justice
Extraterritorial prosecutions have often been subject, legitimately or not, to the charge 
of being show trials. This charge was explicitly raised by Hess in the Nuremberg Trial,
66 D uff et al., The Trial on Trial. Vol. 3 ,135-136.
67 On this, see my criticism to D uffs position in chapters 2.6 and 4.2.3 above.
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by Milosevic before the ICTY, by Saddam Hussein before the Iraqi High Tribunal, and 
can be inferred in the statements by Justice Rudedge of the US Supreme Court on the 
trial o f General Yamashita, and Justice Pal at Tokyo.68 There is certainly no agreement 
in the literature on what makes any particular criminal proceeding a ‘show trial’.69 But 
some instances hardly need elaboration. Meir Code recounts that in the Prague 
proceedings, Regulation of 25 January 1950 stated “The court must inform the 
Prosecutor in advance of the judgement it is about to hand down and get his opinion 
whether the judgement is correct... the Prosecutor’s opinion is binding on the 
Court”.70 “ [D]ress rehearsals were conducted prior to these trials and these rehearsals 
were taped so that if a defendant deviated from the script, the microphone was 
switched off and the tape would begin playing the defendant’s pre-recorded 
responses”.71 There is littie doubt that this type of judicial proceedings is illegitimate 
and that this undermines S’s authority to punish D. The more interesting question is 
why exactly this is so. This section provides an answer to this question and will show 
that in order to decide whether it is the case that S’s has the authority to punish D it is 
irrelevant where the offence was committed.
Saddam Hussein faced trial before the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) for a number of 
offences related to killings perpetrated in the town of Dujail in 1982. He was sentenced 
to death and hanged on December 30, 2006. During the proceedings, he robustly 
questioned the authority o f the IHT: “I do not respond to this so-called court... what 
is built on illegitimacy is illegitimate”72; and he specifically raised the show trial charge: 
“this is all theatre by Bush”.73 If he was right in that the legitimacy o f the Court was 
tainted, as I think he was, where does the normative force o f his claim lie? The central 
problem with the IHT, and the Dujail Trial in particular, is not necessarily that the 
verdict was inaccurate, but rather that it failed to provide the defendants with a fair
68 Simpson, Law, War and Crime, 108.
69 For a recent attempt, see Jeremy Peterson, 'Unpacking Show Trials: Situating the Trial o f Saddan 
Hussein1, Harvard International Law Journal 48, no. 1 (2007).
70 Cited in Simpson, Law, War and Crime, 130.
71 ibid.
72 ibid, 105.
73 S. Tisdall, "A Chance for Justcice, but Will It Be Seized?," The Guardian, 19 October 2005.
trial. Among its main reported shortcomings are severe political interference, breaches 
in fair trial standards, and serious evidentiary and analytical gaps.74 In effect, it is 
reported that the Higher National DeBa-athification Commission repeatedly intervened 
in the Tribunal’s appointments and removals and functioned as a “sword over [its] 
work”.75 Moreover, the defence counsel had limited access to important evidence and 
the IHT denied defendants the full opportunity to contest evidence presented against 
them. There was a failure to gather and disclose exculpatory evidence which, in turn, 
impaired the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Moreover, due to 
the fact that the trial was held amidst intense conflict, it was impossible for the defence 
to conduct its own investigations, particularly in al-Dujail village.76 This is hardly meant 
as an exhaustive list, but it certainly suffices to show where lies the normative force of 
the ‘show trial’ charge.
A couple o f points are therefore in order. First, these examples both show the 
explanatory power o f the service conception of authority, and reinforce my initial claim 
that the NJT must include fairness in criminal trials. According to the NJT, the IHT’s 
authority must rely on it improving the conformity to reasons which independendy 
apply to the relevant individuals. The reason which justifies the IHT having the power 
to punish D is that individuals in Iraq (and possibly elsewhere) have an interest in a 
criminal rule against mass killings being in force. For this type of criminal rule to be in 
force, I have argued, D must be punished for having violated it. Now, the fact that 
Saddam was subjected to an unfair trial can hardly ground the perception that he was 
punished for violating these rules. Fairness as I suggested is crucial to credibility. But what 
is more important, this holds even if most people believed that Saddam was in any 
event guilty as charged. That is, the lack of fairness harms A’s authority to try D in 
much the same way as lack of reliable evidence.
74 Miranda Sissons; and Ari S. Bassin, Was the Dujail Trial Fair?1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 
(2007).
75 ibid, 277.
76 ibid.
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One may of course object that show trials are capable of delivering public order. 
After all, Stalin used them in 1937-8 with considerable success to bring support to his 
‘kulak operation’, which consisted in nothing other than mass killings (“smashing the 
enemies of the people”).77 However, this would be completely to misunderstand what 
is the interest that justifies having the power to punish D, and to turn it into a pure 
consequentialist argument based on conformity with any kind of rule. To be clear, the 
Stalinist type of public order is not based on the belief that certain criminal rules are in 
force and, what is more important, on these rules contributing to the sense of dignity 
and security of individuals living under them. Rather, this type of public order is 
generally grounded on a ‘Who’s next?’-type of concern.78 In Findlay’s words “exposing 
the harsher and more arbitrary operations o f the criminal sanction to wide public 
scrutiny may not appear as a re-establishing of justice, but rather as a reactivation of 
power.”79
The second thing to note is that the issue o f extraterritoriality did not have any 
significant bearing on the legitimacy of the IHT’s authority to punish Saddam. The 
character of the IHT as territorial, extraterritorial or hybrid institution is a complex 
philosophical, legal and political issue in its own right. On its Website, one reads that 
“[t]he IHT is purely a national tribunal and this is beyond discussion.” However, its 
creation was authorised by the Coalition Provisional Authority,80 its statute was 
reportedly drafted by the U.S., and its personnel and Judges were selected by the US- 
appointed Iraqi Governing Council.81 However, reports from people on the ground
77 Michael Ellman, 'The Soviet 1937-1938 Provincial Show Trials Revisited1, Europe-Asia Studies 55, no. 8 
(2003).
78 Mark Findlay, 'Show Trials in China: After Tiananmen Square', Journal of Law and Society 16, no. 3 
(1989), 356.
79 ibid, 354. See also, D. Brown and D. Neal, ‘Show Trials: The media and the Gang o f Twelve’, in Mark 
Findlay and Peter Duff, The Jury under Attack (London: Butterworths, 1988).
80 Order 48, “Delegation of Authority Regarding an Iraqi Special Tribunal”, issued on 10 December 
2003.
81 Moreover, the US contributed some $128 million to its funding, a sum which dwarfs the Tribunal’s 
own budget, and facilitated extensive security arrangements for the Tribunal and associated personnel. 
Most IHT functions, such as analytical, logistical and investigative support, relied heavily on the Regime 
Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO) which is based at the US embassy. Bassin, Was the Dujail Trial Fair?'.
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seem to emphasize how keen the Iraqis were in running the show their way. Charles 
Garraway recently commented that the defiance of due process standards that 
characterized the Dujail trial contravened the explicit advice (pressure) o f the occupying 
powers and was probably a symbolic form of claiming sovereignty over the 
proceedings.82 In any event, my contention is precisely that the illegitimacy of Saddam’s 
trial had nothing to do with it being connected with an extraterritorial authority, but 
rather stemmed direcdy from the lack of fairness o f the procedure and impartiality of 
the court. It may well be that the only way for a court to satisfy the requirements set 
out by the service conception of authority was, perhaps, if he was tried extraterritorially 
by, e.g., Sweden, or the ICC, or a special International Tribunal as some advocated at 
the time.83
It may be objected that the fact that the new Iraqi government relied so heavily on 
U.S. military support would have undermined the legitimacy of the trial anyway. But 
this is not to argue on the basis of the show trials charge. If anything, this claim gets its 
moral traction from the charge of Victor’s justice. This charge is at least as popular as 
the ‘show trials’ one. Underlying it, however, is a simple question that proves difficult 
to answer: how does the fact that S won the war disqualify it from punishing D? Rather, 
it seems to be the fact that S participated in the conflict that might undermine its 
authority to punish enemy combatants. The charge of Victor’s justice seems only to 
acknowledge, uninterestingly, that the losing side hardly ever gets to try its enemies.84
The only way of making sense of this broader claim is, I think, that sTs authority 
would be undermined by the fact that it would be deciding its own case. It might be 
argued in this type of case that state S’s courts lack impartiality and, as a result, 
legitimate authority to try D. This, however, would be too stringent a requirement to
See, more generally, Michael P. Scharf, Saddam on Trial: Understanding and Debating the Iraqi High Tribunal 
(Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2006).
82 Kevin Heller and Chades Garraway (Public Lecture, “A Poisoned Chalice: The Substantive and 
Procedural Defects o f the Iraqi High Tribunal”, 13 November 2007, LSE).
83 See International Center for Transitional Justice, "Creation and First Trial o f the Supreme Iraqi 
Criminal Tribunal," (October 2005).
84 Hersch Lauterpacht, 'The Law o f Nations and the Punishment o f War Crimes', British Year Book of 
International Law 21 (1944), 68.
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sustain. First, it would lead, a contrario, to the implausible proposition that the states 
involved in an armed conflict would also lack authority to try their own combatants for 
war crimes because of the risk o f prosecutions ending up in “partial” acquittals. 
Moreover, this line of argument would also make very little sense in a domestic setting. 
This would mean, for instance, that the Spanish courts would lack the authority to try 
foreigners for the Atocha bombings. This is hardly a limitation most people would 
accept. Ultimately, I suspect that this charge once again stands on a mistaken analogy 
between states and individuals. Most rules guarding the impartiality of courts normally 
make reference to the impartiality of specific judges, or jurors, but not to that of the 
court or political system itself. Moreover, rules on this issue are normally more 
stringent than this argument presupposes. It is the fact that judge A is the sister o f 
victim V, not merely a co-national, that would undermine her authority to try D. In 
short, then, provided that S complies with the conditions o f the NJT and the DT set 
out above, the fact that state S participated in a given conflict is not a clear reason as to 
why it would lack legitimate authority to try its own soldiers, as well as enemy ones.
This leaves us with the charge of tu quoque or, as I prefer to call it, the issue of 
‘clean hands’. This kind of argument was raised, for instance, by Jacques Verges, who is 
best known perhaps for defending Klaus Barbie in 1988, when addressing the ICJ in 
the case brought by DRC against France for certain (extraterritorial) criminal 
proceedings. On this occasion he argued that France had no standing to try the DRC’s 
Minister of the Interior based on the nature of French colonial rule, the failure of the 
French authorities to indict President Chirac for alleged corruption, and the racial 
motivations underlying the French judicial system.85
A first version of the ‘clean hands’ objection suggests that, for example, Spain did 
not have the standing to try Pinochet, because it had been unable or unwilling to 
prosecute Spaniards for crimes against humanity committed in Spain during the Franco 
era. This allegedly shows some sort of moral hypocrisy or at least double standards.
85 Simpson, Lan>, War and Crime, 106. See also, Certain Criminal Proceedings in Prance (Republic of the Congo v  
France).
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This charge seems to imply —incorrectly in my view— that trials for crimes against 
humanity must start at home. Under the service conception of authority there seems to 
be no significant problem with allowing Spain to try Pinochet, as long as he is tried by 
competent judges, the investigation was thorough, and his procedural rights were 
respected. Accordingly, this version of the clean hands objection does not seem to 
conflict with my argument for authority. In fact, the charge of moral hypocrisy seems 
wholly misplaced. I have argued that international offences are those criminal rules that 
cannot contribute in any meaningful way to the sense o f dignity and security of 
individuals in TS unless at least some extraterritorial authority holds the power to 
punish D for them. This is because, whenever this type of offence is committed on TS 
it is the case that TS is either responsible for perpetrating, instigating or allowing them, 
or simply unable to do anything about them.86 Accordingly, extraterritorial prosecutions 
are based precisely on the grounds that TS would not normally prosecute D itself. Even 
in cases of regime change it is unlikely that the new regime will have the political power, 
or even the will to bring to account those members of the previous one who are 
allegedly responsible for international offences. Chile and Spain are both standard 
examples of this.
A second version o f the ‘clean hands’ challenge would go: What if the actual 
regime is itself responsible for some international offence? Would this not undermine its 
authority to try D? Surely a criminal state cannot legitimately claim this kind of 
authority. Had the Nazis won the war, is the argument advocated here committed to 
recognizing them as a legitimate authority to try the Allies for war crimes? One may say, 
of course, that it is unlikely that such a regime would satisfy the NJT. Iraqi law under 
Saddam, for instance, allowed for “the admissibility of coerced confessions, the 
exclusion of Defence Counsel during some investigations, and some proceedings to be 
closed to the general pubic.”87 In other cases blatant interference from the executive 
branch, or admissibility of evidence obtained through torture, would disqualify S’s
86 See Chapter 3 above.
87 Jose E. Alvarez, 'Trying Hussein: Between Hubris and Hegemony \  Journal of International CriminalJustice 
2 (2004), 324.
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claim for authority. Yet, I suggest that even if S wanted to try these offenders fairly, it 
would still lack the legitimate authority to do so. This is not because the court itself 
failed to comply with the NJT, or the DT. Rather, the reason is that S punishing D 
would not bring about the benefits of having a system of criminal laws in force. 
Individuals living under such regime would not consider their rights protected by such 
laws; they would not consider S bound by these laws.
The last and perhaps most difficult case is that o f a state S which, though perhaps 
being relatively decent, has entered the war unjusdy or failed to fight it in accordance 
with the laws of war.88 This was arguably the position of the US and the UK after 
WWII where their authority to carry out war crimes trials was challenged on the 
grounds of their own behaviour in the Dresden and Hiroshima bombings. This charge 
points to the uneasy relationship between the categories of jus ad bellum,jus in bello and 
jus post bellum. Whether they are logically and normatively interconnected is in itself a 
highly complex and controversial question that cannot be addressed here. I suggest, 
though, that the conception of authority advocated here can still provide a convincing 
answer in this type of case.
According to the service conception, in so far as the court satisfies the NJT and the 
DT and is justified in punishing D, there is no good reason to disqualify its authority to 
try D. Few would argue that the U.S. lacks the authority to try offenders domestically 
because of what it might have done in Abu Graib, Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere. 
Whether it holds the authority to punish a murderer in Minnesota ultimately depends 
on whether the competent court fulfils the requirements set out by the service 
conception.89 Yet, there might be no inconsistency in claiming that, for example, Israel 
has the moral standing to punish D domestically but lacks the standing to punish a 
member of Hezbollah. And the reason for this would be that although Israel has
88 For the standard notion of decency in this respect see Rawls, The Taw of Peoples.
89 D uff et al touch upon a related issue when they discuss whether S can claim authority to try D  under 
unjust socio-economic conditions. Ultimately, they suggest that the criminal trial is not the appropriate 
forum for this kind o f claims, but rather that they should be discussed in a political forum (Duff et al., 
The Trial on Trial. Vol. 3, 156). In other words, they righdy suggest that we can never expect perfect
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committed no crimes against its own people, it allegedly has perpetrated some against 
the Lebanese.
However, this case is harder to make than one would initially think. The first thing 
that should be noted is that the charge of ‘clean hands’ consists in the claim that Israel 
lacks the authority to punish Hezbollah fighter D, not because of any crime against her; 
but rather for crimes it perpetrated in Lebanon and against some of her fellow 
nationals. Accordingly, we need to explain what are the precise grounds of this charge. 
Indeed, this objection cannot be simply grounded on nationality considerations. The fact 
that some people who might have been unlawfully killed by S military personnel were 
of S2 nationality would probably not disqualify S from trying a group of S2 terrorists 
for hijacking a vessel flying S’s flag on the Mediterranean. Similarly, this objection does 
not seem to rely on territorial considerations either, that is, on the fact that Israel might 
have committed its crimes on Lebanese soil. If  that were the case it would follow from 
this that Israel would lack the authority to prosecute and punish a Turkish national who 
is counterfeiting Israeli currency and Passports in Beirut.
Rather, I submit that the only situation in which S would lack the authority to try 
D is when, because of its criminal wrongs, it will not be deemed to convict D for having 
committed a crime by the relevant stakeholders. In such situation, the interest that justifies 
S punishing D, that is, the interest in a criminal rule against some wrongdoing being in 
force would not be served. An example might clarify this point. It might be the case 
that the U.S. lacks the authority to try Iraqi insurgents for war crimes committed 
against the Iraqi established authorities even if these acts constituted crimes under 
international law. This is because, the U.S. would arguably be seen neither by the Iraqi 
people nor it seems by anyone with a concrete interest in this type of acts being 
punished as enforcing the relevant rule of international criminal law. Yet, we must be 
careful not to overstate the scope of this argument. It entails neither that the U.S. 
would lack the authority to try an Iraqi counterfeiting U.S. currency in Morocco, nor 
that they would lack the authority to try war crimes committed by its own soldiers or 
against them in Iraq.
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To sum up, then, my position is that the fact that S’s military forces have 
committed war crimes in a conflict against S2, does not per se undermine S’s authority to 
try and punish S2 war criminals. This, in so far as S is a minimally decent state and it is 
seen by the relevant stakeholders as punishing D for the right reasons. Admittedly, it 
would not be easy to set out a list of criteria for when a state stops being minimally 
decent and becomes criminal in the sense that the Nazi state was arguably criminal. 
Similarly, it would be hard to establish a clear test that would tell us when a particular 
state would not be deemed to convict D for the right reasons. However, as already 
stated, the aim of the theory here defended is not to decide where to draw the line, but 
rather to account for standard cases and provide a clear and consistent explanation for 
them.
6. Trials in absentia and of Defendants Abducted Abroad
This last section deals with two further issues that can arise in the context of 
extraterritorial prosecutions: trials in absentia and trials of defendants who were 
abducted or illegally transferred to the forum state. These issues do not pertain 
exclusively to the domain of extraterritorial prosecutions. Yet they constitute a sensitive 
issue that no theory of extraterritorial punishment can ignore. I shall examine whether S 
can claim legitimate authority to punish D in these cases. Ultimately, I will argue that 
while trials in absentia undermine S’s authority, the fact that D is present before a court 
as a result o f having been abducted or illegally transferred does not.
Let us concentrate first on the issue o f trials in absentia. I am concerned here with 
the question of whether S can try (and sentence) D if she was not present at her trial. I 
will not examine borderline situations, such as when she flees or absconds during trial, 
or just before sentencing or if someone is summonsed in an airport in S while in transit 
to S2. My interest is in the core issue of principle, namely, with whether, for example, 
France had the authority to try and convict Alfredo Astiz in absentia, that is, someone 
who was never appropriately summonsed by the French authorities, nor present during
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his trial (and, for that matter, if Argentina had the right to refuse to extradite him on 
these grounds).90
Although article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights explicidy establishes that all defendants have the right “to be tried in [their] 
presence”, the general understanding is that there is no clear prohibition of trials in 
absentia under current international law.91 In effect, even the Human Rights Committee, 
which is in charge of ensuring the ICCPR’s implementation, noted that this provision 
“cannot be construed as invariably rendering proceedings in absentia inadmissible 
irrespective of the reasons for the accused person’s absence.”92 Trials in absentia are not 
uncommon in many civil law countries.93 Although common law countries have tended 
to be more reluctant, the US, for instance, has increasingly admitted this practice 
domestically.94 Indeed, according to a recent survey, o f 139 national constitutions 
examined, only 25 prohibited trials in absentia, and most of them provided for certain 
exceptions to that general prohibition.95 These exceptions include, standardly, 
unequivocal waiver on the part of the defendant, her causing disruption during trial, 
and her absconding once the hearings have started. Under these lines, there would 
seem to be hardly any point in examining this charge.
However, the status of trials in absentia is far from being as straightforward as these 
facts seem to indicate. There are at least three elements in the law that undermine S’s
90 See, the ‘Universal Jurisdiction in Europe” the Redress Trust, at http://www.redress.org/ 
documents/ inpracthtml (last accessed July 8 2008).
91 This right is also recognized, albeit implicidy, in article 6(1) o f the European Convention o f Human 
Rights, and it is implied by the confrontation clause contained the sixth amendment to the US 
Constitution. On the compatibility of trials in absentia with international law see, e.g., Stefan Trechsel and 
Sarah J. Summers, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 254; Cassese, International Criminal Ham, 402, Mark Thieroff and Edward A. Amley Jr., 'Proceeding 
to Justice and Accountability in the Balkans: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rule 61', Yale Journal of International Ham 23, no. 231-274 (1998), 261; and Paola Gaeta, 
'To Be (Present) or Not to Be (Present). Trials in Absentia before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon', 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 (2007), 1174.
92 DanielMonguja Mbenge v  Zaire, para. 76.
93 See, e.g., the French Criminal Procedure Code, art. 639.
94 James G. Starkey, Trials in Absentia', St. John's Ham Reriem 53 (1979).
95 M. Cherif Bassiouni, 'Human Rights in the Context o f Criminal Justice: Identifying International 
Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions', Duke Journal of Comparative 
<& International Ham 3 (1993), 279-280.
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jurisdiction in absentia. First, under the framework of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, trials in absentia are acceptable only in so far as the person convicted can 
obtain a retrial simply by asking for it.96 In addition to this, trials in absentia are far less 
popular in cases of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. The ICC, ICTY and ICTR bar 
trials in absentia almost absolutely. That is, defendants cannot be tried in absentia even if 
they fled or absconded themselves after the beginning of the trial, and even if they have 
unequivocally waived their right to be present.97 Although some hybrid tribunals have 
admitted trials in absentia, they too provide for the possibility of retrial when the 
decision is challenged by the defendant.98 Finally, the established law on extradition 
shows that while many states are comfortable enforcing their own convictions in 
absentia, they are far less happy extraditing offenders who have been convicted in 
absentia abroad. Some jurisdictions require that the requesting state provides evidence 
sufficient to support at least an indictment, but many may require a retrial altogether or 
reserve the right to refuse to extradite her.99 Even France which, itself, is hardly against 
trials in absentia has followed this trend.100
I suggest that the theoretical framework advocated in this thesis can help make 
sense of these different claims. There is little dispute that D has a right to be “tried in 
his presence”, using the language of article 14 of the ICCPR. A lot hinges, however, 
upon the actual structure of this right. Arguably, one way of construing this right is in 
terms of a claim-right.101 In that sense, the fact that D has a claim-right to be tried in
96 See, e.g., B v  France and Colot^a v  Italy.
97 See ICC Statute Art. 63; ICTY Statute art. 21 (4)(d) and ICTR Statute art. 20(4)(d).
98 See Article 22(1) o f the Special Tribunal for Lebanon Statute, rule 60 o f Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, and article 114 o f the SOC Law (Kram on Criminal procedure (8 /F eb /1993), applicable to the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts o f Cambodia).
99 Commentary, 'Foreign Trials in Absentia: Due Process Objections to Unconditional Extradition', 
Stanford Law Review 13 (1961), 377. The same rule applies in the UK, see Ivor Stanbrook and Clive 
Stanbrook, Extradition : Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 150-152. See also 
Extradition Act 1989, s 6(2).
100 Stanbrook and Stanbrook, Extradition : Law and Practice, 150. Interestingly, in the Bo^ano case France 
was ultimately condemned by the ECHR for deporting the defendant to Switzerland, where he was to 
be extradited to Italy, after France refused to extradite him itself on the grounds that he had been 
convicted in absentia.
101 There is hardly any question that this right entails a liberty. In usual circumstances, it would make 
little sense to say that D  is under a duty not to be present at her trial.
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his presence only means that S is under a duty not to exclude D from the proceedings 
by, for instance, denying her physical access to the courtroom. This possibly also entails 
a duty to notify D about the hearings, etc. There is, of course, little doubt that this right 
amounts at least to this. But this is not what the charge of trials in absentia is usually 
about.102
A more ambitious way of describing this right is as containing also an immunity. 
This immunity would entail that S simply lacks the power to punish D in absentia. 
However, I suspect that this interpretation of the right to be tried in one’s presence has 
little promise because one would have to demonstrate that the interest of D in being 
present in court is sufficiently important to put S under a disability to try her. In other 
words, this interest would have to outweigh the collective interest that individuals in S 
have in S’s system of criminal rules being in force. In the light of both the modest 
contribution that these rules being in force arguably make to these individuals’ sense of 
dignity and security, and the serious consequences that follow from a criminal 
conviction, one may be tempted to conclude that this individual interest does suffice to 
confer upon D such an immunity. However, that would be too quick. First, we must 
note that the charge is simply that D is absent, not that the court is biased or convicting 
her on what is clearly insufficient evidence. Moreover, we must take into consideration 
the real implications of D ’s absence. Most courts carrying out trials in absentia will 
provide D with appropriate defence counsel ex officio. What is more, in most criminal 
proceedings it is the fact that her counsel is present, not the fact that D is, that serves 
D ’s interest the most.103 Provided this is the case, then, it seems that D ’s interest in not 
being tried in absentia is hardly as weighty as we might have initially thought and that,
102 See criticisms by the Inter-American Commission in its Report on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Panama on this particular basis (O EA/Ser.L/C/11.44, doc 38, rev 1, 1978, accessible at 
< http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Panama78eng/ chap.4.htm>, last accessed July 1st, 2008).
103 Legal counsel is generally more effective in presenting evidence and scrutinising the case o f the 
prosecution, will not be perceived as trying to subvert the process in her favour, and will be less 
emotionally engaged. Duff et al, The Trial on Trial. Vol. 3, 212.
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ultimately, there are other ways of protecting that interest which do not amount to 
conferring upon D this immunity.104
In any event, the fact that the right to be tried in one’s presence cannot be 
conceptualized as an immunity does not exhaust the challenge that trials in absentia 
represent for the authority of a criminal court. In effect, this charge may still undermine 
the specific considerations on which S’s authority is based. The fact that under several 
legal systems trials in absentia warrant a right to request a retrial seems to confirm that 
they are seen as affecting specifically the bindingness of S’s decision rather than its 
content.105 Indeed, trials in absentia would affect S’s complying with the NJT because 
they may undermine the accuracy of the verdict.106 This would be the case, for instance, 
when D is innocent or there was some mitigating circumstance, as she would know 
best how to defend the case. Yet, this argument does not take us far enough. In other 
cases the inculpatory evidence may be so overwhelming that D ’s presence would not 
make much difference in terms of the accuracy of the outcome. Moreover, the 
instances of trials in absentia that are the subject matter of my present analysis are such 
that D, probably knowing about the existence of the proceedings, has deliberately 
decided to stay at large (usually abroad). Accordingly, she cannot complain about the 
inaccuracy of the result much in the same way as if she decided not to give testimony or 
point to crucial exculpatory evidence at trial.
I submit that, ultimately, trials in absentia undermine S’s authority because they taint 
the credibility of the Court, rather than the accuracy of its verdict. I argued above that 
S’s authority rests not only on the NJT (and the DT for that matter), but also on the 
reasons that justify S’s meting out legal punishment upon D, namely, that it contributes 
to the system of criminal rules being in force. For this to obtain, D has to be punished 
because she violated these rules. Yet when the credibility o f the proceedings is compromised,
104 Interestingly, this right was clearly understood as an immunity (“it deprived the court o f jurisdiction”) 
in the time when defendants were required to defend themselves without the assistance o f counsel. 
Starkey, 'Trials in Absentia', 723.
105 See, e.g., the decision by the ECtHR in Colo^ya v  Italy, Gallina v  Fraser in the US, art. 639 o f France 
Code of Criminal Procedure, and article 22(3) o f the Statute o f the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
106 See Cassese, International Criminal Faw, 403.
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as is arguably the case when D is convicted in absentia, the fact that D is sentenced and 
eventually punished does not convey to individuals in S the message that the reason she 
is being punished is that she violated a criminal rule. This holds, I suggested, even if 
they have good reason to believe she was guilty anyway. Put differently, the sense of 
spuriousness that trials in absentia bring about stems from the fact that it is ultimately 
crucial that D has herself or through counsel of her own choosing the opportunity to 
challenge the accusation if the trial is to be perceived as fair. This is illustrated by the 
fact that states themselves normally take great pains to ensure that defendants are 
present throughout the trial even against their will, going as far as keeping defendants in 
detention or making them liable to arrest in order to be brought to trial if necessary.107 
E x officio defence counsel cannot ultimately convey to individuals in S (and elsewhere) 
the belief that D ’s interests are being appropriately protected. Moreover, this sense of 
spuriousness is enhanced by the fact that a priori it is not even likely that S will be able 
to enforce that conviction. It is therefore only natural that sates are very reluctant to 
extradite offenders convicted in absentia.108 Giving D the possibility of a retrial seems 
the right solution. Yet, this simply means rejecting the bindingness (authority) of S’s 
original decision.
Some may object that, all in all, given the policy goals advanced by extraterritorial 
prosecutions (particularly those carried out for international crimes) and the difficulties 
they normally will have to confront, trials in absentia are preferable to impunity.109 This 
objection, however, misses the particular claim on which my argument against them
107 This account is also compatible with the fact that in less serious cases, some jurisdictions do not 
require the presence of the defendant (see, e.g., Magistrates’Courts Act 1980, ss. 11-12). Indeed, when 
the consequences o f the trial are potentially minor, as in a fine for a traffic violation, the sense o f  
spuriousness dissipates.
108 Commentary, 'Foreign Trials in Absentia: Due Process Objections to Unconditional Extradition', 
377. The author exemplifies this by quoting that “[i]n two [out of] seven reported cases concerning 
extradition o f persons convicted in absentia the American courts have discharged the prisoner on the 
ground that the evidence was insufficient to support even an indictment” (note 31). Similarly, Lord 
Widgery CJ, in Re Salvatore di Monaco, argued that sentences in contumacy “were o f such unsafe duration 
and security that they were not thought suitable to support extradition” (in ibid).
109 Stefania Negri in Michael Bohlander, International Criminal Justice: A  Critical Analysis of Institutions and 
Procedures (London: Cameron May, 2007), 29; Daniel J. Brown, 'The International Criminal Court and 
Trial in Absentia', Brooklyn Journal of International Paw 24 (1998-9), 782.
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stands. Admittedly, it is important that perpetrators of serious crimes, including but not 
limited to international offences, are punished. It is also the case that extraterritorial 
prosecutions will normally face great obstacles, o f which the fact that the defendant will 
normally be at large abroad is but one. Nevertheless, my argument is that in so far as 
trials in absentia undermine the credibility of the court, they do not serve the interest 
thats justifies punishing offenders in the first place. That is, either because D remains at 
large or because the reason why she is being punished is perceived as spurious, they 
would not contribute to our sense that the criminal rule that has been violated is in 
force, and that we have certain rights which the state endorses and protects.
Let us finally examine the cases in which D was abducted from the territory of S 
and transferred to the abducting state’s (AS) territory to face trial. I will look in 
particular at the case of abductions because it is arguably the most extreme case of 
illegal transfer, but the argument I provide should also work for defendants who have 
been transferred to the AS by stealth, fraud or other illegal means. This is a matter of 
concern in international prosecutions. The trials of Eichmann, Barbie, Milosevic and 
Nikolic were all preceded by abductions or transfers of questionable legality.110 
Moreover, this issue affects extraterritorial prosecutions for domestic offences with 
almost the same intensity, as the significant array of cases I refer to below illustrates. 
Again, although this charge is perhaps more common in cases of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, it can similarly affect AS’s jurisdiction to try D for embezzlement 
committed on its own territory, provided she is captured and transferred while living or 
travelling abroad. Before I examine this issue a final caveat is in order. The purpose of 
this section is to examine whether AS has jurisdiction to try D, not whether jurisdiction 
should be exercised.111 In other words, it might be that there are all sorts of prudential 
reasons why states should refrain from trying defendants who have been abducted
110 Simpson, Law, War and Crime, 116.
111 F.A. Mann, ‘Reflections on the Prosecution o f Persons Abducted in Breach o f International Law’ in 
Yoram Dinstein, Mala Tabory, and Shabtai Rosenne, International Law at a Time of Perplexity : Essays in 
Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (Dordrecht Nijhoff, 1989), 414.
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abroad.112 Yet, the question here is only whether a decision reached in these cases can 
claim to be authoritative, or the punishment inflicted justified. To claim that AS has the 
right to punish D in these situations implies, in any event, that it would be up to AS, 
and only up to AS, to weigh the countervailing prudential reasons.
It goes without saying that a state which authorizes or conducts the abduction of a 
person from the territory of another state is responsible for a violation o f public 
international law.113 However, it does not automatically follow from this that it lacks 
jurisdiction to try D as a result o f that violation. A further argument is needed for this. 
The traditional view is that an abducting state violates the victim state’s claim-right to 
territorial integrity.114 This violation purportedly entails AS being barred from trying 
her. Under this view, D would be entitled to bring this up in court herself, but she 
would only have a ‘derivative’ standing to raise this violation as a bar to the exercise of 
jurisdiction.115 This is because she suffered no greater deprivation than that which she 
would have endured through lawful extradition.116
This view, however, rests on slippery grounds. It entails that the victim state’s (VS) 
consent, even if given ex post, would make D ’s abduction morally unproblematic.117 
This is unconvincing. The fact that VS’s authorities may have consented to the 
abduction of D by AS’s officials does nothing to ease our central intuition that some 
moral wrong has been committed. Instead of exonerating AS, we tend to see VS as an
112 Among the often cited ones are the risk o f international friction and the fact that states may sacrifice 
the recovery o f many more criminals through regular means in order to obtain a few drug runners or 
terrorists, etc. See Mann, ‘Reflections on the Prosecution o f Persons Abducted in Breach of 
International Law’, 420; Geoff Gilbert, Aspects of Extradition Law (Dordrecht, Netherlands: M. Nijhoff, 
1991), 185 and Richard Downing, 'The Domestic and International Legal Implications o f the Abduction 
of Criminals from Foreign Soil1, Stanford Journal of International Law 26 (1990), 592.
113 See Mann, ‘Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of International Law’, 
405, and the references in fn 1.
114 AS may also be said to violate its treaty obligations vis-a-vis VS when there is an extradition treaty in 
force between them.
115 Rosemary Rayfuse, 'International Abduction and the United States Supreme Court: The Law o f the 
Jungle Reigns', International and Comparative Law Quarterly 42 (1993), 886 citing Verdugo.
116 Davis v  Mueller; cited in Mann, ‘Reflections on the Prosecution o f Persons Abducted in Breach o f  
International Law’, 418.
117 See article 16 o f the Harvard Draft Convention on Extradition, which states that “no state shall 
prosecute or punish [a defendant].... without first obtaining the consent o f the state or states whose 
rights have been violated” at 'Harvard Draft Convention on Extradition ', American Journal of International 
Law 29, no. Supp. (1935), 623.
accomplice to that wrong. Thus, the wrong to VS simply does not exhaust whatever it 
is that we find morally objectionable about extraterritorial abductions.
Furthermore, I submit that the traditional view fails even in its own terms. It is far 
from clear that even in cases where VS does not consent to the abduction, the necessary 
implication of the wrong is a bar to AS’s power to try her. When abducting D, AS 
violated VS’s claim-right to its territorial integrity. This claim-right, I have argued, is 
explained by the interest of individuals in VS in foreign officials not going around 
physically enforcing their own laws on VS’s territory. It is unclear that this particular 
interest extends to AS lacking the normative power to punish D. VS’s claim-right and 
AS’s power belong to different levels.118 Thus, there seems to be no clear reason why 
compensation should be ruled out as an appropriate remedy for the breach of this 
claim-right. Or, put differendy, there seems to be no reason why the only acceptable 
remedy for this breach would be the restitution of D to the territory o f VS before she is 
tried. Ultimately, as Rayfuse suggests “a claim by an offended State for a violation of its 
rights ... is a separate and distinct matter from the issue o f whether an individual might 
be entided to rely on that violation as a bar to the exercise of a domestic court’s 
jurisdiction.”119 To infer this bar from the former violation is to reason on the basis of 
a non sequitur.
A more promising line of argument for AS’s lack of authority to try D is to see D ’s 
abduction as an infringement of some o f her individual rights. Arguably, these 
abductions violate D ’s rights to personal liberty and freedom from arbitrary arrest and 
detention.120 The crucial question is, once more, whether these violations warrant 
conferring upon AS a disability to try and eventually punish D. This implication is far 
from straightforward. In the eloquent words o f F.A. Mann, “[w]ith rare unanimity and 
undeniable justification the courts of the world have held that the manner in which an 
accused has been brought before the court does not and, indeed, cannot deprive it of
118 See the section 3 o f the general Introduction to this thesis.
119 Rayfuse, 'International Abduction and the United States Supreme Court: The Law o f the Jungle 
Reigns', 890.
120 See, e.g., Article 9 o f the ICCPR, article 5 o f the ECHR and article 7 o f the American Convention o f  
Human Rights.
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its jurisdiction, o f its right to hear the case against the person standing before it.”121 
This is the central tenet o f the famous U.S. Supreme Court’s Ker-Frisbie doctrine and is 
illustrated by the old adage mala captus bene detentus.122 Admittedly, the UK and New 
Zealand have stayed criminal proceedings on the grounds that the defendants had been 
illegally abducted abroad.123 However, these decisions were not based on the 
proposition that they lacked the power to try them. Rather, they were framed on them 
having discretion (the power) not to hear the case.124
I want to argue that the fact that D was abducted from VS does not, per se, 
undermine AS’s authority to try her. This may seem deeply counterintuitive.125 But I 
think this intuition is simply misplaced. Arguably, AS’s behaviour constitutes a violation 
of the substantive rule against abducting individuals. However, this does not necessarily 
affect any of the considerations on which AS’s authority to punish her stands. The fact 
that D was abducted abroad affects neither the NJT nor the DT. She can clearly be 
convicted (or acquitted) on the basis of accurate and reliable evidence, her procedural 
rights during the investigation and trial upheld, and the Tribunal may ultimately decide 
on the basis of reasons which independendy apply to individuals in AS (whether D was 
innocent or guilty).126 In that spirit, the U.S. Supreme Court in A.lvaret<pMachain argued 
that the constitutional procedural safeguards o f a fair trial were sufficient to satisfy the
121 Mann, ‘Reflections on the Prosecution o f Persons Abducted in Breach o f International Law’, 414. 
For a list o f papers both supportive and critical o f this position see Jacques Semmelman, 'Due Process, 
International Law, and Jurisdiction over Criminal Defendants Abducted Extraterritorially: The Ker- 
Frisbie Doctrine Reexamined', Columbiajournal of Transnational Taw 30 (1992), fn 20 and 21 respectively.
122 Named after the series o f cases by which it was established: see Ker v  Illinois, Frisbie v Collins. For a 
more recent application o f this doctrine see United States v  Alvare^ Machain.
123 Connelly v DPP and R. v  Hartley, respectively.
124 In R v Horsefeny Road Magistrates Court, ex parte Bennett, the House o f Lords held that the judiciary had 
the power to “oversee executive action and to refuse to countenance behaviour that threatens either 
basic human rights or the rule o f law” (Per Lord Griffiths, 150). Yet, as it has been correctly argued, this 
already assumes that UK courts have the power to hear the case (Rayfuse, 'International Abduction and 
the United States Supreme Court: The Law o f the Jungle Reigns', 893-894).
125 Indeed, many authors disagree with this claim. See, Duff, Answering/or Crime, 182 and references in fn 
131.
126 This distinction seems to be incorporated in the law o f some countries. Interestingly, an individual 
who is abducted, or even illegally arrested, may be able to suppress statements or evidence provided 
during his illegal custody (see Robert M. Pitler, "'The Fruit o f the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and 
Shepardried', California Taw Review 56 (1968), 601 and f£). The reason for this, I would suggest, has 
nothing to do with the fact that she was abducted per se, but with their lack o f reliability.
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requirements of due process o f law.127 Moreover, I do not think that the credibility of 
AS’s courts in terms of the fact that D is being punished because she committed an offence is 
necessarily undermined by her abduction. No one seems to criticize the trial of 
abducted defendants on this ground. Accordingly, I submit that the adequate response 
to the violation of the substantive rule prohibiting kidnapping is to punish its 
perpetrators. If the state of Virtuosia were to prosecute and punish also its own state 
officials who ordered and carried out the unlawful abduction (regardless of their 
position in government) or allow their extradition to VS few people would still find it 
problematic that it claims the normative power to punish D.
To support my case further, let me explain why the three standard arguments on 
which AS’s disability is based fail. First, the question has been sometimes framed as a 
matter of extending the exclusionary rule beyond the suppression of evidence which 
has been illegally obtained to the suppression of defendants who have themselves been 
illegally seized and brought before the court.128 The first thing to note is that the 
feasibility of this extension depends on the rationale underlying the rule. This extension 
is normally based on the proposition that we exclude evidence obtained illegally to 
deter officials’ misconduct during an investigation.129 Accordingly, this rationale implies 
that we should also suppress D ’s presence to deter abductions. I am not, as is perhaps 
clear by now, a big supporter o f deterrence generally. Above I argued for an alternative 
approach to explain the exclusion of certain pieces of evidence in trial. I submit that 
this rationale fails also to explain this purported implication in its own terms. 
Prosecuting and punishing AS’s officials themselves would have a much greater
127 On trial, the charges against Alvarez-Machain were dismissed on the basis o f insufficient evidence, 
(see Rayfuse, 'International Abduction and the United States Supreme Court The Law o f the Jungle 
Reigns', 886-887).
128 Note, The Greening o f a Poisonous Tree: The Exclusionary Rule and Federal Jurisdiction over 
Foreign Suspects Abducted by Government Agents', N Y U  Law Review 50 (1975), 682. See also Duff, 
Answering for Crime, 185-186.
129 Deterrence seems to be particularly popular with some American writers: see Pitler, "'The Fruit o f  
the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized', 580; Julie Philippe and Laurent Tristan, 'International 
Law, Extraterritorial Abductions and the Exercise o f Criminal Jurisdiction in the United States', 
Willamette Journal of International Law and Dispute Resolution 11 (2004), 75. See also Judge Mansfield writing 
for the majority in Toscanino. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has explicitly rejected this rationale with 
respect to the suppression o f a defendant in United States v  Crews.
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deterrent effect on abductions than simply returning D to VS. Moreover, maximization 
o f the law's deterrent effect would indicate that AS should also seek to punish D, instead 
of sending her back. O f course someone will object that, as a matter of fact, the 
deterrent effect of AS prosecuting its own officials would be very weak because AS will 
normally be very reluctant to do so (let alone extradite them to VS). However, this is 
hardly a reason to advocate suppressing D over my preferred course of action. As most 
o f the cases in this area show, states are as reluctant to suppress abducted offenders as 
they are to prosecute their own officials.
A further reason on which AS’s lack o f jurisdiction is often based suggests that its 
government should not be allowed to ‘benefit’ from infringing the defendant’s rights. 
As the maxim says, ex injuria jus not oritur, i.e., AS should be barred from realizing the 
fruit of its unlawful act by bringing the accused to trial.130 This argument seems to be 
based again on a misuse o f the domestic analogy. It implies that it is the government or 
the state of AS itself who benefit from D being punished. This might be so in certain 
instances, but it is certainly not the reason why that state itself holds the power to 
punish D. This power should be explained by the fact that it benefits the individuals who 
happen to live or be in AS. Accordingly, in so far as it relies on the claim that it is AS or 
its government who benefits from punishing D, this argument is simply flawed. By 
contrast, if we take into consideration the interest of individuals in AS in its system of 
criminal laws being in force, this interest would lead, as I have argued, to AS holding 
the normative power to punish both D and the officials who ordered and executed her 
abduction.
Finally, some argue that by trying D AS’s courts become accomplices in the 
government’s criminal activities.131 This seems to be a form of the ‘clean hands’ 
argument I have addressed in the previous section. I argued there that states cannot be 
treated as individuals in the sense that because some of its agents are responsible for
130 Mann, ‘Reflections on the Prosecution o f Persons Abducted in Breach o f International Law’, 415. 
See, also, Pider, '"The Fruit o f the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized', 600.
131 Note, The Greening o f a Poisonous Tree: The Exclusionary Rule and Federal Jurisdiction over 
Foreign Suspects Abducted by Government Agents', 694. Also Philippe and Tristan, 'International Law, 
Extraterritorial Abductions and the Exercise o f Criminal Jurisdiction in the United States', 79.
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some given wrong, the whole state should be barred from punishing those who violate 
its criminal laws. Moreover, the fact that AS also prosecutes and punishes those 
responsible for the abduction entails morally distancing itself from the wrongdoing. 
Accordingly, one would hardly argue that it remains an accomplice of that wrong.
To conclude, I have argued that as a matter of principle it would be mistaken to 
derive from D ’s abduction a bar to AS’s power to try D. Rather, the appropriate 
normative implication of this wrong is that AS should also prosecute and punish those 
responsible for it. By doing this, AS both enforces the belief in the rule against 
abductions being in force, and morally distances itself from the wrong suffered by D. 
The appropriate remedy for the violation of D ’s daim-rights is therefore a civil suit for 
damages, not her return to VS. This is also consistent with the claim that, as argued 
above, VS’s consent to D ’s abduction or its collusion with AS’s authorities should have 
no bearing on AS’s power or lack of it. That many would still feel uneasy with my 
proposed solution has to do with the fact that few states would normally behave like 
Virtuosia.132 Yet we should not misconstrue the theoretical implication of this fact. It 
might well be that the best way of institutionalising the bundle of moral claim-rights, 
powers, and liabilities examined here is to bar AS from punishing D in this type of 
cases. However, my point is that that this solution would be based on expediency, not 
moral principle or conceptual rigour.
6. Conclusion
This chapter closes my general theory of extraterritorial punishment. I have defended 
three main propositions. First, I argued that the question regarding the conditions that 
any body should meet in order to hold, itself, the power to punish D is ultimately a 
question regarding whether it has the authority to punish D. Secondly, I have argued that 
Raz’s version of the service conception of authority provides us with an insightful and 
convincing account of why (and when) we should recognize a given body having the
132 The US, e.g., explicitly authorized the FBI to abduct foreign nationals subject to outstanding U.S. 
arrest warrants currently residing abroad, and to bring them back for trial. See Downing, The Domestic 
and International Legal Implications o f  the Abduction o f Criminals from Foreign Soil'.
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authority to punish D, and what it means to consider its decisions authoritative. I have 
argued that for X to have the authority to punish D it must carry out a thorough 
investigation of the facts and the relevant law (it must be able to claim an epistemic 
advantage), it must try D fairly, it must have some de facto authority, and it must serve 
the particular interest that justifies it holding this power. Finally, I have examined 
several charges usually raised against extraterritorial prosecutions such as the issues of 
show trials, ‘clean hands’, victor’s justice, trials in absentia and trials of individuals 
abducted or illegally transferred from abroad. I have assessed how convincing each of 
them is as an objection against X having the power to punish D, and reached different 
conclusions in each case. In doing so, I have argued both that, analytically, they are all 
arguments against X having the authority to punish D, not against it being justified in 
doing so; and that in every case whether X has the authority to punish D is unrelated to 
the issue o f extraterritoriality. This confirms the view suggested throughout the thesis, 
and advocated in this chapter, that although a complete explanation of the power to 
punish D needs to account for X having authority, the extraterritorial scope o f this power 
rests on the particular interest that explains conferring this power on X, and on who 
the holder of this interest is.
A final remark is in order here. The reader might find the conditions set out in this 
chapter quite demanding. Yet we should not underestimate the importance of this 
aspect of the account of authority for the overall argument I have developed. In 
Chapter 1 I argued that under the justification for legal punishment defended there, 
states hold the power to punish an innocent individual (by mistake). Even if it would be 
wrong, the exercise of this power would effect a normative change in IN ’s moral 
boundaries. I have similarly argued in this chapter that X’s decision would be binding 
upon third parties even if mistaken (unless the mistake is a clear one). As a result of 
this, I suggest that the fact that the conditions X must satisfy are quite stringent is 
crucial if my account is to be able to tame the unsettling effect that these claims may 
bring about.
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Conclusion
1. The argument
This thesis presents a philosophical account of the morality of extraterritorial 
punishment. I have provided a justification for certain specific instances of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction held both by individual states and by the International 
Criminal Court and challenged the moral defensibility of other well-established rules. 
Yet this thesis is not meant only as a narrow exploration o f the rules that should govern 
the distribution and scope of criminal jurisdiction under international law. I submit that 
the issue o f extraterritoriality also forces us to revise our understanding of the reasons 
we have for punishing offenders, and stirs the debate on the justification for legal 
punishment in a new and pressing direction. Overall, I submit that the theory of 
extraterritoriality advocated here is better equipped than the leading accounts of 
punishment available in the literature to make sense of our core intuitions and practices 
regarding the extraterritorial scope of the right to punish.
By way of concluding remarks, I will provide a summary of how the argument I 
have developed throughout this thesis fits together. I have endorsed here a rights-based 
approach. The question I address is therefore under what conditions would a given 
body B hold the moral right to punish O extraterritorially. Following Hohfeld, I 
distinguished four different types o f rights, namely, liberties, claims, powers and 
immunities. I suggested that the right to punish is essentially a normative power. It is 
the capacity to modify the first and second order incidents held by a particular 
individual O. This power is normally coupled with a liberty, and a claim-right against 
others interfering, etc., though these other incidents do not play a significant role in my 
overall argument. Furthermore, I have argued that rights are best explained as interests 
o f a particularly important kind. In order to assign B the power to punish O we must 
identify a specific interest that is sufficiendy important to warrant putting O under a
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liability to being punished.1 But this is not the end o f it. We need also to account for 
the specific body (B) having the authority to exercise that normative power.2 
Distinguishing these two separate arguments is crucial for the purposes of providing an 
analytically sound account of extraterritorial punishment. Throughout this thesis I have 
argued that the extraterritorial scope o f B’s power to punish O rests exclusively on the 
particular interest that explains B holding this power and, crucially, on whose interest it 
is. By contrast, I have argued that despite being a necessary condition for B to hold this 
particular power, the considerations on which B’s authority stands are conceptually and 
normatively separate from the scope of its power.
Indeed, in Chapter 5 I have applied one of the leading philosophical accounts of 
authority to explain, in particular, why and when we ought morally to recognize the 
authority o f a given court. I have argued, perhaps uncontroversially, that in order for B 
to have the authority to punish O, it must carry out a thorough investigation of the 
facts and the relevant law (it must be able to claim an epistemic advantage), it must try
0  fairly, it must have some de facto authority, and it must decide based on the reasons 
that justify it holding this power. I also suggested, perhaps more controversially, that in 
order for B to have the moral standing (authority) to try O, there need not be any 
particular relationship between them, such as citizenship or nationality. Finally, I have 
argued that some of the most common charges usually raised against extraterritorial 
authorities punishing O, such as victor’s justice, tu quoque, show trials, or trials in absentia 
or against defendants abducted abroad, are unrelated to the extraterritoriality of B’s 
power.
By contrast, I have explained the power to punish O by reference to the collective 
interest o f individuals in there being a system of rules prohibiting criminal wrongdoing 
in force. I argued that having such a system of criminal rules in force contributes to 
their sense of dignity and security. That is, it reinforces their view o f them being rights-
1 I have also endorsed a broad cosmopolitan position, Le., that in order to examine this particular 
question we must ultimately consider the interests o f individuals, we must look at the interests of all the 
relevant individuals concerned, and their interest should matter equally regardless o f their nationality, 
religion, etc.
2 See section 3.3. in the General Introduction to this thesis.
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holders, and of their rights being protected by a system of legal rules. The fact that 
these rules are in force is not a mere psychological fact. For a legal system to be in 
force, this psychological fact needs to rest on certain specific considerations. In short, 
those who violate them (or those who we have sufficient reasons to believe they have 
violated them) should be punished, they should be punished by an authority expressly 
au th o re d  by that legal system, and they should be punished for having violated these 
rules.
Moreover, I argued that S is at liberty to exercise this normative power against an 
offender O. This is because whe she commits a crime, O forfeited her claim-right 
against being punished. The forfeiture mechanism has been explained by reference to 
the fact that the claim-right against being punished, like almost every other moral right, 
is conditional upon the conduct of its holder. In particular, I argued that the claim-right 
against being censured in the way punishment requires is conditional upon O not 
committing a moral wrong.
This explanation for the right to punish O has some important advantages over 
other competing accounts in its own terms. First, it accounts for the fact that the right 
to punish O is a normative power, and not simply a liberty to inflict suffering upon O. 
Moreover, it can accommodate the fact that every single state (and every single 
international, or hybrid criminal tribunal) claims the power to punish an innocent 
individual (although, not qua innocent), while at the same time retain the core intuition 
that it would be wrong (i.e., that it would not be at liberty) to do so.
Most significantly, perhaps, I have argued that this argument is overall the best 
suited to account for our core intuitions regarding both the territorial and 
extraterritorial scope of this normative power. I have argued that individuals in state B 
share an interest in these rules being in force on the territory of B that is sufficiendy 
important to confer upon B the power to punish every violation of a criminal rule 
perpetrated on its territory. A murder in France undermines the sense of bindingness of 
the prohibition of murder in France irrespective of the nationality o f both the offender 
and the victim. By contrast, I have argued that individuals in France lack an interest in
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the French criminal rules being in force in, for example, Canada that is sufficientiy 
important to be protected by a right. Nor do individuals in Canada have an interest in 
the French criminal laws being in force in Canada that would warrant conferring on 
France the power to punish O.3 Ultimately this is because the French criminal laws 
cannot provide individuals in Canada with the sense of dignity and security they can 
provide individuals at home. Rather, individuals in Canada have an interest in Canada’s 
criminal rules being in force there. It is this fact that would contribute to their sense of 
dignity and security. For these purposes I have suggested it is immaterial whether either 
or both the offender (O) or the victim (V) happen to be French nationals.
This implies a somewhat frontal attack on two reasonably well established rules on 
extraterritorial jurisdiction provided for under international law: the nationality and 
passive personality principles. In order to make my stance more plausible I have argued 
that most of the arguments on which these principles are based either beg the 
fundamental question they are meant to answer, or end up advocating much broader 
rules of extraterritorial jurisdiction than they admit to.
I have argued, by constrast, that states hold a power to punish offences committed 
extraterritorially when they affect their sovereignty, security or important governmental 
functions. Unlike with the nationality or passive personality principles, in this case it is 
the interest of individuals in PS in its prohibition against, for instance, counterfeiting of 
currency being in force extraterritorially that explains this extraterritorial scope. This, 
however, does not fully account for allocating this power to PS. In order to confer 
upon PS the power to punish O extraterritorially, PS not only needs to justify holding 
this power to O, but also to individuals in TS. In other words, I have argued that the 
principle of sovereignty normatively entails that individuals in TS have a collective 
interest in TS being a self-governed entity that is sufficiently important to warrant 
conferring upon TS a prima facie immunity against extraterritorial bodies dictating 
criminal rules binding on its territory. Yet I also recogni2ed that this immunity is not
3 In fact, I have argued that the opposite is true. They have an interest in France’s criminal law not being 
in force in Canada that is sufficiendy important to warrant conferring upon individuals in Canada a prima 
facie immunity.
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absolute. It is limited, inter alia, by the interests of individuals abroad. Moreover, the 
interest of individuals in TS in an extraterritorial authority (PS) not dictating criminal 
rules prohibiting certain acts against its own (PS’s) sovereignty, security or important 
governmental functions committed in TS does not outweigh, in particular, the 
collective interest of individuals in PS in such a rule being in force extraterritorially. 
This means that even if TS generally holds an immunity against extraterritorial bodies 
prosecuting offences committed on its territory, this immunity would not normally 
preclude an extraterritorial state acting on the basis of the principle of protection.
A further crucial distinction is in order. I have argued that this restrictive 
framework of extraterritorial jurisdiction applies only to domestic crimes such as 
murder, rape, robbery, fraud, etc. I have argued, by contrast, that some crimes, namely 
international ones, should be subject to broader jurisdictional rules. This is because 
when an international crime such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, etc. 
is perpetrated on TS, it must necessarily be the case that TS is either responsible for it, 
is encouraging or supporting the perpetrators, or can simply do nothing about it. As a 
result of this, the relevant international criminal law cannot really be in force in the 
territory of TS unless at least some extraterritorial authority holds a concurrent power 
to punish O. Assuming that individuals in TS have a fundamental interest in these 
prohibitions being in force, it is their interest that warrants conferring upon PS the 
power to punish O.
I have also argued that TS’s prima facie immunity against PS punishing O 
extraterritorially must be addressed by the explanation o f the jurisdictional rules 
applicable to international crimes. This allows me to introduce an important distinction. 
It is not my claim that the commission of any kind of offence on a widespread or 
systematic basis warrants conferring upon PS the power to punish O for a crime on TS; 
only the commission of particularly heinous or serious type of crime would. It therefore 
follows that the interest o f individuals in TS in the rule against widespread bicycle theft 
being in force on TS might not suffice to override TS’s immunity, but their interest in 
the rule against widespread torture would. This is an important qualification because it
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accounts for one of the most extended normative features usually associated with 
international crimes (their moral heinousness), and it allows the framework I advocate 
to specify exactly what normative work it does.
Admittedly, this is not yet an argument for universal jurisdiction; at least, not 
explicidy. Thus, in Chapter 4 I submitted that the interest of individuals in TS by itself, 
could suffice to warrant conferring upon every state the power to punish international 
crimes committed on its territory. There is no conceptual problem with conferring 
upon A a right on the basis o f an interest exclusively held by B. Yet I argued that 
universal jurisdiction is also advocated on the basis o f the interests o f individuals in 
TS2, TS3, etc., namely, other states where these crimes are being perpetrated, or have 
been perpetrated recendy; and I have argued that certain individuals in other states (PS, 
PS1, etc.), like refugees or members of relevant minorities in a country like Switzerland, 
might also have an interest in these rules being in force, as they would also contribute 
to their sense of dignity and security. The collective interest of all these individuals in 
the rules against widespread or systematic torture, war crimes, genocide, etc. being in 
force explains, or so I have suggested, the fact that every state holds the power to punish 
O for an international crime irrespective of where the crime was committed, or the 
nationality of both offenders and victims.
I have also argued that this joint interest would warrant conferring upon the 
International Criminal Court the same broad jurisdictional competence. The ICC is a 
treaty-body created by a number of states; it is not a global criminal court. Accordingly, 
the scope of its jurisdiction is usually explained by recourse to the powers that its state 
parties have delegated upon it. I have argued that as a matter o f normative argument 
this delegation framework does no justificatory work whatsoever. The scope of the 
ICC’s power to punish O rests directly on the interest of the relevant individuals. And 
just as these individuals (those in TS, TS2, TS3, PS, PS2, etc.) have a joint interest in 
these rules being in force that is sufficiently important to confer upon every state the 
power to punish O, this interest also warrants conferring upon the ICC a power to 
punish O that is universal in scope. Thus, I have argued that the jurisdictional regime
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currently enjoyed by the ICC, which confers upon it universal jurisdiction only if the 
case is referred to the Prosecutor by the U.N. Security Council is unduly restricted from 
a normative point o f view.
Finally, this framework provides for a third type of criminal provision with 
different and case-specific jurisdictional rules. These are internationalized or trans­
national criminal laws. I have argued that states can authorize extraterritorial bodies to 
punish O for an offence she committed on their territory. In other words, the interest 
that justifies TS holding the power to punish O also warrants conferring upon TS the 
power to reach an agreement with PS so that PS can enforce a particular criminal 
provision in force in TS. This, again, is explained by referenced to the interests of 
individuals in TS, and it still means that PS lacks, itself, the power to punish O. I have 
recognized that it would be particularly sensible to reach this kind of agreement in 
matters such as organized crime, certain environmental crimes, etc. But we need to be 
careful in the kind of inferences we draw from this proposition. This means, that states 
can ‘regionalize’ certain criminal provisions, and allow each other to exercise 
jurisdiction for crimes committed on their respective territories or against their 
respective security, sovereignty or important governmental functions. However, this 
only means that states have a prudential reason to authorize extraterritorial bodies to 
punish O for this type o f crime; but this is not the same as saying that these 
extraterritorial bodies (e.g., PS) themselves have the power to punish O. This claim 
both makes my overall position more flexible and largely accounts for internationalized 
or trans-national approaches to the criminal law in certain areas.
With this I close this summarized exposition of the general account of 
extraterritorial punishment advocated in this thesis. I submit that this account has some 
important advantages over other competing arguments, and it is worth highlighting a 
few salient ones. First, it can convincingly explain why states hold the power to punish 
every single offence committed on their territory irrespective o f the nationality of O 
and V. I have argued that accounts such as D uffs influential communitarian theory of 
punishment faces significant difficulties on this account. Secondly, it can readily
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distinguish domestic from international crimes, at least with respect to the jurisdictional 
rules that apply to each of them. This constitutes an important advantage over other 
retributivist, consequentialist or mixed theories available in the literature. These, I have 
argued, mosdy collapse this distinction and advocate states holding universal 
jurisdiction for both of them. Finally, this account of the morality of extraterritorial 
punishment provides a systematic normative argument that makes sense of all the 
relevant instances of extraterritorial jurisdiction. With this lies an important advantage 
over most philosophical or normative work done in this area of international law, 
which standardly rests on ad hoc arguments not easily transferable to other instances of 
extraterritoriality. I submit that the analytical framework I have put forward brings a 
significant amount of clarity, insight and conceptual rigour to an often messy and 
largely under-theorized debate.
2. Avenues for future research
In this thesis I have addressed the core principles o f international law that purportedly 
regulate the scope of states’ and other tribunals’ jurisdiction, namely, the principles of 
territoriality, nationality, passive personality, protection and universality. I have also 
explained how different principles apply to the cases o f domestic and international 
crimes. However, I have only been able to address what I have described as “standard 
cases”. I have neither really tackled the issue of when a particular crime can be said to 
be perpetrated on the territory of TS nor examined other less central, though by no 
means less philosophically challenging instances o f extraterritoriality. This, I suggest, is 
not really a weakness of this project, but rather points to some interesting paths for 
future research.
In the context of the rules o f international law governing the distribution of 
criminal jurisdiction for domestic offences, for instance, it is worth trying to provide a 
more detailed examination of the contours o f the principle of territoriality. In 
particular, I suggest it is worth examining the moral credentials of the controversial 
‘effects doctrine’ by which a state can exercise jurisdiction over O “for conduct outside
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its borders that has consequences within its borders which the states reprehends”.4 
Similarly, I suggest it is worth looking at the rationale behind states’ jurisdiction on 
vessels and aircrafts flying their flag and within their embassies abroad.5 These are 
highly symbolic instances of extraterritoriality which further illustrate how entrenched 
this feature is in domestic criminal law systems and how problematic it is for any 
account o f the philosophical foundations of the criminal law.
With regards to extraterritoriality in the context of international criminal law, there 
are two essential developments which might be o f interest. First, I suggest it is worth 
expanding the theoretical understanding of international crimes and compare the 
analysis I provided of terrorism with piracy or aggression. Secondly, I suspect it would 
be of interest to explore in some detail the relationship between the justification I am 
advocating for the power to punish and other values, such as peace and reconciliation, 
but also economic and social development. For that purpose, I believe greater 
interaction with the paradigm of restorative justice, the practice of truth and 
reconciliation commissions and the normative constraints of transitional justice theory 
are warranted.
Finally, and from a different standpoint, there are other instances o f ‘quasi’ 
territoriality that it would be worth examining in some detail. Mainly, I am referring 
here to the case o f occupying forces and transitional administration regimes and their 
holding the power to punish O both for domestic and international crimes. To what 
extent, if at all, these foreign, albeit territorial institutions should hold the power to 
punish O for an offence committed on the occupied or administered territory is a 
question of momentous significance in situations such as post-war Iraq. To conclude, 
this thesis provides a fully developed philosophical argument for extraterritorial 
punishment, a contribution much needed in this area o f the law; however, it cannot and
4 US v Aluminium Corp of America, at 443. See also Vaughan Lowe, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction : A n  
Annotated Collection of Legal Materials (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1983) and Hirst, Jurisdiction and the 
Am bit of the Criminal Law, 47-48.
5 Hirst, Jurisdiction and the Am bit of the Criminal Law.
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does not claim to exhaust the normative problems raised by this increasingly important 
aspect of the criminal law.
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